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Abstract
This dissertation explores the evolution of Soviet public culture during the decade of
destalinisation that followed the great break of 1953. It was a period both of intense
political change, as the party sought to create new kinds of legitimacy post-Stalin, and
of major social upheaval as millions of prisoners returned from the Gulag to the
Soviet mainland. Destalinisation is examined here as a dialogue between three actors:
the state, the Soviet public, and the returning masses once regarded as society's
outcasts.
Recasting the notion of the 'enemy' was central to this re-conceptualisation of public
culture. The enemy had long held a powerful place in the Soviet political imagination.
In revolutionary cosmogony, the world was locked in a battle between socialism and
capitalism in which good would finally triumph yielding a communist paradise on
earth. Where loathing of the enemy had prevailed under Stalin, his successors sought
to create a more moderate culture, claiming victory was near and the advent of
communism imminent. After 1953, the vilification of political opponents waned, calls
for vigilance lessened, and the rabid invective cultivated by the Stalinist press began
to subside. The binary division of the Soviet realm into two 'zones' - one for Soviet
citizens, a second for its demonic outcasts - was eroded.
The thesis explores the complex nature of these changes. It examines the contribution
of Gulag returnees who sought to recreate themselves as decent Soviet citizens, but
who brought with them the culture of this segregated, other world. It also studies the
reactions of a broader public, whose interpretation of both political and social change
often reflected the ongoing sway of the Manichean beliefs cultivated by Stalinist
culture.
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Introduction
Show no mercy to these enemies of the people,
enemies of socialism, enemies of the workers. Death
to the rich and to the bourgeois intelligentsia who
sponge off them, death to thieves, parasites and
hooligans.
—V. L Lenin, 'How to Organise Competition', 19171
The death of losif Stalin stands as one of the great breaks in Russian history. For an
earlier generation of historians who saw him as the epitome of evil and mastermind of
the terror, the year 1953 was a moment of 'fresh air' for a stifled Soviet people? Even
if we reject totalitarian models of Soviet history, the death of the nation's leader
remains a crucial landmark. In the complex of myths, rituals, and practices that
historians see shaping Soviet culture in the 1930s and 1940s, the magical persona of
'Stalin' was central. The cult of the leader was an integral part of Soviet public
culture, and his demise inescapably provoked change. The nature of such change,
however, is as yet uncharted. Building on recent trends in the historiography of the
Stalinist period, this work explores how the political culture and belief systems
created under Stalin were to develop in the decade following his death.
'V. L Lenin, 'Kak organizovat' sorevnovanie', Folnoe sobranie sochinenil, 55 vols (Moscow:
Gosudarstvenoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi hteratury, 1962), XXXV, pp. 195-205 (p. 201).
2 lmages of a nation gasping for fresh air are comnn place in the secondary literature. See for
example, Merle Fainsod, Khrushchev's Russia. L Internal Developments and Prospects. 11. Foreign
Policy, Directions and Problems (Melbourne: The Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1963),
2Many scholars stress the parlous state of the nation Stalin bequeathed to his heirs. It is
argued that agricultural decline, consumer shortages, and the repressive nature of the
political system all point to a nation on the brink of crisis. In a disparate range of
sources we find depictions of Stalinist society as discontented and desperate, a
populace whose anger was only barely contained by l953. A very different picture is
offered by Jeffrey Brooks in his recent work on Soviet public culture under Lenin and
Stalin. In Thank You, Comrade Stalin!, he traces the state's monopoly of the media,
the recasting of politics as a magical and ritualistic 'performance', and the powerful
way this new culture promoted Soviet life as 'unique and exceptional'. Without
denying that some reform was necessary, he argues that the main task of Stalin's heirs
was to 'maintain the system' that their predecessors had created. 4 Following Brooks, I
argue that the 1953 watershed is important because Stalin's persona - as an
omnipresent, fantastical, prophetic authority - was an absolutely fundamental element
in Soviet culture. His disappearance forced the regime to look for new legitimating
strategies.
p. 240, Martin McCauley (ed), Khrushchev and Khrushchevism (Basingstoke, Hançshire: Macnuifrmn,
1987), p. 3.
3 In the early 1960s, Merle Fainsod wrote of the public's 'aspirations' which 'Stalin bad suppressed and
which his successors could Dot ignore'. In 1992, the labour historian Donald Filtzer began his account
of destailnisation with the proclaniatioit 'when Stalin died in March 1953, he left behind a country in a
deep state of crisis. No sphere of the economy, politics or society was immune.' Vladimir Naumov
asserts that 'in 1953 Soviet society found itself on the eve of a social explosion', while Elena Zubkova,
the leading Russian historian of the post-war period, clams that the death of the leader merely
launched a period of reform that would have been imposed on the Soviet leadership sooner or later by a
tide of dissatisfaction that had been climbing steadily from the end of WWIL Fainsod, Khrushchev's
Russia, p. 234; Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of The Modern
System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953-64 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.1;
Vladimir Naumov, 'Repression and Rehabilitation', in Nikita Khrushchev, ad. by William Taubinan,
Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 85-112
(p. 102); Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions and DiNappointments, 1945-1957,
trans by Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 148-153.
4 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War
(Prmceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. xiii-xx, 233.
The legitimacy garnered by Stalin's cult did not derive from some kind of primordial
Russian longing for another 'tsar' . Emerging from the ideology of a self-consciously
Marxist revolution, the images and practices of the cult held together a complex and
unique system of beliefs. In the revolutionary myth, the Soviet nation was set on a
course that would lead it through struggle and hardship, through battles with many
inveterate enemies towards the light of communism. Within this hostile environment,
Stalin functioned both as revolutionary visionary and the nation's great defender.
With the omniscience of a god, his constant vigilance could instinctively detect the
covert enemy, thereby protecting the Soviet people from deadly threats. Idolisation of
Stalin thus worked within a revolutionary culture based on a series of conflicts:
between socialism and capitalism, the new and the old, light and darkness. Stalin was
the vanguard hero in the nation's deadly struggle against a wretched cast of enemies
who sought to drag the nation back into the mire of the old.6
Manichean beliefs were thus an integral part of the 'performative' culture established
under Stalin.7 On a collective level, the Soviet people were audience to political
rituals where evil was symbolically cast out. Reading newspapers, attending show
trials, or glancing at posters they were participants in the theatrical castigation of
In 1966 James Billington wrote that Stalinist Russia 'fell back on the most primitive aspect of the
original tsarist mystique'. James G. Bilhington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretative Histoiy of
Russian Culture (New Yodc Alfred A Knopf, 1966), pp. 538-9.
'For an example of the iconic role Stalin played in the struggle against enemies, see the front page of
Pravda on 25 February 1930, where an illustration by Dciii depicted Stalin expelling 'a wrecker, a
nepman, and a kulak' through his pipe. Brooks, Thank You, fig. 6.2.
7 Brooks describes how Stalin and others 'employed rituals of the theatre to draw citizens into public
displays of support [...] Journalists created a context in which Stalin could display himself and the new
order he claimed to have created, an omnipresent magic theatre in which all active participants in
Soviet public life acquired ancillary roles.' Brooks views this 'perfonnative culture' as an alternative to
the European socialist tradition where public policy appealed to reason and common sense. Party
leaders instead 'demanded belief and respect for authority'. Brooks, Thank You, p. xvi.
4enemies.8
 On a personal level, the individual was urged to shape himself as a 'new
man' of the future, and to keep vigilant guard against any kind of enemy. 9 Such
binary divisions were even imposed on the nation's geography, with the construction
of two 'zones' - the big zone for free society, the little one for its outcasts.'° The
existence of enemies was a crucial part of the regime's authority because it explained
the ongoing difficulties of daily life within the Soviet Union, united the people in a
heroic struggle to uncover and defeat its foes, and promised a better future once the
battle was won.
With Stalin dead, these rituals began to falter, and a political culture based on his
'prophetic authority' was over." Without him, moreover, it was no longer safe to see
enemies behind every corner. If the nation's great protector could no longer provide
security, the presence of the foe did not make the nation rally together, but led to
increasing fear and uncertainty. Recasting the notion of the enemy was thus central to
the re-conceptualisation of public culture that took place in the 1950s. The rituals of
high politics became more moderate, with defeated opponents increasingly
condemned for committing mistakes and errors rather than being unmasked as
'On the role of the press see Brooks, Thank You; on visual propaganda see Victoria Bound,
Iconography ofPower: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin, 2nd edn (Berkeley, Calif:
University of California Press 1999); on popular participation at mock show trials see Julie A.
Cassiday, The Enemy on Trial: Eary Soviet Cow?.c on Stage and Screen (DeKalb, ilL: Northern
Illinois University Press, 2000); on peasant participation in real show trials, see Sheila F1tzpa1nc1
'How the Mice Bury the Cat Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces', Russian
Review, 52 (1993), 299-320.
'In his analysis of a Soviet diary of the 1930s, Jochen Heilbeck traces one man's attempt to reshion
himself as a true Soviet citizen. Constantly striving towards his ideal of the new Soviet man, the diarist
saw his life as an ongoing 'struggle'. Helibeck writes: 'In Podlubnyi's life, the struggle took place on
several "fronts", to use his terminology in the first place, he struggled with himself to "overcome" the
reactionary part within, but he also struggled against "enemies" at work bent on denouncing him as a
wrecker.' See Jochen Heilbeck, 'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 193 1-
9', in Stalinism: New Thrections, ed. by Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledg; 2000), pp. 77-116 (p.
101).
'°Nanci Adler, 'Life in the "Big Zone": The Fate of Returnees in the Aftermath of the Stalinist
Repression', Europe-Asia Studies, 51(1999), 5-19.
5enemies. The rabid invective of the Stalinist press subsided. The territorial division
into two 'zones' was eroded, as millions of prisoners made their way home. Instead of
denouncing enemies, Soviet citizens were to aid one another in becoming good
communists.
Throughout his rule, Nikita Khrushchev sought to reinvigorate the eschatological
myth and to reassure his audience that the Soviet nation was advancing rapidly
towards their shining future, yet he no longer exhorted the Soviet population to
engage in a continual quest to unmask hidden enemies. Claiming that the nation was
now progressing to the next stage on the revolutionary journey, he rejected Stalin's
thesis that the nearer the nation came to communism the more deadly the enemy
became. In his revised eschatology, fear of covert foes had been exaggerated. Rather
than demanding constant vigilance, this next stage required Soviet people to busy
themselves with constructing communism and raising new men of the future.
Thus it is not only in the retrospective gaze of the historian that 1953 emerges as a
defining moment, but deep within the rhetoric of the time. However, the beliefs
nurtured under the aegis of Sta]inist culture did not simply disappear, but continued to
condition public responses. Investigating the changing notions of the 'enemy', I study
the process of destalinisation as a negotiation between the political elite and the
public, in which new myths and beliefs were developed and old ones persisted. In this
process the rhetorical strategies of each were appropriated, contested, and often
transformed.
"Brooks, Thank You, p.239
6HistorlcIsin2 the 'Enemy'
The 'enemy' began to occupy an important place in the Russian political imagination
even before 1917. Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii have argued that demonic
imagery developed within the traditions of the revolutionary underground,
maintaining that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both radical
subcultures and official Tsarist culture elaborated a 'demonic lexicon' to attack and
denigrate one another.' 2 Foreshadowing the Stalinist repertoire, pre-revolutionary
activists labelled their tsarist and capitalist adversaries the 'dark forces', predators,
vennin, parasites, spiders, snakes, and 'gangs of cruel wild beasts'. With the outbreak
of WWI they could also accuse them of espionage and treachery. In a more subtle
study, Daniel Beer has traced the development of 'languages of illness and
contagion', showing that Bolshevik mentalities were embedded in discourses
developing in late Imperial Russia whereby dissenting opinions were already held to
be the source of a highly threatening and debilitating contamination.' 3
 With a choice
of zoological, scientific, medical, and epidemiological metaphors, the revolutionaries
of 1917 were already armed with powerful rhetorical weapons with which to assail
their chosen targets.
As Lynn Hunt has observed, revolutionary rhetoric and rituals can create a 'new
community'.'4 One way that a new consensus can be articulated is by reviling the
12 Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Ruasian Revolution: The Language and
SrboLc of 1917 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 153-7.
'Daniel Beer, "The Hygiene of Souls": Languages of illness and Contagion in Late Imperial and
Early Soviet Russia' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Univernty of Cambridge, 2001).
'4 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, Calif: University of
California Press, 1984), p. 27.
7imagined 'other'.' 5 Donald Raleigh has argued that the initial stages of the civil war
formed a crucial moment, when the Bolshevik press began to experiment with many
of the rhetorical devices that would later become standard features of the Soviet press.
Already by 1918, he suggests, newspaper language was studded with binary images
representing the struggle between the old and the new. Uncertain of their own
political identity, the Bolsheviks found 'meaning - and unity - in the inunediate
appearance of an opposition'.'6
Faced with the challenge of creating a 'new community', the fledgling state employed
propaganda techniques to vilify those who ostensibly sought to overturn the
revolution. Visual images were highly important in a society with widespread
illiteracy. Among the first targets were the exploiting classes of the old order. Priests,
kulaks, and capitalists were soon finnly established in the Bolshevik rhetorical
lexicon; the burzhui in his top hat and tails and the corrupt pop, paunch bulging out
from his cassock, became familiar figures. 17 ideological opponents represented
another important category, and the Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists,
White Army generals, Kadets, as well as individuals such as Viktor Chemov, Anton
Denikin, Nikolai ludenich, Aleksandr Kerenskii, frequently starred as principal villain
in Bolshevik propaganda of the civil war era)8
' This notion of the 'imagined other' is borrowed from Benedict Anderson's theory of 'imagined
communities'. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origm and Spread of
Nationahsm (London: Verso, 1991).
'6 DId I. Raleigh, 'Languages of Power How the Saratov Bolsheviks Imagined their Enemies',
Slavic Review, 57(1998), 320-49 (p. 321).
17 Bonndll, Iconography, pp. 188-189, fig. 5.1.
"Bonnell, Iconogrophy, p. 191.
8In addition to posters, songs, and skits, the early Bolshevik regime also staged mock
show trials, in which Soviet citizens were not only observers, but also active
participants in 'instances of revolutionary carnival'. One of the most famous of these
mass spectacles was the 1920 mock trial of Baron Vrangel, the civil war enemy. Ten
thousand soldiers took part in the trial with such enthusiasm, that the actor playing the
title role, actually 'feared physical harm at the hands of the enraged audience'.'9
Admission to the new community was not only dependent upon holding correct
polifical ideas and possessing the right class heritage. Aspiring to radical social
transformation, the Bolsheviks also deployed images of the enemy to vilify the anti-
social, deviant, dissolute, and criminal. Increasingly, the Soviet regime employed the
same rhetorical strategies used against political opponents to demonstrate that by
committing acts detrimental to the social good, individuals became enemies of Soviet
power.2° By the end of the first decade of Soviet power, bellicose propaganda
regularly listed the thief, the embezzler, the drunk, and the spendthrift alongside the
wrecker, the kulak, the landowner, and the priest.2 ' Mock show trials were also used
to this end. The Trial of Stepan Korolev (as a Result of Drunkenness), for example,
showed the extensive damage done by two 'types': ñrst, Korolev, who stood accused
"Cassiday, The Enemy on Trial, pp. 51-58.
Viewing criminals as society's 'enemies' had long-established revolutionary roots. In his Social
Conh-act, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that 'every malefactor, by attacking the social rights, becomes
by his crimes a rebel and a traitor to his cmtry by violating its laws he ceases to be a member of it;
he makes war upon it [
... J in putting the guilty to death we slay not so much the citizen as the enemy.'
Cited in Michel Foucault; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan
Harmondsworth, Middlesex Penguin, 1977), p. 90.
'One poster from 1929 showed a giant red hand grabbing the hand of a man caught in the act of
stealmg, underneath the slogan 'The enemy is sneaking in - chase him away!' The bottom frame of the
poster featured two rats - a well-established dehinnanising technique - and a list of 'our major
enemies', which included the wrecker and kulak, the bureaucrat and procrastinator, the thief and
embexzler, the drunkard and the thrifUess person. In the same year, the well-known artist, Deni
designed a poster showing 'internal' and 'external' enemies: on the left, the landowner, kulak,
drunkard, and prieSt On the right; the foreign journalist, capitalist, Menshevik, and White Army officer.
Bonnell, iconography, pp. 208-210.
9of systematic drunkenness, theft of factory goods and materials, wife-battery, assault,
and the attempted murder of a policeman; second, Pavienko, the bootlegger and bar-
owner, charged with drawing Korolev into such a life of drunken debauchery. While
the audience was allowed some sympathy for Korolev, Pavienko was labelled a
'spider that drinks in the worker's body and sucks his blood'. 22 As someone who
encouraged inappropriate behaviour amongst the weak, Pavienko was shown to be a
dangerous enemy - a 'spider' and 'blood-sucker'.
The Soviet media thus used its maturing demonic lexicon to vilily perpetrators of
anti-Soviet behaviour, as well as ideological or class foes. According to Daniel Beer,
all three types of enemy —'social deviants of all shades, their class enemies and
political opponents' - were imagined in the same terms, all three regarded equally as
dangerous sources of degeneration and corruption.23
Curin2 Isolatin!g Exterminatin2
From the outset of the revolution the regime had to decide on the fate of its enemies.
In 1917, Lenin seemed to encourage a great variety of approaches, arguing that
thousands of different forms of punishment should be elaborated by workers
themselves:
In one place they might put ten rich people, a dozen thieves and half a
dozen shirkers in prison [...] In another they might makes him clean the
loos (sortfry]. In a third they might give those leaving solitary
confinement yellow cards so that the people [narod] can keep a close eye
on these hannful individuals [liuduj until they have been corrected. In a
fourth they would shoot one in ten found guilty of parasitism
Cassiday, The Enemy on Trial, pp. 60-62.
Beer, 'The Hygiene of Souls', p. 99.
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[tuneiadstvoj. In a fifth, they might think up a combination of measures;
by giving a suspended sentence, for example, they might correct the
redeemable elements amongst the rich, the bourgeois intelligentsia,
thieves, and hooligans.2'
Lenin envisaged a variety of fates for the enemy, including incarceration, death,
punishment, surveillance, and correction through labour. His initial impulse was to
allow the workers to elaborate their own means to deal with enemies.
The problem continued to plague the party, and increasingly worker control over the
act of punishing and correcting waned. The party leaders wrestled with difficult
questions. Could a person identified as an 'enemy' be saved? Could enemies one day
be readmitted to the revolutionary political community? Did all foes require the same
treatment?
Analysing how the party imagined the 'opposition', Igal Halfin has identified two
approaches. While the party believed that some heretics were 'politically immature',
'ideologically ignorant', and could be made to 'see the true light of communist truth
and return to the fold', it also acknowledged the existence of 'deliberate adversaries'
and the 'irredeemably evil' who could never be saved.25 The party invested huge
energies in diagnosing the nature of an individual's thought-crimes, before deciding
on a course of action: correction or purging. Drawing on the party's own metaphors of
contagion, Daniel Beer makes an additional distinction, noting that some could be
cured or rehabilitated, but only in a place of isolation. 26 After assessing the likelihood
24 Lenin, 'Ku organizovat' sorevnovanie', p. 204.
Igal Halfin, 'The Demonization of the Opposifion Stalinist Memory and the "Communist Archive"
at Leningrad Communist University', Kritika, 2(2001), 45-80.
Beer, 'The Hygiene of Souls', p. 99.
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of returning an individual to health, the party would thus decide on one of three
outcomes: cure, isolation, or elimination.
During the 1920s, the emphasis was on curing, and when Lenin defeated the Workers'
Opposition he did not call for their destruction, but for 'a carefully individualised
approach, a sort of healing treatment'. 27 In keeping with the Marxist regard for work,
labour was invariably the key to such rehabilitation. For those found guilty of many
offences the remedy was to make them toil within the community, and during the first
years of NEP 80 per cent of persons convicted in cowl received a sentence of
compulsory work, which was to be organised by the local authorities. Significantly,
deviating party members were treated in the same way, and were often dismissed
from their more senior office positions to take jobs back on the factory bench.
Gradually, greater stress was placed on treating malefactors in isolation from the rest
of society, however. Katerina Clark identifies a transitional period between 1931 and
late 1935 in which a combination of rehabilitation and isolation prevailed. Under
Maksini Gor'kii's tutelage, there appeared several accounts of how social aliens were
despatched to bard labour within the camp system, given intensive re-education,
thereby 'reforged' as decent citizens. 29 Both class enemies and the socially dangerous
could be effectively treated this way, it was alleged. Belomor, the literary work edited
by Gor'kii, contained the bold claim that 'As a result of the twenty months of work,
the country has acquired several thousand skilled builders who having gone Through a
27 Halfin, 'The Dernonization of the Opposition', p. 49.
Peter H. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin (Canthridge: Canibndge University Press,
1996), p. 52.
Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History As Ritual, 3rd edn (Bloomington, md.: Indiana University
Press, 2000), pp. 118-9
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school of severe discipline, have cured themselves of the putrefactive poison of the
petty bourgeoisie.' 3° For young deviants, the colony allowed similar opportunities for
re-education through labour. Journey to Life (Putevka v Zhizn ), a 1931 film based on
the writings of the renowned pedagogue Anton Makarenko, told the story of a group
of violent street kids who were taken to a remote commune, taught a profession, and
transformed into happy and honourable young workers. 3 ' Accounts of reclaiming
criminals were common in the Soviet press. For instance, in 1935 Izvestiia proudly
recounted the good work of Matvei Pogrebinski, director of a NKVD labour
commune, who devoted his life to converting criminals into loyal members of the
Soviet community.32
Exile, though less brutal, was understood to have a similar function. In 1932, Stepan
Podlubnyi, the introspective protagonist of Jochen Heilbeck's innovative work,
recorded his own frustration with his father, who returned to Moscow upon
completion of his three-year term of exile, still 'old', 'backward', and 'useless' -
'despite the opportunity to remake himself in exile'. In the worldview of this aspiring
Soviet citizen, exile from the Soviet capital allowed the former class enemy a valuable
occasion to be transfonned. Podlubnyi was much happier with his mother who had
're-educated herself a little in the course of her "emigration"'.33
 By temporarily
excising them from the social body, exile or incarceration allowed outcasts to turn
themselves into active and productive members of working society. Although this
3°Cited in Beer, 'The Hygiene of Souls', p. 157. See Belomor: An Account of the Construction of the
New Canal between the White Sea and the Baltic Sea, eL by Maksim Gor'kii, L Auerbacb, and S. G.
Ferin, frans. by Amabel Williams-Ellis (Londoit John Lane, 1935).
31 Journey to Life (Putevka v Zhizn). Dir. Nikolai Ekk. Mezhrabprom. 1931.
32 5ee Sheila Fitzpathck Everyday StalinLcm. Ordinary Lfe in Extraordznasy Tunes: Soviet Ru2sia in
the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 78.
33 fiellbeck, 'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul', pp. 90-91.
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approach divided the Soviet populace into two opposing camps one socialist,
ordered, educated, healthy, and human; the other animal, criminal, archaic, sick, and
degenerate - it allowed an individual to make the return journey, to come back from
the negative axis to the positive. TM For marginals such as Podlubnyi and his mother, it
gave hope that though cast out once, they could eventually be fully readmitted.
Increasingly, however, the construct of the irredeemable and incurable 'enemy' seems
to have prevailed. Rather than seeking to transform offenders, the growing emphasis
was on eliminating them. Even those who had been rehabilitated were now re-
imprisoned, exiled or shot, as if the regime could not quite believe in its own capacity
to correct its adversaries. 35 While the Stalin Constitution seemed to claim that class
struggle was over, Stalin's report to a Central Committee plenum on 3 March 1937
made a fundamental amendment. 36 In this revision of revolutionary narrative, the
enemy only became more belligerent and more cunning as the Soviet people advanced
towards the light of communism. Stalin launched a battle against the 'rotten theory'
that 'with every advance forwards, the class struggle will be extinguished, that as we
are successful, the class enemy will become more and more tame'. His prognosis was
rather more frightening: 'The further we advance and the more success we have, the
more embittered the defeated remains of the exploiting class become, the more
treacherous their attack on us will be, the more dirty tricks they will play against the
Soviet state, and the more reckless the weapons they will use, as the last attempt of
Greg Carleton, 'Genre in Socialist Realism', Slavic Review, 53(1994), 992-1009 (p. 1002).
"On the re-arrest of those formerly sentenced as kn1aki, Amir Werner writes: 'It seemed no accident
that the first salvo of the bursting Terror was directed at those who bad already been punished and
pardoned..' Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the BoLshevik
Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 145-6.
" Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: StalinLsm as a Civilization (Berkeley, Calif: University of
California Press, 1995), p. 281.
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the doomed'. 37
 In this cornerstone speech, Stalin argued that if once Trotskyism had
been a political current withm the working class - albeit an erroneous one - the
Trotskyists had now become an 'unprincipled and unethical band of wreckers,
saboteurs, spies, killers, a band of inveterate enemies of the working class, employed
by foreign intelligence services'. 38 Stalin's speech, reproduced in Pravda on 29
March 1937, was riddled with invective and perfectly articulated emerging
'newspeak'.39 It thus had three important functions: first, it offered a new
interpretation of the revolutionary course in which the threat of enemy action was set
to remain an important feature of Soviet culture; second, it suggested opponents were
guilty not of correctable 'error', but unadulterated enmity; third, it provided a model
example of the accusatory mode in which political life was now to be conducted.
This important break had its well-known and tragic results. In the purges of 193 6-8
those defined as enemies were radically eliminated from Soviet society, whether by
killing them or condemning them indefinitely to hard labour in the Gulag.4° Not only
members of the political and social elites were culled, but also marginals whose
37 L V. Stalin, '0 nedostatkakh partiinoi raboty i merakh Iikvidatsü trotskistklkh i inykh dvurushnikov:
Dokiad na plenume TsK VKP(b) 3 March 1937 g.', in I. V. Stalin: Sochineaüa, 3 vols, ed. by Robert
H. McNeal (Stanford, CaliL: Hoover Institution Foreign Language Publications, 1967), 1, pp. 189-224
(p. 213). Aniir Weiner glosses Stalin's speech in the following way. 'After several decades of
socialism, accompanied by contixmal purges, the fact that these human "weeds" still existed had to be
the result of their devious and ehisive nature.' Weiner later adds, 'With socialism bui1t extermination
was the only way to cope with those who had not yet redeemed themselves.' Weiner, Making Sense of
War, pp. 35, 145-6.
31 LV. Stalin, 'Onedostatkakhpartiinoiraboty',p. 198.
Dermot Filzsimons, 'Shoot the Mad Dogs!': Appellation and Distortion during the Moscow Show
Trials, 1936-8', Slovo, 13(2001), 172-187.
4°For a review of the different assessments of the terror's scale, see 3. Arch Getty, Gabor T.
Rittersporn, and Victor N. Zemikov, 'Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years: A First
Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence', The American Historical Review, 98(1993), 1017-49.
Their own archival research suggests that the number of people shot was likely to be a question of
hundreds of thousands, rather than the alleged millions (p. 1023).
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criminal or antisocial behaviour marked them as enemies of the Soviet state.4' As we
trace the imagined 'enemy' through Soviet history, the Ezhovshchina emerges as an
absolutely crucial turning point. From this juncture, the 'enemy' was to embody an
absolute evil that must either be destroyed, or at least, relegated to almost eternal
exclusion from society.42
The fundamental shift of 1936-8 set the tone for the rest of the Stalinist era. Jumping
forward to January 1953 and the unmasking of the Doctors' Plot, we find important
continuities. Fifteen years on, enemies were still harboured at the very heart of Soviet
power, vigilance still demanded from every Soviet citizen. Enemies were still targeted
with a string of abusive terms that marked them as unequivocally evil, and they were
offered no chance of rehabilitation. On 13 January 1953, Pravda labelled the doctors
'criminals, spies, warmongers, traitors, monsters, loathsome vermin, foul degenerates,
contemptible hirelings, a band of beasts in human form, members of a terrorist group,
41 Paui Hagenloh argues that the established picture of the 'Great Terror' as an attack on the political
and social elites is far from complete. 'The Terror was also the culmination of a decade-long
radicalisation of policmg practice against "recidivist" criminals, social niarginals, and all manner of
lower-class individuals who did not or could fit into the emerging Stalinist system.' Paul M. Hagenloh,
'"Socially Harmful Elements" and the Great Terror', in Stalinism: New Directions, pp. 286-308 (pp.
286-7)
Why the party ceased believing in its own capacity to save sinners, has been the subject of several
recent studies. Several historians have examined the intellectual and cultural origins of the radical
beliefs that made the terror of 1937 possible. Bonnell has drawn on Iurü Lotman and Boris Uspenskii's
explorations into Russian culture to claim that the Bolshevik's inherited a 'binary model of thinking'
that coirçelled them to view humanity duaIisticalIv. (Laura Engelstein, however, recently critkpied the
neaftiesa of the Tartu model which has 'inspired scholars to find such contrasts everywhere) Oleg
KharkFnxdin stresses the importance of Orthodox traditions. Beer looks to the importation, adoption
and zusdification of certain scientific discourses from Western Europe in the late Imperial period.
Halfin einphasises the incontestable nature of the Marxist creed, with its claim to absolute truth. Sec
BonneU, Iconography, p. 187; Iurii M. Lotruan and Boris A. Uspenskii, 'Binary Models in the
Dynamics of Russian Culture (to the End of the Eighteenth Century)', in The Semiotics ofRussian
Cultural History, ed. by Alexander D. Nakhiniovsky and Alice Stone Nakhimovsky (Ithaca1 N.Y.:
Cornell University Press 1985), pp. 30-66; Laura Engelstein, 'Culture, Culture Everywhere:
Interpretations of Modern Russia across the 1991 Divide', Kritika, 2(2001), 363-394 (pp. 392-3); Oleg
Kharklkordin, The Collective and the Individual i Russia: A Study ofPractices (Berkeley, Calif:
Univemity of California Press, 1999); Beer, 'The Hygiene of Souls'; Igal Halfin, From Dar*iiess to
Light: aass, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
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and a gang of doctor-poisoners', with clear echoes of Stalin's personal tirade against
Trotskyists within the party in l937.
Even at its most extreme, however, the drive for purification was never absolute. At
the height of the Terror, over a million of those labelled enemies were granted the
'reprieve' of the Gu1ag. The Gulag thus came to occupy an ambiguous position.
While earlier corrective-labour camps had been promoted as the chance for an
offender to be rehabilitated, this element was now vastly downplayed. Tales of
'reforging' had disappeared.45 With the redemptive nature of the Gulag now in
question, it became a place of exile for those rejected from society. Instead of
'curing', it even seemed to corrupt. By the 1930s, the camp system nurtured a
criminal network and subculture, where thieving fraternities flourished, and those
incarcerated were more likely to emerge as hardened bandits than respectable Soviet
citizens.46
With the division between the two zones far from absolute, and the waning of the
rhetoric of correction, the Gulag came to represent an additional danger to Soviet
society. Despite the long sentences, return from the Gulag was possible, and as Amir
'3 'Podlye shpiony i ubiitsy pod maskoi professorov-vrachei', Pravda, 13 January 1953, p. 1.
Getty, Rittersporn and Zemskov suggest that in the period of 1937-8, over a million people were
given custodial sentences. Getty, Ritterspom and Zemskov, 'Victims of the Soviet Penal System', p.
1023.
' Katerina Clark writes that by the mid-thirties the theme of the misfit being socialised to become an
adopted member of the great family of the state had lost currency. Clark, The Soviet Novel, p.119.
4'The Vory-v-Zakone (thieves-in-law), for example, were a fraternity who prided themselves on rigid
observance of a hermetic communal code of behaviour, and Frederico Varese has compared them with
the Sicilian mafia. David Shearer attributes the resurgence of banditry in the 1930s to the prison
system, arguing that many of gang-members were kulaks escaped from the labour colonies. Frederico
Varese, 'The Society of the Vory-v-Zakone, 1930s-1950s', Cahiers du nonde russe, 39(1998), 515-
538; David 11 Shearer, 'Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin's Russia: A Reassessment of the Great
Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression', Cahiers du monde russe, 39 (1998), 119-148.
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Weiner evocatively puts it: 'the Gulag doors kept revolving'. 47 Even a ten or twenty-
year sentence could eventually be served, or shortened by labour days or amnesty.'8
Those who offended against the Soviet people were condemned as vile enemies, yet
they were eventually readmitted to society, and no assurances were given that they
had been corrected.
The legacy to post-Stalinist culture was a problematic one. Soviet public culture had
long promoted the notion that the nation was engaged in a deadly battle against a host
of deadly enemies, who were irredeemable, dangerous, and elusive. Unable to correct
them, the Gulag became a kind of 'holding cell'. Official Stalinist culture interpreted
all kinds of unwanted behaviour as signs of a ubiquitous, yet elusive, enemy presence,
but while it had conjured up this terrifying 'other', it could claim neither to have
destroyed, nor to have reformed it.
The Cultured Self
In the historiography of the Soviet Union, the functioning of power through violence,
confinement, and terror has perhaps been overstated. Excision, whether real or
symbolic, was not the only method used to construct the revolutionary community. At
the same time as constructing the sinister figure of the 'enemy', the Bolsheviks also
created his positive counterparts - the Soviet 'new man' and 'new woman'. From the
outset of the revolution, the state devoted huge energy to fashioning Soviet heroes;
47 Weiner, Making Sense of War, p. 147.
Getty, Rittersporn and Zemskov estimate that during the period 1934-53, in any given year, 20-40%
of the inmates were released. Getty, Rittersporn and Zemskov, 'Victims of the Soviet Penal System', p.
1041.
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films, novels and newspaper stories provided inspiring examples of this new person.49
In addition, citizens were urged to work on themselves, to study and train to become
ideal citizens. Drawing on some of Michel Foucault's later insights into the
functioning of state power, scholars such as Stephen Kotkin, Vadim Volkov, and
Helibeck encourage us to explore not only the repressive nature of Bolshevik power,
but also its 'productive' modalities?°
The NEP saw the flourishing of radical projects, as revolutionary ideologues
encouraged men and women to transform themselves, to experiment with communal
living patterns, and to form new, more 'liberated' personal relationships. 5 ' With the
huge social transformations of collectivisation and industrialisation at the end of the
1920s, however, the imperative to raise the new man and woman became ever more
pressing - and the profile of this new persona slightly different. According to Moshe
Lewin and David Hoffman, the peasants who flooded into the new urban conurbations
during the first five year plan brought with them their own customs and communities,
often at odds with the image of the Soviet worker promulgated by the authoiities.52
The Soviet press frequently voiced its concerns, with reports on life in the communal
apartment, where 'gossip, domestic violence, foul language, and [...] even the most
49 Lynne Attwood and Catriona Kelly, 'Programmes for Identity The 'New Man" and the "New
Woman"', in onstructuig Russian Culture in the Age ofRevolution: 1881-1940, ed. by Catnona Kelly
and David Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 256-290.
5°Stephen Kotkin ites that 'power relations created effects - of experience, identity, resislances', and
encourages a focus on what the party and its programmes 'made possible, both intentionally and
unintentionally'. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain p. 22; Vadim Volko'r, 'The Concept of Kul'tunwst':
Notes On The Stalinist Civilizing Process', in StalinLrm: New Directions, pp. 210-230; HeiTheck,
'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul'. See also Michel Foucaull, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice
of Freedom', in The Fi,val Foucault, ed. by James Bernauer and David Ramusscn (Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1988), pp. 1-20.
51 Richard Stites, Revofraionaiy Dreams: Utopian Virion and Experimental Lfè in the Russian
Revolution (New Yo± Oxford University Press, 1989).
52 M	 Lewin, 'Society, State, and Ideology during the First Five-Year Plan', in Cultural Revolution
in Russia, 1928-1931, ed. by Sheila Fitzpatrick (Bloomington, Ind. Indiana University Press, 1984),
19
elementary grasp of hygiernc principles' were lacking. 53
 In his seminal work on the
new industrial city of Magnitogorsk however, Kotkin argued that a potential
'ruralisation' of the cities was contested all the way, as the new authorities sought to
transform these in-migrants into Soviet workers.M
In its project to transform the masses into model citizens, the Soviet authorities
increasingly turned away from some of the radical plans of the early revolutionary
period, and focused more on creating a productive, modem, urban populace. The
regime sought to change daily behaviour, including speech, manners, dress, and even
personal hygiene. Volkov has argued that in the context of social upheaval of
revolution, industrialisation, and urbanisation, the state was engaged in a 'civilising
mission'. In its ongoing struggle to recast the peasant as modern Soviet worker, the
party regarded the transmission of 'culturedness' (kul 'turnost') a key task. Relocated
to the city, the 'traditional rural mechanisms of control and customary law were losing
their grip on the former peasants, an epidemic of violent crimes, hooliganism, rape,
alcoholism, and other forms of deviance overwhelmed the urban environment in the
1930s'; the regime hoped to inculcate an innate sense of order in its citizens.55 lithe
new Soviet citizen could be taught to internalise Soviet values, he would live an
ordered, productive, healthy, and hygienic life of his own volition.56
pp. 41-77; David L Hoffman, PearantMetropolLs: Social Identities in Moscow, 1929-1941 (Ithaca,
N.Y.: ConidllUniversityPress, 1994), pp. 41-77.
'3 Attwood and Kelly, 'Progranunes for Identity', p. 266.
'4 Koktin, Magnetic Mountain.
"Volkov, 'The Concept of Ku! 'tunwst", p. 214.
'4 Volkov's view of 'culturedness' is slightly different from the one proposed by Sheila Fitzpatnck.
Fitzpatrick shows how a hierarchy of 'culturedness' reflected social status. While a peasant was simply
encouraged to wash, brush his teeth, and acquire basic literacy, she suggests, aspiring members of the
new elite were expected to speak well, show perfect manners, and deincustrate good taste in their
choice of clothing and home fumishmg. Fitzpatrick has also argued that the concept of 'culturedness'
was linked to a socialist realist conception of how life was changing in the Soviet Union. The lower
ranks were encouraged to see the nre luxurious lifestyle and domestic comfort their superiors enjoyed
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Becoming cultured was no easy task. In his study of Podlubnyi's diary, Helibeck
shows how one Soviet citizen struggled internally to recreate himself. Once labelled
and denigrated as a 'kulak', Podlubnyi was desperate to reconstruct himself as a new
Soviet man. His diary reveals the great significance he attached to the polar terms of
'culture'— by which he understood a conscientious attitude to work, political
consciousness, Soviet virtue, and urban living as opposed to 'backwardness' -
indifference to work, drunkenness, peasant ways, and criminal tendencies. Yet even
as he denigrated friends and acquaintances whom he regarded as 'backward', he
acknowledged that he was drawn to them. Though horrified by the drunken and
debauched revehy he witnessed in the neighbours' apartment, he still gained pleasure
from his visits and from the company of these 'animal-like' in-migrants from the
Kaluga countryside. While the notion of becoming 'cultured' was highly important to
Podlubnyi, he did not find it easy to conquer his own backwardness.57
Throughout the Stalinist era, the quest to transform all workers into conscious,
cultured members of the Soviet collective remained elusive. Yet there are signs that in
the late Stalinist era, some Soviet citizens cherished the importance of correct
manners and appearance, and were highly angered by public transgressions. In his
study of the stiliagi - youths who created rebellious identities through their choice of
alternative clothing, music tastes, dance-style and slang - Mark Edele suggests that
collective pressnre could be very powerful. He notes that 'what former stiliagi
not as unfair privileges, but as a way of hfe they could expect in the future. Fitzpatrick, Eveiyday
StalinLcm, pp. 79-83; Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary
Russia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 216-37. For an earlier interpretation of
'culturedness', see Vera S. Dunham, In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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remember in memoirs and interviews is fear of society, of confrontations with
"average Soviet people", not fear of what the state might do'. 58 Although the state was
highly vigorous in its clampdown on political student groups, it did not intervene in
the area of stiliagi. With members of the public so ready to intervene in issues of
behavioural conformity, the state could stand to one side.
At some future point, it was believed, Soviet citizens would be fully limbued with
communist morality, and the state would no longer be required as policeman and
prison-warden. In Foucauldian terms, citizens would have acquired the rules of law,
the ethics, and the ethos that would allow the games of power to be played with a
minimum of domination.59 According to Marxist metanarrative, indeef, the state was
expected eventually to wither away; yet the Marxist creed offered no suggestions as to
how long each stage of the revolutionary process might take. Under Stalin, at least,
the use of force remained an important part of maintaining behaviourall and
ideological conformity.
Khrushchev's Cultural Revolution
By the late l940s, party theorists were beginning to think that the socialist stage of the
revolution was nearly complete, and that within a period of twenty yeirs, a new
historical era would begin.60 Preparation for the great event only began in earnest
under Khrushchev, however. Stalin's death was a powerful marker of change, a
Heilbeck, 'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul'.
' Mark Edele, 'Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and the Life of Stiliagi, 1945-53',
JalzrbilcherJi7r Geschichte Osteumpas 50(2002), 37-61, p. 61.
' Foucault, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self'.
60 Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp. 33-4.
22
landmark on the nation's great journey towards its future, and party leaders used this
natural break in order to accelerate towards the great transition.
With Stalin gone, the prospect of a final showdown with the enemy was a disturbing
one. Stalin's successors still prescribed to the millenarian goals at the heart of the
Bolshevik revolution, still sought to transform Soviet society into a perfect and
harmonious collective; yet they shied away from further confrontation with the
'enemy'. The solution lay first in revising Stalin's formulations of 1937. In the Secret
Speech, Khrushchev contested the primacy given to 'enemies' under Stalin, directly
attacked Stalin's thesis on the intensification of class struggle, and criticised the kind
of invective generated within Stalinist culture. He claimed it was unnecessary to
'destroy' (unichtozhat') those who had stepped out against the party line, calling for a
return to the policies of correction fostered under Lenin.6'
His ideological amendments did not mean, however, that Khrushchev had abandoned
either the goal of radically transforming society or the belief that it was possible to
build communism within his lifetime. Indeed, Khrushchev did not seem to accept any
limitations on the possibility of transforming human nature or the natural world. 62
The late 1950s marked a new burst of utopian hope. There was a renewed belief in the
state's power to turn the weak-willed, or the erring, into new men and women. Rather
than using violence to achieve the purity of the social body, post-Stalin leaders
believed the path to the harmonious and productive communist era was through the
inculcation of core Soviet values in all citizens. Renewed attention to the moral
"N. S. Khrushchev, '0 kul'te lichnosti iego posledstviiakh', in A. N. Iakovlev (ed), Reabihtaciia:
Poliuicheskieproisessy 30-50 godov (Moscow: Tzdatel'stvo literatury, 1991), pp. 19-67.
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education of its citizens was the order of the day, and belief in the community's power
to correct and redeem sinners was restored.
The state displayed a growing attention to the concept of 'byt'. 63 A deluge of
pamphlets and newspaper articles aimed to teach citizens how to behave at work, to
conduct their personal lives, to dress, to arrange their living space, and to spend their
leisure time." The rhetoric of the 1950s and early 1960s established a direct link
between internalising 'morality' and building communism. In a recent article on
'taste' under Khrushchev, Susan Reid registers the growing importance of consumer
culture, and claims that the party's new intervention in 'seemingly mundane and
intimate matters' was part of a project to form 'the fully rounded, socially integrated,
and self-disciplined person', linked to the imminent advent of communism. Reid
continues: 'Having intemalised "communist morality", the future citizens of
communism would voluntarily regulate themselves, at which point the state could
wither away.' 65 Although there are certain parallels with the radical projects of the
The Virgin Lands project is one example of Khrushchev's ongoing belief that it was possible to
transform nature through human determination.
The term 'byt' translates as 'way of life' or 'everyday life'. Iurii Trifonov has explained that this
'incomprehensible word' means 'how husbands and wives get on together, and parents and children,
and close and distant relations too... And the interrelationships of friends and people at work, love,
quarrels,jealousy, envy—alithis, too, isbytThisiswhatlifeconsistsofl ... Weareallenmeshedin
byt in our own network of everyday concerns.' It also related to how people spent their leisure time,
how much alcohol they drank, what they wore, if they swore, how well they applied themselves at
school or work, and so on. With varying degrees of intensity, the Soviet government had endeavoured
to define and mould this sphere of personal relationships and daily behaviour ever since 1917. Iurii
Trifonov, Kak slovo nashe olzovetsia (Moscow: Sovclskaia Rossiia, 1985), p. 102, cited in Adele Marie
Baker, 'The Culture Factoiy Theorising the Popular in the Old and New Russia', in Consuming
Russia: Popular Culture, 5cc, and Society Since Gothachev, ed. by Adele Marie Baker (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 12-45 (p. 32).
In Refining Russia, Catriona Kelly sees the growing publication of advice literature from 1954
onwards as a sign of a greater commitment to providmg a more sophisticated level of material comfor1
and explores the problematic accommodation between communist ideology and consumerism. Catriona
Kelly, Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Genderfrom Catherine to Yeltsin,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). On the new importance attached to the lay-out and style of
the Soviet home, see Victor Buchli, An Archaeology of Socialism (Oxford: Berg, 1999).
'5 Susan E. Reid, 'Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the
Soviet Union under Khrushchev', Slavic Review, 61(2002), 211-252 (pp. 216-7).
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NEP era, the cultural revolution was now positioned at a different point along the
eschatological timeline. Where the cultural revolution of the NEP era sought to recast
the peasant as Soviet worker, the new venture aimed to fashion men and women of
the communist future. This was a new stage in the unfolding and permanent
revolution.
There were also important differences with the campaigns for 'culturedness' of the
1930s. Two decades earlier, Helibeck's Podlubnyi had understood the revolutionary
struggle as a conflict between two binary terms: culture opposed to backwardness. He
understood the introduction of the passport system as a 'purge' enacted by the state as
a means to eradicate all the useless elements in society, including speculators,
alcoholics, thieves, disfranchised persons, and other uncultured types. The new era
ushered in by Stalin's death renounced such a combative approach to those who had
as yet failed to acquire consciousness and culture. The new project was to be all-
inclusive. Instead of wishing to eliminate or purge the marginals and deviants from
the Soviet city, or indeed society more broadly, the goal was to correct, re-educate,
and redeem them. Instead of being cast out as anti-Soviet, they were to be transformed
by the positive force of the mature and healthy Soviet collective.
This dissertation thus explores this new era of cultural revolution, and the nature of its
implementation. Over the past quarter of a century, the party had insisted that beating
the enemy was a prerequisite for achieving the communist paradise. State propaganda
had repeatedly warned that the enemies were all around, biding behind the mask of
the good communist, and Soviet citizens had continually been encouraged to imagine
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their own community as good, defined against a blurred, but dangerously evil 'other'.
Would the Soviet public now believe it was safe from enemy plots? Would citizens
prove responsive to the new programmes of moral and cultural education? Would
they be ready to view those labelled 'uncultured' not as their opponents, but as
potential members of the communist collective? And would it be possible to eradicate
incidents of social deviance, crime, and political heresy without using the forceful
techniques of extermination, excision, and isolation?
The task was made additionally difficult by the legacy Stalin left in the form of the
Gulag, which contained those rejected from society as heretical, criminal, uncultured,
and un-Soviet. This body of 2,466,914 people would offer the biggest challenge to the
new policies of correction and healing within society. 67 The Khrushchev era was thus
marked by revived belief in the advent of communist society, but also by deep fear of
the destructive forces contained within the Gulag.
Definin! Belief and Rhetoric - Towards a Methodolo!y
Ransacking the archives for petitions and letters-to-the-editor has become a staple part
of research into Soviet history, as they seem to offer a ready bank of texts, providing
some kind of indication of public opinion. While they do not allow access to the
unprocessed or raw emotion of the subject, they do show how some members of the
public wished to present themselves to the authorities, and they offer insight into an
"Heilbeck, 'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul', p. 85.
'' This was the number of prisoners held on 1 April 1953, before the March amnesty took effect. GARF
f. 7523, op. 89, d. 4408, L 82.
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important point of contact between state and society. Throughout the Soviet era, the
system of gaining housing, legal rights, jobs, party membership and so forth depended
upon the act of writing letters. After 1953 in particular, the authorities strongly
encouraged citizens to contribute their opinions to newspapers or relevant political
bodies, and the results of their campaigns provide another growing category of
1etters. It seems that the state was actively inviting its citizens to participate in the
kind of 'practices of the self defined by Foucault. 7° Unlike diary-writing, however,
the epistolary form was not a solitary act of self-constitution, but recreated the self
through the act of dialogue.
An anonymous letter from one Soviet citizen in April 1953 illustrates this process.
Writing to Viacheslav Molotov about the party's recent repudiation of the Doctors'
Plot, the author offered his opinion, though he had nothing material to gain from
penning his letter. Indeed, choosing anonymity, he deliberately avoided any direct
consequences. Why then did he write? What did he hope to gain from the act of
writing? In part, it seems, he believed it was his duty. Concerned about the course the
party was taking, he thought they needed to hear the opinion of the people. He opened
the letter by identifying himself: 'I am the most simple and ordinary Soviet person,
Russian, communist and on the whole I think that I am the most common,
"Sheila Fitzpatrick has described the great volume of public letter-writing as a 'treasure trove' for
historians. Sheila Fitzpatrick 'Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the
1930s', Slavic Review, 55(1996), 78-105 (p. 78).
Zubkova argues that there was new interest in letter-writing after 1953. Some newspapers and
journals began to reserve special columns for the publication of readers' letters and the volume of this
correspondence began to be considered a matter of prestige. At the XXII Party Congress, the chairman
of the Supreme Court Aleksandr Ciorkin, spoke at length ofletter-wnting praising citizens who
corresponded with the authorities for their political activism. See Zubkova, Russia After the War, pp.
161-2; 'Rech' A. F. Gorkina',Izverbia, 18 October 1961, pp. 3-4.
10 Foucault's describes 'practices of self, whereby the subject 'constitutes himself in an active fashion'
through 'patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed suggested and imposed on him by
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unremarkable representative of our society.'7 ' His representativeness legitimised his
act of writing. By taking into consideration his views, he implied, the state would
learn something of the popular mood. As we read on, however, we find that this
identity that he embraced so dramatically at the start of his letter was not something
fixed or unchanging. In order to become this typical Soviet citizen who faithfully
submitted his opinions to Molotov, he had to be in ongoing dialogue with the state. In
the second paragraph of the letter, he offered the reader a visual image of himself,
sitting at his desk with recent copies of Pravda spread out before him. In order to
speak as a Soviet citizen, he also had to be reading and absorbing the words provided
by official texts.
The writing, self-constructing citizen drew on official texts. This does not mean,
however, that he reproduced them faithfully. His interpretation of what he read
invariably reflected pre-existing beliefs and values, whether these came from texts
provided by earlier interactions with the state, from pre-revolutionary or imported
traditions, or even from subcultures such as the one nurtured by the Gulag. The Soviet
citizen who believed he was faithfully speaking the words the party wished to hear,
still produced a text or speech-act with significant variation. Comparing the official
text with the reader's response, we find hesitations, discrepancies, distortions, and
errors as the writer sought to communicate in the official language. 72 Even a
this culture, his society and his social group'. Heilbeck's diary-writers are prm examples of this kind
of private self-constitution. Foucau1t 'The Ethic of Care for the Self, p.11.
l& RGASPI £ 82, op. 2., d. 1466,1 44.
This approach is greatly influenced by Carlo Ginzburg's rich exploration into the mental universe of
a sixteenth-century Italian miller accused of heresy. For him, the cpiestion is not only what an
individual reads, but how he reads it. Taking passages from the books Menocchio has read, and
comparing them with the miller's interpretation, Ginzburg finds important 'gaps and discrepancies'. In
these lacunac and deviations, Menocchio is uncovered as a man both imbued in an oral, materialistic,
peasant culture, and deeply influenced by his reading of radical texts of the Reformation. As he tries to
express what he has read, Menocchio's statements - recorded by the dutiful clerks of the Inquisition -
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petitioner, desperate for some benefit or other, anxious to prove his credentials as a
good Soviet citizen, was idiosyncratic in the way he reproduced the official script, for
his own utterance was dependent upon the way he had imbibed Bolshevik ideology.
In their written texts, Soviet citizens displayed a broad range of ideolects and dialects
as they tried to 'speak Bolshevik'. 73 There was enormous potential for
misunderstanding, miscommunication, and linguistic variation.
This heteroglossia, I suggest, did not only impact on the way ordinary citizens
expressed themselves, but also the production of party rhetoric. Soviet rhetoric is
typically viewed as monologue, and the party is seen reproducing its own ideology,
seeking to impose it on its subjects. I hope, however, to explore more closely the
relation between state and society, between reading and writing. The state itself was
constantly engaged in reading the letters, petitions, and autobiographies submitted by
the Soviet public. Tremendous energy was spent recording the verbal statements made
by party members and ordinary Soviet citizens. What was the purpose of this great
infrastructure devoted to gathering the public's thoughts?
are a reworking of written, high culture by medieval, popular culture. Carlo Ginzburg The Cheese and
the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, frans. by John and Anne Tedeschi (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).
ThMy position here is shghtly different both to the one held by Stephen Kotkin, who created the
valuable concept of 'speaking Bolshevik', and to Helibeck and Halfln's challenge. In their review of
Magnetic Mountain, they suggested that by talking of a Soviet 'identity game' and creating Soviet
citizens who had acquired the linguistic skills because it was pragmatic, Kotkin 'ultimately leaves the
Stalinist subject unprobleniatised.' Referring to private as well as public documents from the era, they
suggest that individuals did not only adopt this language because it was utilitarian, but that official
Soviet discourse pervades 'even individuals' subjective self-conscious.' While I follow Heilbeck and
Halfin in believing that 'official' Soviet beliefs fashioned private thinking and dialogue as well as
public interaction, I emphasise to a greater extent the heteroglossia of the Bolshevik 'language'. Igal
Halfin and Jochen Heilbeck, 'Rethinking the Stalinist Subject Stephen Kolkin's '?vfagnetic Mountain"
and the State of Soviet Historical Studies', Jahrbacherfür Geschichte Osteuropas, 44(1996), 456-463;
Kotkin, Magnetic Mountaia, pp. 198-237.
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In his study of Soviet surveillance techniques, Peter Hoiquist asserts that the regime
did not collect information so as 'to determine which policy to pursue in conformity
with public opinion or to win support', but in order sculpt a better, purer society, to
act on people, and to change them. 74
 In this view, feed-back was needed primarily in
order to hone the state's own performance. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin's insights, I
suggest a rather different relationship between state, society, and the Bolshevik creed.
Often it seems that the party was permanently engaged in the mono logic reassertion
of its own ideology, yet if we look more closely at the style of party rhetoric we find
the speaker invariably promoted his own argument, by responding to other, undefined
voices. Political speeches were structured in response to imagined theories,
arguments, or viewpoints against which the speaker struggled. As such, these texts
have a highly dialogic quality. The party did not speak into silence, but responded to
the criticisms, misunderstandings, or misinterpretations they attributed to their
interlocutors within the party or the Soviet public. 75 I suggest that party officials and
ideologues were not totally impervious to the ideas and beliefs of those amongst
whom they lived and worked, and whose opinions they investigated with such
fanatical interest. Such a model injects dynamism into Soviet history, and enables us
to account for the plurivocality and fluid nature of official discourse over the long
durée of Soviet history. Even if the overarching metanarrative of progress was
incontestable, it left huge scope within the Bolshevik project for negotiation,
reworking, and adaptation.
14 eter Hoiquist, "Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in Its
Pan-European Context', The Journal ofModern H,stoy, 69(1997), 415-450 (p.417).
M M Bakhtin, 'The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology and the Human Sciences: An
Experiment in Philosophical Analysis', in Speech Genres and Other Late &saj, trans. by Vem W.
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IlistorloEraphy
Understanding a period popularly labelled 'destalinisation' is inescapably dependent
on how we interpret 'Stalinism'. Where Sheila Fitzpatrick's social and cultural history
has been pioneering, the works of Stephen Kotkin, Igal Halfin, Jochen Helibeck,
Vadim Volkov, Amir Weiner, and Jeffrey Brooks have gone on to offer exciting new
interpretations of what it meant to be Soviet. Emphasising the importance of ideology,
their approaches stress the highly interventionist nature of the Soviet state. iAll explore
the revolutionary project of creating Soviet man, whilst purif ring society olf all that
might pollute the social body. Some emphasise the inspiration and technique for
forcefully removing the impure (Halfin, Weiner); others explore state initiatives to
inculcate Soviet beliefs and behaviour (Helibeck, Volkov, Kotkin); a third 'açproach
examines how the growth of the modem media and mass literacy made sudh
revolutionary projects possible (Brooks). My view of Soviet society in the 1195 Os is
heavily dependent upon their insights. I explore both the Soviet state's ongoing
devotion to 'sculpting' model citizens, and the importance of official Soviet beliefs in
citizens' own self-definition. However, in contrast to some of their approadhes, I do
suggest that Soviet identity remained a contested site. Not only could the disparity
between lived experience and ideology prove problematic in the search for stable
identity, but the belief system in itself was often multivocal and obscure, making for
varied and competing understandings of the Soviet self and his place in the world.
McGee, ed. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Hoiquist (Austin, TeL: University of Texas Press, 1986),
pp. 103-131 (p. 126).
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In contrast to the flourishing field of Stalinist history, study of the Khrushchev era is
still in its very early stages. There is, of course, a great wealth of literature originating
in the tradition of political science. Studying the effectiveness of Khrushchev's
reforms and the strength of his political leadership, the works of Carl Linden, George
Breslauer, Michel Tatu, Merle Fainsod, Martin McCauley, and, more recently,
William Tompson offer a variety of assessments. Despite their differences, however,
certain fundamental assumptions seem to underlie their work and distance it from the
approaches taken here. 76 Regarding Khrushchev's Soviet Union as an unequivocally
post-revolutionary society, they tend to view ideology as a tool with which to
maintain power. They understand the aims of the Soviet state as geopolitical ones -
namely to create an economically sound, ordered, and well-defended state, enjoying
some kind of popular legitimacy. While some works take this cynical approach to the
extreme of seeing the new and less belligerent 'terminology' of the Khrushchev era as
a concession to foreign propaganda, 77 even the more sophisticated ones impose a
fundamental division between the leader's role as policy-maker or problem-solver on
the one hand, and his role as 'ideologue' or spin-doctor on the other. According to
Breslauer, for example, it is possible to 'separate empty rhetoric from operative
statements'?8 These approaches are significantly different from my own for two
reasons: first, I follow the recent scholarship of the Stalinist era in viewing the Soviet
Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership (Balthnore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1966); George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authonty in Soviet
Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); The Soviet Union Since Stalin, ed. by Stephen F.
Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlet (Bloomington. lncL: Indiana University Press,
1980); Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New Yoric Viking, 1969);
Fainsod, Khrushchev's Russia; Martin McCauley, 'Khrushchev as Leader', in Khrushchev and
Khrushchevzsm, ed. by Martin McCauley (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 9-29;
William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Lfe (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1995).
" Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, p.165.
' Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, p.4, p.15.
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state's actions as ideologically motivated; second, I view the Khrushchev era not as
the cynical aftermath of revolution, but rather as its continuation and extension.
A second approach derives from literary or cultural studies. Because of the leading
role that the literary intelligentsia is understood to have played in the process of
destalinisation, there is an accepted wisdom: 'the story of Thaw politics is about
culture. The story of Thaw culture is about politics.' 79 Gratified to see the emergence
of dissent and disbelief during the cold war, western commentators identified the
intelligentsia as potential defectors. 8° The artistic rebel was often a flamboyant and
attractive figure; and through the act of writing or painting, he made his thoughts and
ideas at least partially accessible to the foreign observer. 8 ' In her study of 'permitted
dissent', Dma Spechier argues that the post-Stalin political leaders were disorganised
and confused, allowing members of the cultural and scientific intelligentsia to feel
safe expressing their desire for change, and optimistic that their wishes would be
fulfilled. Spechler wants to accept the Russian intelligentsia's own self-definition as
'the conscience of society, its defender against corrupt, immoral, or incompetent
political authority'.82 The first forays into the archives have continued these trends:
Stephen Bittner chooses the Arbat district - an area renowned for its strong cultural
7'Nancy Condec, 'Cultural Codes of the Thaw', in Nikita KhnLshchev, cd. by Taubman, Khrushchev,
and Gleason, pp. 160-176 (p. 160).
Anna Krylova has argued that in the west Cold War discourse constructed the Stalinist man 'as the
opposite of the liberal self. Repulsed by this spectre of the 'mechanically' believing man, Western
commentators desperately searched for signs that the liberal self could be reborn, hoping for a shift to
'liberated disbelief and active resistance'. lnterpiet$ions of the Khrushchev era in particular have been
dominated by a perceived struggle between ardent believers in the communist catechism on the one
hand, and a clutch of nascent dissenters on the other. Anna Krylova, 'The Tenacious Liberal Subject in
Soviet Studies', Krigika, 1(2000), 119-146. Sec also Jochen HelIbeck 'Speaking Out Languages of
Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia', K,itika, 1(2000), 7 1-96.
8t Priscilla Johnson, Khrushchev and the ArLr: The Polities ofSoviet Culture, 1962-4 (Cambridge,
Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1965).
Dma Spechler Permitted LXrsent tn the USSR: Noiyi Mir and the Soviet Regime (New York:
Praeger, 1982).
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heritage - for his micro-study of Moscow during the Khrushchev era; and Karl
Loewenstein explores the party's literary organisations as a site for the emergence of
a nascent civil society. 83 While it is indisputable that film, literature and art were
exciting spheres of innovation during the 'thaw', it seems that the views espoused by
outspoken intellectuals have often been implicitly ascribed to Soviet population per
se. It is perhaps time to explore the beliefs and ideas of Soviet society more broadly,
and to question whether the popular response to the post-1953 changes echoed the
optimism of the intelligentsia.
Although there has been little Western study of a broader social or cthral history,
several Russian historians have begun to address these issues. For over a decade,
historians such as Elena Zubkova, lu. A. Aksiutin, A. V. Pyzhikov, and N. A.
Barsukov, amongst others, have engaged in archival research with the aim of charting
aspects of 'public opinion' during the Khrushchev era.M Whilst Zubkova's works are
the most renowned in the west, others have also offered insight into public reaction to
key events, especially the Secret Speech. Their research suggests that the reactions of
the broader Soviet public differed from those of the intelligentsia, and in the place of
euphoric détente they find distress and confusion. Perhaps the most original
contribution is Vladimir Kozlov's study of mass unrest under Khruhchev and
'3 Stephen V. Bittner, 'Exploring Reform: De-Stalmkzation in Moscow's Arbat District 1953-68'
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 2000); Karl Edward Loewenstein, The Thaw
Writers and the Public Sphere in the Soviet Union, 1951-57' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke
University, 1999). A similar interest in cultural politics is also evident in post-Soet Russian
approaches. See for example M. P. Zezina, 'Gloto& svobody Sovetskaia intelligentsia posle smerti
Stalina', in Inteiligentsiw v uslovi:akh obshciiesvenaoy nestabil'nosti, ed. by A. (L Studenikin
(Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1996), pp. 200-214.M,ka, Rursta After the War lu. V. Aksiutin and A. V. Pyzhikov, FoststaIimkoe obshcheslvo:
Problema Iiderstva i transformaisiia viasti (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 1999); Iurii Aksiutm, 'Popular
Responses to Khrushchev', in Nikua Khrushchev, ed. by Taubman, Khrushchev, and Gleason, pp. 177-
208; N. A. Barsukov, 'Oborotnaia storona "ottcpei", Kenlavr: lstonchesko-polhologicheskü zhurnal,
1993.4, 129-143.
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Brezhnev.85 Firmly rejecting post-Soviet nostalgia for a way of life that is now
remembered as ordered and peaceful, Kozlov's examination of violent social and
ethnic conflict depicts the post-Stalin penod as an era of struggle in which ordinary
Soviet citizens could become - albeit briefly the principal actors. All these works
take us out of the realm of Kremlinology and cultural politics, and Kozlov's work is
particularly useful in drawing our attention to the violently disruptive nature of some
sectors of Soviet society in the 1950s and early 1960s.
To finish this overview of the historiography, four works deserve greater attention as
they examine the return of four different kinds of Gulag returnee: the high-ranking
purge victim, the 'ordinary' victim of political repression, the homosexual, and the
nationalist insurgent. (It is noteworthy that while a great majority of those returning
from the camps had received criminal rather than political sentences, the criminal
returnee has largely been written out of the story.)
Describing post-Stalinist Russia, Anna Akhmatova wrote of 'two Russias eyeball to
eyeball - those who were imprisoned and those who put them there'. Her metaphor
has often been evoked in the American and European literature. As one of the first to
study both the impact of the 'great return' and to consider popular reactions to
destalinisation, Stephen Cohen uses Akhmatova's image to depict a divided society,
imagining pro-Stalinist conservatives pitted against anti-Stalinist reformers. In
'5 Vladimir A. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR. Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years,
trans. by Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (Annonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).
Stephen F. Cohen, 'The Stalin Question since Stalin', in An End to Silence: Uncensored Opinion in
the Soviet Union, ed. by Stephen F. Cohen (New York W. W. Norton, 1982), pp. 22-50; Stephen F.
Cohen, 'The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union', in The
Soviet Union Since Stalin, ed. by Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch,, Robert Sharlet
(Bloomington, md.: Indiana University Press,, 1980), pp. 11-31.
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Cohen's view, Gulag returnees formed a powerful community with access to the top
leadership, and this 'fonnidable force' had some success in influencing repentant
Stalinists like Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoian. With those bearing responsibility for
the terror equally determined and no less powerful, the result was the great political
stand-off of the 1950s, in which Cohen finds a powerful contest between reformism
and conservatism. This dissertation challenges the notion that there were clearly
defined, pre-destined, and universal political identities such as 'reformer' and
'conservative'. Instead I explore how the search to find a legitimising political culture
post-1953 produced new myths and revised established beliefs, resulting in a more
complex political process than a tussle between two pre-existing political stances.
More recently, Nanci Adler also adopted Anna Akhmatova's 'two Russias' image as
the departure for her study of the 'the Gulag survivor'. Focusing on those without
access to power, Adler shows the difficulties camp returnees experienced in returning
to a normal life, concluding that 'returnees' efforts at reassimilation and readaptation
were by and large impeded by individuals, officials, and even family members, to say
nothing of their own psychological scars.' 87 Highlighting the moral failings of the
Soviet regime, she concentrates on the limited and grudging nature of reform.
Although she acknowledges that some purge victims did not lose their faith in the
communist creed, this is clearly counter-intuitive to Adler. She writes that 'from a
common-sense point of view, it would seem that a political system should deliver on
its political promises and if its does not, faith in that system should be abandoned.'88
Adler leaves the question unresolved, seemingly baffled that Gulag survivors could
Nanci AdIer The Gulag Surviwr: Beyond the Soviet System (New Bnmswick NJ.: Tinsaction,
2002), p. 263.
g Adler, The Gulag Survivor, p. 213.
36
emerge from their ordeal still believers. My intention is to explore this very issue, to
examine how those once labelled the enemy came to interpret their suffering, and how
the party accepted, and even promoted, their tales of heroic martyrdom.
In his study of homosexual desire in the Soviet Union, Dan Healey asserts that within
the camps there was a culture of sexual humiliation and rape, and that the Gulag was a
site 'for mutual sexual cruelty'. According to Healey, the large-scale returns from the
camps in the 1950s contributed to late Soviet perceptions of same-sex desire. Fears
were widespread 'that returnees from the brutality of camp life could carry "mental
infection" to society, spreading the "perversions" of Gulag existence'. As a result,
police activity against men identified as homosexual, and the numbers of men sent to
prison for sodomy, increased. 89 The sad fate of the homosexual returnee exemplifies
the problematic nature of repudiating the Gulag during the 1950s, as fears of
contamination and perceptions of the Gulag as a source of degeneration escalated.
In an unpublished paper, Amir Weiner explores the return of amnestied prisoners to
Western Ukraine. 90 The state of affairs on this Western frontier was unique for a
number of reasons; first, because the contested territory had only recently been
conquered; second, because of its proximity to the turbulent events in Hungary and
Poland in 1956; third, because a majority of those who returned were nationalist
leaders and Uniate priests - anti-Soviet radicals, untempered by their stint in the
Gula& Weiner emphasises the important differences between centre and periphery,
Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation ofSexual and Gender
Dissent (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 229-46.
Ainir Werner, 'The Empires Pay a Visit Reform Revolt, and Rebirth in The Soviet Western
Frontier 1956-57' (unpublished paper presented at Maryland Workshop on New Approaches to
Ressian and Soviet History, May 3-4, 2002).
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and suggests that the nationalist returnees were both more politically hostile and
violent than returnees elsewhere. Questioning why the party risked such a dangerous
course of action, Weiner argues that the new leadership placed greater confidence in
the political worth of local cadres. With growing faith in the indigenous party
organisations, Moscow decided to trust them with the task of controlling and
reabsorbing the Gulag's heretics.
The work of Weiner and Healey point in different ways to issues that are important to
this thesis. While Weiner highlights the state's confidence in its own capacity to deal
with former enemies, and in its power to correct and convert, Healey draws attention
to popular anxiety about the effect of Gulag culture, expressed in fears of contagion
and pollution. Rather than using Akhmatova's metaphor of 'two Russias' to find a
nation divided by resentment for the suffering experienced or guilt over crimes
perpetrated, I see a nation divided in other ways. Drawing on the oppositions that had
been disseminated by Stalinist culture, I find different sets of binary oppositions
important in the Khrushchev era, including the conflict between purity and
contamination, respectability and criminality, 'culturedness' and vulgarity.
Summary
Three strands are explored in this dissertation. First, I look at the projects of the state,
exploring developments in official ideology. Rather than studying the intricacies of
political decision-making, I examine ideology in its didactic form - in newspaper
articles or official publications. I suggest that in the 1950s, party leaders seemed
intent on creating a revolutionary community that was no longer so dependent upon
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its imagined 'other'. Second, I turn to those who had been imagined and labelled as
the enemies of Soviet society. As both criminal and political outcasts were granted
reprieve, how did they seek to construct an identity as Soviet citizens? Third, I try to
understand something of the broader responses to the new direction in state policy and
to the homecoming of former enemies. Interpreting citizens' reading of official
writings and the production of their own texts, I ask if they accepted the erosion of
Manichean beliefs. Were they convinced that they need no longer fear the enemy?
And how did they respond to the revised status of those previously banished to the
other world of the Gulag under the label of 'enemy'?
Chapter I examines the dramatic year of 1953, described by one young Soviet worker
as 'the most painful year'.9' The rehabilitation of the Kremlin Doctors, the March
amnesty, and Beriia's arrest represent the three key events in Soviet political life in
the months following Stalin's death. I examine both their rendering in the official
press and the public's reading of such material. In the wake of the great leader's
demise, newspaper readers continued to interpret confusing and disturbing events as
evidence of enemy activity, and in particular voiced concern about Gulag returnees as
a dangerous and disruptive 'other' that should remain excluded from society.
The focus of Chapter II turns to those who had been excised from the collective body.
My first point is that the Gulag created its own subculture, language, and ethos, even
if all Gulag veterans were not fully acculturated by this other world. Secondly, I
suggest that even those who might espouse rebellious positions also became engaged
in practices of the self as the system frequently required them to explain and justify
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their lives in the form of a petition. Drawing on myths from revolutionary culture or
adapting socialist realist forms, both political and criminal returnees sought to
construct their own Soviet selves. In the process, they inadvertently pointed to the
heterogeneity of Soviet culture and provided the authorities with new ways of making
sense of the Stalinist past.
The Secret Speech is the subject of Chapter ilL Seeking to eliminate the confusion of
1953, Khrushchev revised Stalin's version of the revolutionary tiineline to explain to
the Soviet public why they should no longer fear the enemy. In the process of creating
a new legitimising myth, he drew on aspects of former enemies' own narratives, and
even appropriated their accounts of revolutionary martyrdom to fortify the party's
own story. I use letters-to-the-editor and transcripts of party meetings to explore how
the rank and file of the party and the wider public then responded. In a 'performative'
culture populated by heroes and enemies, where a conflict between good and evil
explained historical change, the introduction of greater neutrality into political culture
was alien. Consequently the bewilderment of 1953 was not resolved.
Chapter N examines the new initiatives taken to create a harmonious and ordered
society without the isolation or excision of harmful elements. A propaganda campaign
for improved byt was launched, and new communal practices, such as comrades'
courts and volunteer brigades, were elaborated. By such means the party hoped to
inculcate a heightened sense of legality and morality in its citizens which would
enable to them to aid in the healing of offenders and transgressors within society. As
the Soviet public received these new texts on byt, however, they read them as citizens
' RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1449,1 122.
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imbued in Stalinist culture. In effect, they reworked the new commitment to morality
and respectability proclaimed in Khrushchevist rhetoric from a perspective where
notions of contamination, degeneration, and infection were still prominent.
Chapter V finds a resolution to some of these strains and tensions. Radical utopianism
gripped the country in 1961, and even the horrors of the Stalinist purges were used to
create a new narrative of eschatological advance: the dark days of the terror became
another hurdle on the perilous road towards communist paradise. However, there was
also a return to the practices of isolation and excision. Reflecting the popular distrust
of 'correction' and 'redemption', party ideology and policy now symbolically cast out
those whose antisocial behaviour was regarded as an impediment to the building of a
pure and harmonious communist society.
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Chapter I
1953: 'The Most Painful Year'
The autocracy collapsed upon the death of the
autocrat.
- Robert Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind'
Suddenly the library was in commotion. The librarians sped from one
reading room to the next like whirlwinds: 'Turn in your books! Turn in
your books at once! The library's closed!' [..j I ran outside. From the top
steps of the Lenin Library, I could see people running. Good Lord! Not
two, not three, not five, but an entire street of people running as one man.
[...] 'They're letting people in to see Stalin. In the Hall of Columns!
They've announced the body's on disp'2
Although a dissenting member of society by 1953, Andrei Siniavskii was nonetheless
caught up in the frenzied chase to view Stalin's body. In his memoirs he recounts in
detail how he was absorbed into the thronging masses filling the Moscow streets,
losing his individuality and autonomy for the few hours that followed. As Brooks
writes, describing the hysterical days of national mourning that followed Stalin's
'Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Post-Stalin Change (New York Praeger,
I963), p. 162.
2 Abram Tertz (Andrei Siniavskii), Goodnight! (New York: Viking, 1989), p. 249.
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death in early March 1953, 'Stalin's final triumph was the enactment of his own
funeral'.3
In his account of the 'performative' culture that evolved under Stalin, Brooks rightly
identifies the first few days of March as the final 'drama' in this story, a last Stalinist
performance which drew on 'the metaphors of past decades, including the path,
family, school and construction, to bind the nation to him once more'.4 The country's
new leaders drafted in all the media resources, with photographers, writers and
journalists producing images, poems, and articles for radio and newspaper. Exploiting
the public space of the capital city, they transformed the funeral into a mass rally with
Muscovites thronging the streets, following events on Red Square through the
loudspeakers.5 The Hall of Columns at the House of Trade Unions, where Stalin's
body lay in state, was transformed into a site for collective displays of grief,
reproduced in grainy newspaper images for all those citizens far from Moscow. Over
and over again, the press beseeched the nation to remain unified and called for
especial vigilance against the nation's enemies.6
Citizens grieved in a variety of ways. In addition to the funeral rallies taking place on
the streets and in the workplace, many also played out the drama through the act of
letter-writing, and newspaper editors and Stalin's former colleagues were inundated
3 Brooks, Thank You, p. 233.
'Brooks, Thank You, p. 237.
S On the day of Stalin's funeraj many participants were crushed in the Moscow crowds. In March 1956,
Khrushchev would tell the Polish United Workers' Party that 109 people had lost their lives See
Brooks, Thank You, p. 234.
'On 7 March 1953, Prawla carried a front page headline 'The Greatest Unity And Cohesion'; on 8
March, 'Let Us Unite Tighter Still Around The Communist Party!'; on 11 March, 'Let The Ranks of
the Communist Party Unite Tighter Still!', while the second page bore the headline 'Steel Unity', the
third 'Indestructible Cohesion', and so on.
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with letters ofcondolence.7 Even as these writers sat alone at home, they presented
themselves as participants in a national event. A Leningrad student described bow
they shared the experience through the radio broadcasts, writing 'it was not possible
for us all to be there at this hour in Moscow on Red Square, but in thought, with our
hearts, we were all there at the Mausoleum. 8 The wireless set, constantly switched
on, directed performances of grief within every home, so that even when transposed
from public places to the private, mourning became a national experience. One
housewife described how a group sat together around the radio, sleepless for five
days. 9 Another woman wrote to Molotov, saying 'There aren't any words to express
my warm feeling towards you! I cried so much listening to your speech on the radio
and I cry now writing this letter."° Radio broadcasts on the one side and condolence
letters on the other constituted a dialogue between state and society, and, in the few
days of national mourning, became a channel for intense emotion. Many letter-writers
expressed their own sense of inadequacy, claiming to have no words to express their
grief— yet they too participated in a kind of national graphomania. Referring to the
heavy silence that had descended upon the country, they launched into prolix and
often poetic articulations of their woe.
Official and individual formulations achieved remarkable harmony. Model letters
published in the press, and unpublished letters, now preserved in the archives, are
strikingly similar, both in terms of the emotions expressed and the language used. The
7 In his memoirs, D. T. Shepilov, then editor of Pravda, recalled 'a flood of telegrams, letters and
articles' from people who wanted to publish testimonials to Stalin. See D. T. Shepilov, 'Vospon'nii',
Voprosy istorti, 1998.3, 3-24 (p. 16). Molotov's archive at RGASPI (f 82, op. 2) preserveS 253
condolence letters, substantially more than would be kept relating to any other individual topic.
RGASPII.82,op.2,d. 1441,123.
'RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1466,132.
10 RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1466,1 36.
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media constantly referred to Stalin as the nation's father and depicted children
offering flowers to Stalin, and citizens responded with appropriate lamentations of
filial loss." One student wrote that she cried more over Stalin's death than when her
own father died in 1941.12 Another young woman told Molotov that she was raised in
an orphanage and that she was personally grateful to Stalin for her upbringing.' 3 Other
familiar tropes of Soviet culture found confident expression in these unpublished
letters. A certain Bitiukov wrote from Sverdlovsk that he, along with his whole of the
city, had sworn to build communism in gratitude to Stalin for having brought them to
socialism and victory over the Gennans." Another composed poetry, promising that
'we won't turn from the correct path'.' 5 The struggle against enemies took a
prominent place. While Pravda editorials reminded readers how Stalin taught them to
be vigilant of their enemies, readers in turn promised to remain strong, to 'sharpen
their teeth', and to be ever more ferocious with enemies. 16 Despite their sad tone, the
letters suggested that the death of Stalin might serve to re-affirm the common values
and shared language of Soviet society.
In the first days after Stalin's death, letter-writing was used primarily as a means to
participate in this Stalinist performance. Calling for its amplification and perpetuation,
many offered their own ideas for new rituals and symbols: Moscow to be renamed
after the dead leader; a new military order to be created in his name; every adult
"See particularly 'Proshai, Otets!', Pravda, 8 March 1953, p.4, an article by the author Mikhail
Sholokhov which begins 'Farewell, father! How suddenly and terribly we have been orphaned!'.
'2 RGASPI fL 82, op. 2, d. 1441,124.
'3 RC1ASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1443,11.49-50.
' RGASPIL 82, op. 2, d. 1441,1 108.
'5 RGASP! f. 82, op. 2, d. 1443,162.
"Veichaishaia splochennost' i edinstvo', Pravda, 7 March 1953, p.1. RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. 1466. 1
23.
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citizen to give an oath of loyalty to the motherland.' 7 Death, they seemed to claim,
should prove no impediment to Stalin's capacity to unify the nation.
For some, of course, Stalin's death promised sought-after change. Despite his
involvement with the crowd of mourners, Siniavskii's memoirs also tell of a private
and less dutiful response to the news of Stalin's death. Relating how a friend had
called at his apartment, led him away from the neighbours and down to the basement,
he wrote: 'I double-locked the door. We stood facing each other, our eyes radiant. We
embraced silently."8 Less restrained forms of dissent could be dangerous. The
Procuracy archives contain a number of appeals from those sentenced for the
slanderous comments they made in the days following Stalin's death. The incidents
often happened in trains or at railway stations, and most of the accused would later
deny any anti-Soviet sentiment, blaming intoxication. Somewhere between
Michurinsic and Smolensk, Mikhail Prokopov allegedly made slanderous comments
against the country's leaders, although he would later claim to only remember
boarding the train, bickering with the conductor, and falling asleep - to be woken at
the next station by policemen, who took him to a cell.' 9 On the same day at Manzovka
station in the Far East, Nikifor Popov drank, whistled, and then began to curse
Stalin.20 Ivan Skuratov was accused of a similar drunken transgression, though he was
later highly aggrieved that anyone could sentence him for a political crime, when he
7 RGASPI £82, op. 2. d. 1470. Many of the suggestions are identical to those made in 1949 to mark
Stalin's seventieth birthday, suggesting the desire for continuity with the public rituals of Stalinisni.
(Of particular note and more original is the letter from one 'Old Bolshevik' in Groznii who asked to
dedicate his brochure 'My Method Of Deep Breathing' to Stalin.)
'8 TCIIZ (Siniavskii), Goodrnght!, p. 238.
'9 aAiu f. 8131, op. 31, d. 59688, II. 2-10.
GARF £ 8131, op. 31, d. 68217, IL 9-12.
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was so clearly an alcoholic! 21 As they sought to be re-classified as hooligans, not
traitors, the petitioners portrayed themselves as hardworking Soviet citizens,
temporarily estranged from society and themselves by the dislocating act of travel -
and the effects of alcohol. While dissenting attitudes towards Stalin's life and death
certainly existed in March 1953, their expression was possible only in the privacy of a
locked basement or in the surreal world of the drunken train journey.
Initially few voiced any sort of criticism of the dead leader. 22 Over the coming
months, however, such harmony would disappear and the triumphant trumpeting of
national solidarity in March proved premature. As the media clumsily groped for an
effective public culture 'after Stalin', citizens increasingly came to question and
debate the meaning of the new tenns and ideas they found in the press. In both their
letters and the snatches of public chatter reported to the Soviet authorities, people
articulated diverse worldviews. Bringing their own core beliefs to the act of reading,
their interpretations of the new official rhetoric were heterogenous. Their responses
reveal the plurality of beliefs held within Soviet culture and which, as the media
faltered, came to the surface.
If, until, 1953 the figure of Stalin had functioned as the source of absolute knowledge
and truth, a divinity who need obey no rules exterior to him, Soviet culture was now
robbed of its 'prophetic authority'. Seeking a new mandate, party leaders turned to the
21 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 68212,11.5-6. On the sane day, travelling between Moscow and laroslavi,
Sergei Telenkov, a pattemmaker at the Scientific Research Institute of the Electrical Industry Ministry,
dnmkenlycalledStalinaGeorgianswine(GARFf8I31,op.31,d.59515,1L5-6).Afewweekslater
Aleksandr Minakov would be found guilty of bad-mouthing Stalin, while drunk in a station buffet
GARFL 8131, op. 31, d.43260,L 6).
There was a handful of exceptions to this. One communist from the city of Gor'kii informed Molotov
that the great masses were expecting significant change, hoping for a relaxation of the international
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notion of the 'law'. Rather than invoking Stalin's infallibility, the press now invoked
zakonnost', a term which translates as either 'legality' or 'lawfulness' •23 Used
frequently in party rhetoric and legal debates in the early 1 930s, the term zakonnost'
had largely disappeared from official discourse with the purges? The concept was
now used to legitimise three important political events: the acquittal of the Kremlin
doctors; the arrest of Lavrentii Beriia, leading politician and head of the MVD; and
the introduction of amnesty and criminal justice reform.
The doctors' acquittal already signalled the changing status of the category 'enemy'.
While in January a vicious campaign against several Jewish doctors accused of
poisoning their eminent patients had encouraged citizens to see potential foes
everywhere, the press now halted its calls for vigilance. Even those now accused of
terrible miscarriages of justice were not condemned as enemies in the same way. This
was an important psychological shift for it allowed the possibility that people might
commit error. Such a change was accompanied by the elaboration of a new kind of
language and the rabid invective of the Stalinist era subsided. As we shall see,
Beriia's arrest proved more ambiguous in some respects, but it too promoted the
concept of 'socialist legality' over the arbitrary wunasking of the enemy. The
campaign thus marked a fundamental ontological shift. By undermining the spectacle
of 'unmasking' and publicly reviling enemies, it broke with the Manichean beliefs
that had conditioned public culture for so long, and marked an end to the Stalinist
sitition and inrovements in their living standards. He even lamented the use of terror within the
Soviet system, and called for an end to anti-semitic policies. RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1450,1.103.
Although 'legality' is the usual translation, and mere elegant in English, 'lawfulness' perhaps gives a
better sense of the Russian, as it best conveys the sense of acting in accordance with the 'law'.
This earlier, non-official meve for 'socialist' or 'rcvolutionaiy' legality was short-lived. Its leading
light, A. Ia. Vyshinskii was to become the public face of the show trials and the legal profession co-
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performance where all political actors could be divided absolutely into the 'good' and
the 'evil'.
The campaign also impacted on the way the state imagined the social body more
broadly. With the status of the enemy revised, the party now challenged the need to
uphold the powerful segregation between respectable society and those considered
unfit to belong, embodied in the 'large zone'/'sinall zone' division. Society was now
sufficiently 'developed' to allow a majority of prisoners home, and in the future, it
was promised, more moderate measures would be taken to deal with offenders. The
state's new-found promotion of 'error' over emnity, of correction over condemnation,
paved the way for new practices in criminal justice.
In this chapter, my aim is to study the dialogue between state and society in 1953,
focusing on the public response to these changes through the reading of internal
memoranda, letters-to-the-editor, and letters to political leaders. First, I find readers
expressing their distress as the certainties of Stalinist public culture crumbled. The
heterogeneity of opinion held within Soviet culture now became tangible as citizens
tried to make the new rhetoric fit with their beliefs. Many responded fearfully to such
reform and, paradoxically, some understood the claim that the enemy threat had been
over-played to in fact be the siy double-crossing of hidden foes. In a second area of
change related to the introduction of new penal practices, we again find real fear of
the enemy, as citizens fought to defend their own 'culturedness' and society's purity
against the returning outcasts.
opted into the well-known brutalities of the late Stalinist period. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, pp.
160-168.
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The Doctors' Plot Reversed
On 13 January 1953, Pravda announced that enemies had been uncovered at the very
core of Soviet power. A group of Kremlin doctors bearing Jewish surnames were
accused of murdering Andrei Zhdanov and Aleksandr Shcherbakov and of hatching
further plots against Soviet leaders. This was the culmination of the post-war anti-
semitic campaigns. Although it did not openly admit to attacking Jews, the late
Stalinist press had frequently made allusions to 'bourgeois mentality' and 'bourgeois
nationalism', or simpiy showered hostile abuse upon those bearing Jewish names. On
this occasion Pravda did both, referring in passing to Solomon Mikhoels as 'the well-
known bourgeois Jewish nationalist', and in a spectacular performance of Stalinist
invective, identifying the doctors as every kind of enemy conceivable, from spy and
traitor, to monster and loathsome vermin.25
Just under three months later, on Saturday 4 April 1953, a decree ordered their release
and rehabilitation. On the same day, Nikolai Mikhailov, first secretary of the Moscow
gorkom, sent a special report to Khrushchev on reactions to the reading of the decree
in a Moscow factory. It suggested that workers had failed to react appropriately. In
keeping with the etiquette of Soviet report-making, Mikhailov first gave examples of
the 'correct' responses, citing a worker who expressed gratitude that the party always
told them the truth, 'however bitter that truth might be'. 26 Mikhailov was soon
obliged, however, to turn his attention to the voices of dissent. After the
' 'Podlye shpiony i ubiitsy pod maskoi prokssorov-vrachei', Pravda, 13 Januazy 1953, p.1. Mikhoels,
a leader of the Jewish Antifascist Committee and director of the Moscow Jewish Theatre, became one
of the most prominent victims of post-war anti-semitism when he was assassinated in January 1948.
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announcement was read aloud in one factory, workers broke out in noisy protest,
posing such questions as 'Who should we believe?', 'Why write that they confessed,
and then that they didn't?', 'Who's guilty then?'. They also shouted 'They'll poison
again' and 'We don't understand anything'. The report had to be read aloud three
times before the workers would be silenced.27
By Monday morning, Pravda had published a long front-page editorial, intended to
offer answers to the questions workers had posed. The headline 'Soviet socialist
legality is inviolable' promoted the concept of zakonnost' as the key to understanding
the event, although the main tbnist of the article in fact highlighted the very fragile
nature of Soviet legality.28 The reader discovered how great carelessness and political
blindness had allowed MVD deputy M. D. Riumin - a hidden 'enemy of the people'
and 'despicable adventurist' - to fabricate the case. Repudiating anti-semitism in
April 1953, the party now accused Riumin and his accomplices of inciting 'national
hostility'. To readers accustomed to reading the Stalinist press, this clearly signalled
that anti-semitism was now officially repudiated. Foregrounding ideas of Soviet
legality, however, the editorial showed a reluctance to use the media's normally
bellicose rhetoric - even with regard to Riumin. Whilst in January the doctors had
been branded with every possible term of abuse, Riurnin was rarely designated by
anything stronger than the relatively mild 'despicable adventurist'. In place of the
hysterical evocation of enemies, the term 'zakonnost" was taken up. Those guilty of
political blindness were not vilified as enemies, but reprimanded for failing to guard
'zakonnost". The article had significant implications: firstly, it suggested that that the
RGANI f 5, op. 30, d. 19,1 10.
2 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 19,11. 14-15.
'Sovetskaia sotsialisticbeskaia zakonnost' neprikosnovenna', Pravda, 6 April 1953, p.1.
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government was now committed to ensuring legal due process; secondly, it repudiated
anti-semitism; thirdly, it introduced into the Soviet press a new and more restrained
approach to correcting error.
How far did the article serve its purpose? Did it successfully calm the rather
insubordinate mood described by Mikhailov on 4 April? His subsequent reports
suggest not. He informed the Central Committee that on 8 and 9 April 1953, Pravda
had received 52 letters, only 14 of which approved the doctors' release.29 Moreover,
most of the letters voicing support for the doctors came from Jews - a group with
vested interest.30 Of the letters addressed to Molotov, a majority expressed their
concerns over the new course the party was taking.
One anonymous letter addressed to Molotov revealed the deep anxiety provoked by
the official admission of error. Displaying a remarkable insouciance for those who
died as a result of these errors, he was incredulous that the authorities had opted for
such an unprecedented admission of guilt. He wrote that 'it would have been quite
sufficient to say to them: "Your guilt turns out to be less then it seemed until now, so
go home, work quietly and about what happened - keep silent"' 31 His distress
stemmed not from the admission of injustice, but from the disruption to the
established public performance, where all was joyful, and where mistakes were
RGANI £5, op. 30, d. 5,11.23-26.
The conventions of Soviet report-making dictated that examples of model letters should appear in the
opening pages. Here the letters Mikbailov garnered as evidence of support came exclusively from Jews
—people who stood to benefit concretely. In one letter a Jewish communist expressed his satisfaction at
the new direction in official policy, while in a second a mother of two Jewish sons articulated her relief
ihet discrimination would finish. It is perhaps telling that in the 14 letters commending the release,
Mikhailov seems to have found examples of support only from Jewish correspondents.
ROASPI £ 82, op. 2., d. 1466,1.45.
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hushed. His letter suggests that the Pravda editorial of 6 April, far from resolving the
questions that arose in response to the doctors' release, instead sparked new ones.
in the days that followed, readers frequently expressed their frustration with the
illisibilité of the Pravda article and they wrote of the increasing difficulty they
experienced in making a correct reading of the press. Three main arguments can be
found in their responses: first, concern that the malpractice uncovered within the
MVD was more widespread and entrenched than acknowledged; second, anger
against the repudiation of anti-semitism; third, generalised fear of increased enemy
action and anxiety over the state's reduced vigilance.
Some readers did greet the doctors' release with alacrity, hoping for an end to legal
and judicial malpractice. One anonymous letter arrived from the city of Orel and, after
briefly praising the amnesty, the author discussed the Doctor's Plot at length,
demanding still greater reform within the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). Readily
believing in the innocence of the doctors, the author was moved to express his
suspicions about the methods used by the MVD more generally. 32 He detailed the
kind of corrupt practices that existed, describing an incident that had occurred at a
factory in the city of Shchigry in Kursk province in which forty people were
interrogated 'to find "spies" amongst them'. Placing the word 'spy' in inverted
commas, the writer not only criticised the way innocent people were interrogated, but
also challenged the language used to vilify them. The writer called for radical change,
claiming it was necessary 'to re-examine the present day practices within the
investigatory organs, especially at the lower levels'. In many respects, this anonymous
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citizen found the reforms mooted by the socialist legality campaign inadequate, but he
articulated demands for change with the very concepts that official rhetoric now
sought to eradicate as part of an arbitrary and ritualistic culture. Deploriii the
miscarriages ofjustice, he wrote: 'It seems that within the investigatory organs there
are either wreckers or that excessive zeal and well-meant actions have gone awry.
This weakens the rear (tyl] and the state's power, and the people suffers. Although he
considered the problems facing reformers more grave than officially acknowledged in
the post-Stalin press, his explanations drew on beliefs nurtured during the Stalinist
era. He saw the Soviet state engaged in permanent battle, its weaknesses quite
conceivably the result of an enemy presence within.
When a similar letter arrived from a certain Popov in May 1953, Mo1otw's assistants
considered it sufficiently important to type him a summary. Popov's letter brazenly
refuted official assurances that zakonnost' had been re-established, even suggesting
that any opposition to Soviet power was born of the regime's own arbitrariness and
injustice. His letter was overtly critical of many aspects of Soviet policy:
Soviet legality has not yet been restored. Where do the enemies within the
party and power come from? It is very often as a result of our own
bungling. Is it really so difficult to recruit enemies from amongst Ihe
Volga Germans when they have been banished to Kazakhstan and are still
in exile there, from amongst the Crimean Tatars, Ingushes, Mingrelians
and Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists?33
Again Popov's letter reveals the profound hold the 'enemy' had in the Soviet
imagination, even for those who championed change. Although he blamed the
authorities for creating antipathy, he did not question the fact that such enemies had
indeed been recruited. Later in the letter he wrote:
32 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1466,11.40-41.
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How could it happen that a 'new Ezhovshchina' repeated what happened
fifteen years ago, when along with tens of guilty people, hundreds of
innocents were arrested and exiled, about whom until now their relatives
still have no news whatsoever. This was evidence of the scandalous
arbitrariness on the part of various despicable adventurists, working - and
who knows, maybe some remain? - in the former MGB-MVD?'
Three years before Khrushchev's revelations at the XX Party Congress, Popov was
already beginning to debate the purges, yet even as he wished to condemn the
practices of purging and exiling, he spoke as a man imbued in the Stalinist woridview.
Popov believed that enemies existed and he considered them the prime cause of all the
nation's troubles.
Such appeals for great reform were in fact rare. An overwhelming number of letter-
writers were in overt opposition to the socialist legality campaign, primarily because
they read it as a break with the anti-semitic beliefs Stalinist culture had condoned.
Disturbed by the party's new stance on Jewish nationality, several letter-writers took
the opportunity to demand the banishment of Jews. One anonymous letter lamented
that Moscow has been flooded with Jews, calling for them to be deported to the
'national state of Birobidzhan', where Lazar Kaganovich would be their leader. 35 A
letter from the town of Gor'kii, signed 'a group of comrades', enlisted the Soviet
constitution in order to denounce Jews. Nowhere, they wrote, did Jews have as many
rights as in the USSR, allowing them to become the most wealthy of all the
nationalities, take all the best flats, and seize the best jobs in medicine, trade, theatre,
33 RGASPI £ 82, op. 2. d. 1456, L 2.
3'RGPI £ 82, op. 2. d. 1456, L 2.
"Addressing Beriia, Bulganin, and Molotov collectively, the authors of this letter ideittifled
themselves as a group of Russian workers (RGASPI L 82, op. 2, d. 1446, IL 42-43). Although it had
been said that Stalin was himself planning Jewish deportation to Birobidzhan , these assertions are
based on hearsay, perhaps paying greater testimony to the popular mood, than to official policy.
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music and so on - 'anywhere where physical work is not necessary'. 36 In both
examples, the authors considered their views not as anti-semitic, but well within the
bounds of Soviet thinking on nationalities.
Others drew on more traditional myths about Jews, and one anonymous letter
addressed to Molotov is illustrative of the way Soviet language sometimes broke
down to reveal violent and unmodified anti-semitism. 37 Although the awkward
handwriting and spelling suggest a lack of confidence in writing, the author
nevertheless manipulated official categories of class in order to portray himself as an
ideal Soviet citizen, claiming to stand for 'all the workers', and elsewhere 'we
military workers and peasants'.38 In the opening paragraph, however, he justified his
hatred of Jews by dint of a personal anecdote which was articulated in a language
long pre-dating 'Bolshevik speak'. 'I was at the front and I was ill', he explained, 'and
there was a yid selling vodka. I asked him to sell me some for money, but he said he'd
only sell it for my gold watch and rings.' The war-time setting suggests his
experiences at the front gave such beliefs new meaning, but his formulation draws on
age-old stereotypes.4° The itinerant Jew selling vodka evoked a banished Russian
past, where Jewish peddlers moved from village to village selling vodka; the man's
36 RGPI £ 82, op. 2., d. 1466, L 55.
37 RGASPI £ 82, op. 2., d. 1466, L 3 8-39.
Although song of his formulations are unusual - for example, he addresses his readers as 'Comrades
Military Workers and Infelligeny' - he has clearly absorbed a woridview where class is an absolutely
crucial aspect in defining identity. This is an example of how a Soviet citizen might share the regime's
official language, but use it in an idiosyncratic manner.
RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1466,1.38. The writer uses the offensive Russian word zhid, equivalent to
the English word 'yld'.
4°Werner argues that the post-war rise in anti-semitism cannot be explained only in terms of the
regime's quest for purity, or the deep roots of Russian anti-semitism, and he strongly eniphasises the
expenence of the wat Weiner exanunes both the impact of German anti-semitic propaganda in the
areas of occupation, and also the rise in Jewish nationalism as the survivors sought to remember and
commemurate their dead. Weiner, Making Se*se of War, pp. 191-235. Sec also Gennadi 1(ostyrchenko,
Out of the Red Shadowc: Anti-Semitirm in Stalin's Russia (New York Prometheus Books, 1995).
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insistence on payment in jewels played into a centuries-old image of Jewish money-
lenders, greedy for gold. 4 ' To make his argument even more compelling, the letter-
writer continued: 'And there's still the fact that they bathe their wives in milk and
then the milk gets sold in the shops!' 42
 Fearing contamination, he projected onto
Jewish culture dangerous and secretive rituals and reviled Jews as unhygienic
outsiders. In another letter, a young worker called Anna Karob claimed they love
'bloody feasts'.43 Echoing the Beilis case of 1913,M when a Jewish worker stood
accused of the ritual murder of a child, these letters suggest the survival of a popular
culture, which had, in some respects, resisted Soviet refashioning.45
According to the Pravda article of 6 April, no anti-semitic formulations, whether
adopting Stalinist conventions or reverting to pre-revolutionaries notions of the Jew,
were now acceptable. Letter-writers put pen to paper because they feared the party
was making a grave mistake. In fact they suspected that this 'leniency' towards Jews
was part of a much wider breakdown in vigilance, and they feared a rise in enemy
activity. Anna Karob's visceral anger towards Jews was linked to her broader concern
that the nation's new leaders were not on their guard. She went on to describe how
41 Herbert A. Strauss writes that images of the Jew originated 'in the complex of differences that
historically had set Jews apart from their agricultural neighbours in education (literacy!), occupational
structures, economic values, and mentalities'. The Jewish community appeared in Russia with the
absorption of Poland into the Russian Empire, and they inhabited a clearly defined geographical area,
employed predominantly in commerce. See Herbert A. Strauss, 'Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union -
Enduring Mentalities', in Hostages ofModernizatwn: Studie3 on Modern Anti-semitism 1870-1933/39,
ed. by Herbert A. Strauss, 3 vols (Berlin de Gruyter, 1993), II, pp. 1177-1187 (p. 1179).
RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1466, L 38.
RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1449, L 122.
Sec Hans Rogger 'The Beilis Case: Anti-Semitism and Politics in the Reign of Nicholas II', Slavic
Review, 25 (1966), 615-629.
45 william Korey has examined the interviews of Soviet refugees conducted by the Haivard project and
finds that pre-revolutionary stereotypes were still entrenched. He suggests that about 10 per cent were
ready to voice a violent anti-semitism that might, for example, depict Jews as ritual blood-drinkers.
Comparing these stereotypes with materials collected for the Pablen Commission in the I 880s, he
identifies remarkable similarities. William Korey, 'Continuities in Popular Perceptions of Jews in the
Soviet Union', Hostage, ofModernization, II, pp. 1383-1405.
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disorienting young people found the rehabilitation of those who had been so
combatively labelled enemies only three months previously:
First of all I'd like to tell you a little about myself; and then I will ask you
to give me an answer. I am a simple worker on the railways and I live in a
dormitory. Lots of signalmen live here, all young boys and girls coming
from different districts. And I'll tell you honestly, no one reads any
newspapers, books or magazines, though sometimes if there's something
alarming on the radio, then you might see the young people gathering
round the wireless. And so when it was announced that the doctor-
professors were released and that the government had fully acquitted them
of the slander the people had cast on them, no one could get their head
round it. Seeing as I read a lot of literature, the girls in our group - 12 of
them - came to me for explanations. But I couldn't help them, when I
myself had lost my head.
According to Anna, young workers may appear impervious to the world of the Soviet
media, but they were nonetheless aware of major change and disturbed by the
breakdown in public culture. Calling 1953 the 'most painful year of all we have lived
through', she went to show that public confidence, already shaken by Stalin's death,
was made doubly unstable by the spectre of enemies at large:
We lost our great friend and father, our beloved and dear losif
Vissarionovich, and the tears on our face were still not dry, the trepidation
in people's hearts over our children's future had not calmed, when the
stunning news spread, and the terrible thought pierced people's brains -
that enemies of the people are free.47
Anna Karob was primarily opposed to the doctors' release because she believed in the
existence of enemies. Experiencing significant distress, she attributed her anxiety both
to Stalin's death and to the inexplicable exoneration of those who had been so
unequivocally cast as enemies. When she claimed that 'enemies of the people are
free' she did not only fear the doctors themselves, now able to engage in their
dastardly actions once more, but also seemed to suspect that the new reform course
indicated a more general rise in enemy activity.
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The violent reactions provoked by the doctors' rehabilitation was not only the result
of anti-semitic traditions, but pointed to wider fears about a breakdown in vigilance
amongst the nation's leaders. Significantly, those who accepted the doctors'
innocence also sought enemies to blame for the confusing and unsatisfactory
situation. Without waiting for the usual prompt from the Soviet press, they launched
into their own vitriolic attacks. One anonymous letter affinned:
We, Soviet citizens of Dnepropetrovsk, like all respectable [chestnye]
people of the Soviet Union and the whole world, heap shame on the
former workers of the MGB, raging bourgeois nationalist-antisemites,
base betrayers of the multi-national Soviet state, bandits and pogrom-
organisers of the same breed as Petliura, Ezhov, Hitler, who committed
cruel violence and torture, in contravention of the laws of the Soviet state,
against leading figures in Soviet medicine - the professors Vovse,
Vinogradov, Egorov, Feld'man, Etingar, B. B. Kogana, M. B. Kogana.48
The paragraph begins with an assertion of collective identity, that has several
foundations - Soviet citizenship, locality, respectability. However, the collective is
primarily bonded by the act of shaming others and branding its enemies. As has been
noted, the press treatment of Riumin and his colleagues in the MVD had been
restrained, and Pravda's criticisms seem insipid next to the string of abuse offered by
this letter. Its writers refused to follow the linguistic shift towards moderation,
ignoring the press's attempt to base criticism on rational argument, not hysteria. Using
all the devices the press had taught them over the past quarter century, the letter-
writers unstintingly piled on layers of abusive terms: ones specific to the case - anti-
semite and pogrom-organisers (pogromshchikx); more malleable labels such as
betrayers, bourgeois nationalists, and bandits; a selection of adjectives to add an extra
4'RGASPI £82, op. 2. d. 1449, L 121.
RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1449, L 122.
4'RGANIf. 5, op. 30,d. 5,1 30.
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dash of condemnation - raging, base, cruel; and reference to some of the big names
from the Soviet roilcall of enemies - Simon Petliura, Nikolai Ezhov and Adolf Hitler.
They constructed compound terms such as 'bandits-antisemites-terrorists' (bandity-
antisemity-terroristy) which, by chaining together insults, became Iriply virulent.49
The Soviet citizen was, it seems, extremely fluent in this language of hate, and found
great difficulty censuring opponents without imagining them as enemies.
Some writers were obedient to the press, calling Riwnin merely an 'adventurist'
(avantiurist), but many were more innovative, labelling those who fabricated the
cases 'foul vermin' (gnusnaia gadina) and 'sadists from the NKVD' (sadisty iz
NKVD).5° Tn January, the doctors were vile enemies and Lidiia Timashehuk the
national heroine whose vigilance had unmasked these 'base spies'; with the
rehabilitation of the doctors, Timashchuk was now frequently imagined as an enemy.
Although some of the more vehemently anti-semitic letters expressed resentment that
a Russian woman had been condemned, many other citizens were ready to adopt her
as the new foe. Chugunov from Moscow wrote to Pravda, saying 'That base creature,
that diploma'd Northerner with Hitlerite ideology, under the guise of a Soviet patriot,
committed the most disgusting anti-Soviet acts.' 5' Timashchuk was thus dehumanised
and de-Sovietised, linked to Hitler and labelled an outsider.
Despite the press's apparent attempt to find a more neutral voice, Soviet readers did
not immediately modify their way of viewing the world, and a Manichean mentality
In the rhetoric of the Moscow show-trials Dernt Filzsinns identifies compound tem as one of
the rhetorical tools used to produce the required nwod of excited hatred. Fitisimons, 'Shoot the Mad
Dogs!'.
5°RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 5,11.28-30.
51 RGANI L 5, op. 30, d. 5,1. 8.
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proved powerful. Not only unleashing a wave of anti-semitic texts, the rehabilitation
of the Kremlin doctors spurred some citizens to defend a Soviet identity that relied on
its collective vigilance in the fight against enemies.
An Enemy Unmasked
A second political outrage hit the headlines in July, when the tentative triumvirate of
Beriia, Molotov, and Georgii Malenkov collapsed. Beriia was not only removed from
the political arena, forfeiting his position as Minister of Internal Affairs, but also
became the subject of a criminal investigation which was to end in December with
public announcement of the death sentence. In his memoirs, Khrushchev depicts
Beriia's ousting as a legitimate move against a nascent dictator whose undisguised
manoeuvring for power had begun immediately upon Stalin's death. 52 The ongoing
disturbances in Berlin and the unsuccessful role that Beriia had played in German
affairs offered more grounds to make the case for Beriia's arrest. 53 In making Beriia's
arrest public, the authorities chose, however, to evoke the concept of 'socialist
legality' once again.
In Pravda's rendition, Beriia's offences were many and varied: he had attempted a
personal seizure of power; he had tried to promote the Ministry of Internal Affairs
over the Soviet government; he had even delayed decisions on rural matters in order
to increase social strife in the country; crucially, he had disobeyed orders to
strengthen legality (zakonnost') and to correct certain cases of lawlessness and
N. S. KhnLShCheV, Khrushchev Remembei, trans. by Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971),
pp. 321-341.
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arbitrariness within the Ministry. Generous proof was thus presented to demonstrate
that Beriia had turned away from communism to become a 'bourgeois', a hireling of
foreign imperialist powers. These accusations were all made public on the front page
of Pravda on 10 July 1953•M
Beriia was the highest ranking political figure to be eliminated since the show trials of
the 1930s, and it hit the front pages without any sort of warning or build-up. The tenor
of the first article suggests apprehension about introducing this piece of disturbing
news. The headline was encouraging - 'The indestructible unity of the party,
government and soviet people'— and roughly the first third of the article was spent
reassuring the reader of the great industrial and economic strength of the Soviet
Union. This uncertainty also manifested itself in the language of the text. To some
extent, Pravda returned to the hostile and adversarial rhetoric that had been employed
under Stalin to condemn enemies and designated Beriia a 'bourgeois turncoat', 'a
traitor', 'a renegade' and, of course, an 'enemy of the people'. There was tentative
reference to a 'cult of personality', as a damaging phenomenon in Soviet life. 55 As the
term the 'cult of personality' (lati 't lichnosti) had been frequently encountered in the
press during the Stalinist purges as a 'battle cry' to incite popular anger, it could be
interpreted as the start of a more intense campaign against enemies. However, the
article did not abandon the new terms of 1953, and the more extreme aspects of the
" Amy Knight, Berw: Stalin's Fi,rt Lieutenant (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993) p.
191.
' 'Nesokrushimoe edinenie partii, pravitelstva, soveiskogo naroda', F7uvda, 10 July 1953, P.1.
" Fravda declared: 'In its party propaganda the Moscow party organisation has deviated from Marxist-
Leninist conception of the cult of personality over the last few years. Instead of explaining correctly the
role of the party in the building of commmiism in the country, party propaganda often got caught up in
the cult of personality. This meant the role of the party and its leading centre was overlooked and the
creative activity of the party rank and file and the broad working masses was diminished.' Sec
'Kommunisty moskvy i moskovskoi oblasti edinodushno odobriaiut postanovienir plenumalsK
KPSS', Favda, 10 July 1953, p.2. Again note that Beriia's name does not appear in the headline.
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Stalinist lexicon were avoided. In official rhetoric, for example, neither zoological
labels nor metaphors of disease were used to condemn Beriia. Instead the articles
repeatedly alluded to the importance of zakonnost', and Beriia's disregard for legality
in his work at the MVD. Readers were told that Beriia had opposed the changes of
recent months:
Required to fulfil the directives of the Central Committee of the party and
the Soviet govermnent on strengthening Soviet legality and eradicating
lawlessness and arbitrariness [bezzakoniia iproizvol], Beriia deliberately
hampered the completion of these directives, and in several cases sought
to distort them.57
The lexicon of the socialist legality campaign was now expanded, with the notions of
lawlessness and arbitrariness (bezzakonila iproizvol) frequently used to condemn
Beriia's political style. Thus on the one hand the public was encouraged to imagine
Beriia as an enemy, on the other readers were told to abhor the arbitrary practices of
vilifying enemies encouraged under Beriia. The ambiguity gave rise to a variety of
passionate, and often confused, reactions.
Beriia's direct victims were some of the first to respond. A letter signed by A. E.
Nikiforov from the town of Syktyvkar in the Komi ASSR opened with a dramatic
self-revelation: 'I am not at all Nikiforov and I am no Georgian. I am Nikolai
Vasilievich Kokoev, Ossetian, and for twenty years! have been hiding from the
enemy of the people Beriia under the surname Nikoforov.'58 Having fiercely hidden
his real identity and endured separation from his family for two decades, he
considered the revelations about Beriia sufficient proof of refonn to risk confession.
Nikiforov/Kokoev was one of the first purge victims to write this sort of plea for
Khaikhordin The Collective and the Individual in Russia, p. 194.
'Nesoknishimoc edinenie partii, pravitelstva, sovetskogo naroda', P-avda, 10 July 1953, p.1.
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rehabilitation, believing that the attack on Beriia and the Ministry of the Interior
documented the Soviet leadership's intention to right some of the wrongs of the past.
He was not the only purge victim to take such a step, and Pravda 's editors reported to
the Central Committee that they had several letters, coming in particular from the
Caucasus, where Beriia worked in the early part of his career. 59 Others chose to write
directly to the Central Committee, believing their story worthy of the leaders'
attention. On the whole, however, many seemed to have hesitated in 1953. It was not
until 1954 when rehabilitation was firmly under way that large numbers of purge
victims despatched their petitions to the Central Committee and other official
bodies.6°
In addition to such personal missives, however, several letters engaged with the
question of the enemy broadly construed. Many seem to have greeted Beriia's arrest
with feelings of relief, welcoming an apparent return to the rituals of condemnation
and castigation that had flourished under Stalin. The instabilities of the preceding
months could, it seemed, be explained by the unmasking of Beriia, an enemy of
almost unprecedented stature. Official reports frequently commented on the rapid
proliferation of 'absurd' rumours.61 Between 10 July and 20 August, Pravda received
300 letters from readers about Beriia's arrest, and many of the extracts they included
in their summary reveal a delight in constructing and condemning a new enemy.62
5 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 4, L 133.
RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 4.
60 !n April 1954, A. A. Kalmykova wrote to Mlkoian, dramatically opening her letter with the moment
when she first heard about the arrest of Beriia on the radio, and claiming to be one of Benia'a victima
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A collective identity founded on a shared urge to revile the 'enemy other' could once
more be articulated. It was a community accessible to any literate Soviet person.
Excluded physically from society by illness, P. Loginov saw the collective
denunciation of Beriia as a chance to join the imagined community, writing:
I am seriously ill, I am bed-ridden, but along with the people, I can still
express my indignation over the baseness of the bandit Beriia. As a Soviet
person, I have the right to voice my anger and have the right to ask the
Supreme Court of the USSR to punish this despicable enemy severely, to
punish him in accordance with all the laws of Soviet legality. The bandit
Beriia deserves to be hung like a dog.63
Again a reader's interpretation of the press reveals the powerful nature of Stalinist
culture. Although there is a nod to the new insistence on Soviet legality, Loginov
labelled Beriia a 'bandit', 'dog', and 'enemy', drawing on the rhetoric of the 1930s
press in a manner far more extreme than the Pravda editorial. Z. A. Shomko
displayed equal readiness to engage in violent rhetoric against Beriia. Although her
letter began conventionally, with images ofjoyous throngs of Soviet parents
unanimously declaring, 'We won't allow anyone to destroy our happiness and the
happiness of our children,' she soon transformed these Soviet parents into a blood-
thirsty lynch-mob: 'I join my voice to the millions of voices of mothers and fathers
who say: "Death to the base enemy of the people Beriia. Death to enemies of
humanity! Death!MThe core Soviet values of family and happiness are defended
against potential assailants in the most bellicose terms. Confined to composing letters,
Shomko not only imagined a community of like-minded parents, but also dreamed of
joining a crowd viciously shouting slogans of death.
'2 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 4,11. 129-141.
'3 RGANI L 5, op. 30, d. 4,1140.
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Some members of the public seem to have regretted the decline of the 'performative'
aspects of Soviet culture, and wished for public rituals to be elaborated. Claiming that
Beriia was a beast (zver), M. E. Nud'ko in Kazakhstan hoped that the collective
hatred of the enemy might be embodied in colourful rituals. Nud'ko wrote: 'He
should be put in a cage like ajackal and taken round the cities, the large communist
building-sites, factories, mines and collective farms, showing workers his brutal,
beast-like [ozverelyi] physiognomy.'65 Perhaps remembering the revolutionary
celebrations of the late 1920s when large mannequins representing various enemies
were paraded along the streets in cages, Nud'ko now imagined a pageant enlivened by
the performance of a living enemy.
Beriia's arrest offered a possible key to understanding the changes occurring in the
country. In the identification of a new enemy, people found a scapegoat for the
misfortunes that had befallen them over the past four months. By placing Beriia's fall
as the culmination of a narrative that began so traumatically in early March with the
first announcement of Stalin's illness, citizens seemed to hope that this marked a
return to more familiar territory. Beriia was imagined as an enemy of great stature
who could be made to bear responsibility for all the recent ills, from Stalin's death in
March to the release of the Kremlin doctors and the amnesty decree.
In a world where evil plots were so frequently uncovered, it is perhaps unsurprising
that Stalin's death came to be viewed as suspicious. In a report on workers' reactions
to the newspaper readings held in July 1953, Mikhailov listed some of the questions
"RGANI £ 5, op. 30, d. 4,1. 141.
'6 Bonnell, Iconography, p. 210.
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posed. One person asked if Beriia's 'sabotage' had caused Stalin's sudden death,
while at the Voroshilov kolkhoz another wanted to know if Beriia and his assistants
had 'shortened the life of IosifVissarionovich Stalin'. 67 Seemingly reluctant to
believe Stalin human and mortal, they preferred to create a more dramatic iaarrative,
in which Beriia starred as the evil plotter and where death conlirmed Stalin's status as
hero and martyr.
At such meetings, many also brought up the Doctors' Plot: What role had Beriia
played in it? Was it true that the doctors had now escaped abroad? Was the release of
the doctors correct, or had perhaps Beriia contrived the release in order to slander
colleagues in the MVD?68 Behind these questions lay the glimmer of hope that the
release of the doctors, the repudiation of anti-semitism, and the apparent softening of
Stalinist culture, were all part of a loathsome plot concocted by Beriia. Beiriia was also
blamed for the amnesty. 69
 One kolkhoz member asked: Was the decree on amnesty
linked to Beriia's sabotage? 7° Unwelcome to many citizens, the amnesty could be
rebuffed as part and parcel of Beriia's criminal activity. The unmasking of an enemy
was a familiar act in Stalinist culture and was interpreted as a signal that the recent
reforms - such as the amnesty and the doctors' release - might be reversed and
repudiated.
'7 ROANI t 5, op. 30, d. 4,11. 12-13.
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One colourful rumour wove a complex narrative, offering an inventive explanation for
the difficult events of past months. 7' The rumour, attributed to a Moscow party
member named Zen'kovich, began with Stalin's death:
At the time of Stalin's illness there were permanently guards from the
MVD in the room where he was lying. After L V. Stalin's death all the
guards took an aeroplane to go on holiday to a resort. During the flight the
aeroplane exploded and all the guards died. This was done on Beriia's
instructions in order to cover up his traces.
Zen'kovich went on to claim that Beriia had been the main person responsible for the
release of the doctors, asserting they had now been re-arrested. He finished his tale by
claiming that 'the amnesty recently decreed was on the whole for Viasovites and
criminals, and Beriia wanted to turn them into an anny and seize power.' Widely
resented as a threat to law and order, Beriia's disgrace allowed the amnesty to be
discredited as part of a planned coup d'etat.
From the report we know almost nothing of Zen'kovich, but the fact that his story was
incorporated into a report on the high level of rumours in the capital seems to imply
that his version of events was not considered out of keeping with the general mood.
Failing to offer a convincing narrative of the events of 1953, the socialist legality
campaign left citizens to construct their own explanations. As they did so, they
displayed their fear of the changes occurring, and in their exaggerated vilification of
Beriia, their continued psychological dependency on the concept of the 'enemy'.
Anxiety over the effect of Beriia's arrest even infiltrated the higher levels of the party.
Mikhailov also reported on the party elite's debates at the Moscow gorkom and
71RGANIf.5,op.30,d.4,L25.
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obkom plenum on 9 July 1953.72 Although Mikhailov asserted the meeting's
unanimous condemnation of Beriia, the report hinted at some misgivings, even
amongst the highest ranking delegates. While S. N. Kruglov, Beriia's replacement at
the MVD, admitted that mistakes within the Ministry had allowed careerists and
enemies of the people to defame honourablc party and state workers, he also
considered the meeting an opportune moment to voice his concerns about reform. He
reminded the audience that 'the police force has a duty to ensure exemplary public
order, to intercept any attacks from criminal elements, to uncover any crimes rapidly
and punish the criminals.' 73 Beriia's arrest, accompanied by criticisms of the MVD
and promotion of zakonnost' already led some within the party elite to worry that
more liberal policies was resulting in social unrest. Speaking three months after the
huge amnesty of March 1953, his comments testified to widespread concerns about
rising threats to Soviet law and order.
Mass Exodus from the Gulag
Let us now return to the amnesty. Decreed on 27 March 1953 by the Supreme Soviet
and announced on Pravda's front page the following day, it had far-reaching effect
over the course of 1953 and beyond.14 Prisoners who had displayed a conscientious
attitude towards work and whose crimes did not represent 'a significant danger for the
state' were to be offered amnesty. The first clause released those with sentences under
five years, while later clauses amnestied pregnant women, mothers with children
RGAM L 5, op. 30, d. 3,11. 69-74. This meeting took place on the basis of the government decree,
prior to the newspaper article. This meant that on 10 July 1953 Pravda could also publish a report on
Moscow party reactions.
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under ten, children under 18, men over 55, women over 50, those convicted for
certain offences at work or during military service, and those sentenced by laws now
under review. The decree also recognised the need to reconsider the length of
sentences given to those convicted for some domestic crimes and work-related
offences and indicated that criminal justice reform was planned.
Just three weeks after Stalin's death, readers were told that this mass release of
prisoners was possible as a result of the 'consolidation' of the Soviet state and society
(uprochneniia obshchestvennogo igosudarstvennogo stroia), the improved welfare
(blagosostoianie) and raised cultural levels of the population, the growth in citizens'
political awareness, and their honourable attitude towards their publiw duty. The
wording of this decree suggested that the amnesty should be regarded as a step in the
nation's progress towards a harmonious and self-regulating society. Having reached a
new stage in its evolutionary development, Soviet society could now be trusted to deal
with former offenders and deviants within society.
The Soviet authorities tried to persuade the public that the amnesty was an appropriate
decision. Writing in Pravda three weeks after the decree, K. P. Gorshenin, Minister of
Justice, asked readers to interpret the amnesty in the light of 'socialist legality'
(sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost ), and lauded the decision to allow prisoners to return to
their homes and work as evidence of socialist humanity (sotsialisticheskaia
gummanost p)." The article promised further reform of the criminal justice system,
alongside more assurances that 'socialist legality' would be strictly observed, and
citizens' rights defended.
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Despite such efforts, the amnesty proved immensely problematic. Not only the
magnitude of the release, but its composition caused concern for in practice the
amnesty did not only include petty criminals. In reducing sentences by half for all
prisoners, the fourth clause could be applied to those convicted for even the most
serious crimes and serving a twenty-five year sentence. In fact, over a third of those
released by the amnesty had sentences of over five years and were amnestied in
accordance with the fourth clause.76 Although the seventh clause sought to filter out
the most dangerous, by excluding those sentenced for large-scale theft of socialist
property, banditry and premeditated murder, it was apparently not effective.77
Recidivists who had already served many years inside the camps, establishing
networks and associations and imbibing the subculture of the criminal underworld,
were now heading back from the Gulag en masse.
Travelling back across Russia, drinking to freedom and to excess, some shouted anti-
Soviet slogans, others brandished knives or committed petty crimes, more again
simply hung out around train stations, swearing and smoking. With trains already sites
of undesirable behaviour, the railway network was now overrun by a swarm of angry
" 'Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost' na strazhe interesov naroda', Pavda, 17 April 1953, p.2.
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ex-convicts, many with no clear destination. 75 The police did their best to regulate the
situation, and on 4 April 1953, an internal circular from the Deputy Minister of
Internal Affairs, I. A. Serov, announced several measures to 'safeguard social order
and to prevent displays of criminal behaviour in places with a concentration of
prisoners released by amnesty'. 79 Local authorities were instructed to ensure there
were sufficient boats and trains running so that those released did not gather at
stations; police were to have a strong presence on trains carrying large numbers of cx-
prisoners and at stations where prisoners transferred, so as to prevent them assembling
in the parks and markets nearby, station buffets were to refrain from selling them
spirits. Returnees were clearly regarded as a major threat to law and order. Moreover,
the measures enacted revealed clear concern that the returnees would not go 'home'
but remain a migrant, menacing mass; police were told to set up surveillance of them
using the services of railways officers, local housing committees, caretakers and other
trusted people. Special attention was likewise devoted to places where there was a
concentration of returnees, including 'apartment-traps, dens, doss-houses', 'attics,
cellars, empty places, stairwells and entrances in large building', and warehouses,
dacha areas, and the 'outskirts of towns and villages'. In the authorities' imagination,
the returnees occupied liminal areas - on the edges of towns, up in the attics, down
below ground.
The authorities were clearly ill-prepared to accommodate the returnees once they
arrived in the cities. Failing to take pre-emptive measures, and spurred into action
only by the escalating crisis, the Council of Ministers issued a resolution in late May
Th Vladimir Kozlov describes how in the spring of 1953 soldiers drank to excess during a Irain journey,
resulting in fights with civilians, thefts and even attacks on the local police. He does not present this as
an atypical incident Kozlov, Mass Uprisings, pp. 47-50.
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1953 on 'the elimination of inadequacies in the resettlement of citizens freed by the
amnesty'. The problems continued throughout the summer, however, with more new
arrivals every week. Between 20 and 30 of June 1953, for example, 45,400 cx-
convicts arrived in towns and cities. Reporting to Khrushchev on the progress made in
June and July, the official responsible for the returnees, Pronin, claimed that the
situation was improving, but acknowledged that the deadline of 15 June set by the
decree had not been met. Towards the end of the report, he suggested that even with
the new and more vigorous measures adopted, a core body of unemployed ex-zeks
remained.80 On 1 July 1953 he explained that sixteen per cent of arrivals had still not
been resettled. This was due partly to the sheer volume of arrivals every week, partly
to local sluggishness, for he admitted that some local administrations and party
organisations were still working unsatisfactorily. In his view, however, this residual
core of unsettled zeks also presented a more grave and long-term problem. According
to the reports Promn received from the regions, most of those who were not yet in
employment, had in fact been offered work and refused it; mostly people aged
between 25 and 30, the report described them as 'fallen people [upustivshiesia liudi],
thief-recidivists, not wishing to work honestly, but once more to take the path of
robbery, theft and other crimes.' 8 ' Both on the railways lines spanning the Soviet
Union and in the cities, the amnesty threatened to produce a mobile underclass that
refused to be shackled by either the Soviet registration system or by work.
One result was a rise in crime over the summer of 1953. If in the first quarter of 1953,
2280 cases of violent assault were investigated, the figure rose to 5081 by the third
GARF L 9401, op. la. d. 521.1 14.
' The Russian terni 'zek' denotes prisoner, an abbreviated form of the Rissian word 'zakliuchennyi'.
"RGANI £ 5, op. 30, d. 36,11.35-7.
73
quarter; cases of rape from 1272 in the first quarter to 2181 by the third, murder from
1891 to 3103.82 Despite the attempts to reform criminal justice throughout 1953, the
perceived rise in crime was such that the Council of Ministers issued an order in late
August 'On strengthening the protection of social order and the struggle with
criminality', which promoted harsher sentences for violent crimes.
Politicians' assessments of the rise in crime varied. Kliment Voroshilov, for one,
believed that the public outcry was exaggerated. At the Central Committee plenum,
called in early July to condemn Beriia, he criticised the way the former head of the
Ministry of the Interior had implemented the amnesty, but gave a moderate
assessment of the rise in crime:
There is much talk, and many letters - both signed and unsigned - have
been written about the murders, rapes and so on that are supposedly the
result of the amnesty. However, when you make inquiries with the various
officials responsible for the regions from where these alarming accounts
have come, it appears that in reality nothing of the sort has occurred.M
Speaking on the same subject, however, the Leningrad party chief, Vasilii Andrianov
took a different tack:
On the subject of the amnesty, I think that provocateurs within the
Ministry of the Interior left their dirty mark. Out-and-out cut-throats were
let out and the police failed to make even the most basic of preparations.
As soon as these people appeared in the city, the knives were out. A very
alarming situation developed and without a doubt, the letters sent in to
local authorities and to the government and the Central Committee were
justified.85
Voroshilov and Andrianov's commentaries are highly significant in what they reveal
about the relationship between state and society, for - despite their differing
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interpretations - both leaders articulated serious concerns for the public reaction to the
amnesty, and both identify letters as the prime means to gauge society's mood.
Close reading of four letters written over the course of 1953 suggests that the public
resisted and even derided official notions of the amnesty as an act of humanity and
legality. Citizens in fact demanded a more hostile attitude towards those who violated
the social order, expressing fears that the city was becoming a site of crime and
deviant behaviour. Two letters from Moscow, one from Leningrad, and a fourth from
the city of Kazan, these texts articulate an escalating urban anxiety.
Throughout the Soviet period, as the state struggled to impose order on the city, the
trope of 'hooliganism' - first emerging in 'Russian national discourse' at the turn of
the century - embodied the nation's ongoing struggle to bring order and respectability
to urban space.86 The discourse of hooliganism was one possible way to understand
the disruptions to Soviet life in the summer of 1953. In May, a Leningrad mother
penned Molotov a very tentative letter. Asking him repeatedly to forgive her for
taking up his time, she felt obliged to ask for his help. In Leningrad, citizens were
fearful, the police powerless. Emphasising her suffering as a mother, she evoked the
collective anguish of the war:
85 RGANIL2,Op 1, d. 42,14.
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Dear Comrade Molotov, you know how hard it is for children to lose a
father, and for parents to lose children. This isn't the war after all. But
every day, parents mourn their children [...] Dear Molotov, we mothers
ask you, beg you, please make the police more vigilant, and keep people
safe.
The letter spoke for an imagined community of respectable Soviet citizens, who
cherished family values and survived the war, but now felt targeted and threatened by
an unnecessary danger. This threat was personified by the figure of the 'hooligan'. By
calling for greater police attention, she hinted at her own fear that a lack of vigilance
was threatening the community.
Other letter-writers presented returnees through the symbolic figure of the bandit, and
were more explicit in their fears of the enemies. In contrast to the rather lachrymose
tone of the first, a second letter to Molotov manifested an aggressive opposition to the
amnesty and labelled the returnees 'bandits'. The anonymous letter-writer claimed
that 'night and day, the returnees, these jailbird-bandits [vernuvshiesia tiuremshchiki-
bandity] kill and slaughter peaceable citizens, carry out armed break-ins at
warehouses, and murder guards and policemen'.88
A third letter, from a Moscow tram-conductor called Antonova, employed similar
terms, claiming that 'such disgraceful horrors happen in Moscow, without even
speaking about the Moscow suburbs, where the bandits reign [tsarstvo banditov],
especially with their lairs in Nikitovka and Obiralovka, stations on the Gor'kii railway
line'.89 According to Antonova, the bandits had created their own mini-kingdoms
within the confines of Moscow. This emergence of local identities within the urban
RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1466,171.
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space - often at odds with the intentions of the authorities - is often a feature of the
modem city, but how these pockets of criminality were defined is significant In her
treatment of hooligans in turn-of-the-century Petersburg, Joan Neuberger suggests
that the hotbeds of hooliganism had then primarily been poor slum areas. 9° In 1953, in
contrast, the danger-spots were not identified by their poverty, but as points on
railway lines - 'their lairs in Nikitovka and Obiralovka, stations on the Gor'kii
railway line'. Whereas the hooligan tended to be a figure emerging from within the
urban landscape, the bandit was a man in transit, arriving by train as an outsider and
an alien in the city. Although the Russian bandit - or razboinik - had been a common
character in pre-revolutionary popular literature, and held an ambiguous appeal for
readers,9' the term bandit promoted in the 1930s as part of the lexicon of Soviet
newspeak was categorically hostile.92 Constantly reappearing in the course of 1953,
the term bandit branded criminal returnees with the same hysterical hatred that the
Neuberger, Hooliganism, pp. 216-278.
"Jeffrey Brooks' woik on popular literature of the late imperial period includes a study of the 'bandit'
hero in lubok and newspaper serial fiction, read by both urban and rural readers. Although real-life
bandits were violent criminals and regarded with fear, they also stood for the conflict between state and
society, and - especially as the Russian people geared up for 'one of the major rebellions in history' -
they were also admired as personifications of 'the yearning for a better world and a kind of anarchistic
freedom'. Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917
rinceton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1985), pp. 166-213.
Razboinik is the old Russian word, a derivative of the verb 'razbivat" meaning to 'break' or 'smash'
and in the literature explored by Brooks, popular writers use only this term. Although the word bandit
was already an established borrowing in the Russian language, it does not seem to have passed over
from elite culture into popular speech. In the Soviet period, hewever bandit eclipsed razboinik
producing a crucial semantic shift Published in the 1930s, the Explanatory Dictionaiy of the Russian
Language gives three meanings to the word razboinik firstly, a violent thief - but this usage is noted to
be obsolete; secondly, as a 'rhetorical' term - giving the example 'fascist bandits' (fashistskye
razboinik); thirdly, in colloquial Russian, as an affectionate term which would be appropriate for a
naughty child. Carrying affectionate connotations in familiar speech and yet able to denote fascists in
official rhetoric, the semantic value of the word razboinik was ambivalent The entry for bandit, in
contrast, suggests that the word was becoming more viable. The dictionary offers the following
definitions: an 'armed thief'; a member of an enemy partisan band a rhetorical term e.g. 'imperialist
bandits' (imperialist- bandiy). This final use was marked a new use. Bandit carried none of the
affectionate nuance, which weakened the capacity of razboinzk to castigate the enemy effectively, and
was the ascendant term, acquiring new figurative meanings. As a foreign word, bandit could nxwe
forcibly present complete opposition, and it became a core term in the aggressive newspeak of the
l930s. See N. M. Shanskii's Ethnologicheskii slovar' russkogo iazyka (Moscow Izdatel'stvo
moskovskogo universiteta, 1965); Vladimir Dal', Tolkoiyi slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo iayka, (St
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press had previously directed at 'enemies of the people', and branded them as
outsiders to the Soviet city.
Letters to Molotov not only labelled returnees from the Gulag bandity, but also
adopted many of the rhetorical devices developed by the Soviet press to castigate
political enemies. The anonymous letter cited above opened:
Dear Viacheslav Mikhailovich!
Your gracious [milosthyi] decree of the 24 March of this year about the
release of criminal-recidivists, degenerates, the dregs of humanity, has
turned into a blood-bath, into carnage, inificted on the workers of the
towns and countryside.93
Like a good Soviet journalist, the writer piled on layer after layer of insult, forming a
blanket of animosity to entrap the reader. The composition of compound terms like
'jailbird-bandits' indicated enemies so vile that no single word could do them justice.
Later in the letter, he invoked one of the great enemies of Russian cultural memory,
rating the horrors Soviet citizens were currently experiencing as greater than those
'the blood-thirsty Ghenghis Khan inflicted on his enemies'.94
Meanwhile, tram-driver Antonova proved equally eloquent in her attack on 'bandits':
Indeed this dirty water, these Russian 'gangsters' ['gangstery 1 are
without conscience [sovest'] or honour [chest]. We conquered Germany
when she was armed to the teeth, can it really be that our state is without
the strength to conquer these parasites [darmoedov]?95
Her metaphors of 'dirty water' and 'parasites' suggest the returnees were a source of
dangerous contagion. By invoking the enemy Germany, she drew on the nation's
Petersburg and Moscow: Tipografa M. 0. VoI'fa, 1882); D. N. Ushakov, Tolkoyi slovsr' rucskogo
iazyka (Moscow: OOIZ, 1935).
RGASPI L 82, op. 2, d. 1466,171. The anosiymous correspondent mistakes the date of the amnesty
decree.
RCiASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1466,1.71.
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recent trauma to whip her readers into a state of unified hostility. The term 'gangster'
was more unusual. A more recent borrowing than either 'bandit' or 'hooligan', the
word 'gangster' was still regarded as foreign word, and indicated her desire to reject
the returnees outright as a foreign import. Qualifying the gangsters as 'Russian',
however, she acknowledged they were a blight too familiar to be cast out as
'American'. Choosing to label them 'Russian' rather than 'Soviet', she dismissed the
returnees as part of the old, uncultured past that the Soviet world had supplanted.
Antonova tried to find an effective rhetoric with which to repel returnees and the
disruptive behaviour they brought as something completely beyond the boundaries of
the respectable realm of Soviet society.
These letters embody an outright refusal to contemplate the readmission of returnees
back into Soviet society. While Pravda editorials claimed that those released from the
camps had shown a conscientious attitude towards work during their time in the
Gulag, readers were more doubtful. Challenging the claims made in the press, one
correspondent from Kazan asked: 'Why didn't Stalin - who so valued the people's
labour - do this? In the month or so since Comrade Stalin's death, have the criminals
really become 'conscious' [soznatel'nye] citizens?' Distraught that the people had
lost their most heroic defender, the author questioned the notion that a criminal could
so easily be brought to consciousness. While the party seemed to be using Stalin's
death as a break that allowed them to move forwards to a new stage of revolutionary
' RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1440, L 78.
According to N. M. Shanskii's EynwlogicaI Dictionwy of the Russian Language of 1965, this
borrowing cane from the USA in the twentieth century. He notes that it appeared for the first time in
the Dictionary of Foreign Words in 1942. Only a decade previously therefore, it was still very clearly
on the imrgins of what was accepted as Russian.
ROASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1466,1.58.
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development, where all could be brought to consciousness, this correspondent
remained unconvinced.
In a similar vein, another letter-writer listed the horrible crimes committed by the
returnees whilst ironically referring to them as 'the refonned' (ispravshie.cia). By
placing the term in inverted commas within the context of such anger, he clearly
derided it. Antonova was equally distrustful of the word, writing that 'only the grave
corrects the hunchback' (gorbatogo ispravit mogila). She also enp1oyed the term
gummanic/tat' (to be humane) - a pejorative derivative of gummaizost ' - and told
Molotov there has been quite enough of it already. Gorshenin's piromotion of Soviet
humanity had clearly failed to convince Pravda readers, and the term was either
rejected or mocked by angry members of the public.
Antonova ended her letter with some suggestions for how the authorities should deal
with criminals. Antonova was much more extreme in her recommendations than the
Leningrad mother who requested that 'hooligans' be punished in keeping with the
law. She wrote:
We ask you to decree a law, which says that a thief who is caught, will
have five fingers cut off from his left hand, they should be branded, so
that people will know that these are thieves and can beware of them.
Merciless and severe measures should be taken.98
In her work on punishment in the nineteenth century, Abby Shrader writes that a
combination of coiporal punishment, physical mutilation and Siberian exile 'served as
a mechanism by which autocrats constructed social boundaries by marking those who
RGASPI L 82, op. 2, d. 1440,1 78.
80
transgressed the parameters of social behaviour'Y Under Stalin, such boundaries had
been maintained and intensified by the extensive development of the Gulag as a place
of exile, while corporeal punishment and physical mutilation had diminished - at least
in theory. With the division between the two zones now unclear, Antonova seemed to
see the return of deliberate and overt physical mutilation as the only way left to retain
solid boundaries between respectable society and its deviants.
'From the Courtroom'
Concerns about rising crime were not confined to citizens' letters. The year 1953 saw
the Soviet press radically increase the inches of newspaper print dedicated to law-and-
order news. On Thursday 18 June, the back page of Pravda contained the serial rubric
'From the courtroom'. Under the simple headline, 'Thief-recidivist', the reader
learned how the criminal Kotov was tried for pick-pocketing and sent down for six
years - his sixth sentence. 10° One week later, Pravda reported that the organiser of a
gang of anned thieves working in the Moscow suburbs had been sentenced for
twenty-five years.'°' Local newspapers took the cue, and there was a dramatic rise in
the number of 'From the courtroom' (Iz zala suda) articles over the coming months.'°2
Leningradskaiapravda published three 'From the courtroom' articles in late June,'°3
and a further five by the end of the year. Moskovskaiapravda and the Vladimir local
' Abby M. Shrader, 'Branding the Exile as 'Other': Corporal Punishment and the Consiruction of
Boundaries in mid-l9th Ccntuiy Russia', in Rusrian Moderniy: Politics, Know!edge Practices, ed. by
David L. Hoffman and Yanni Kotsonis (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 19-40 (pp. 21-
22).
'°°'Vor-Retsidivist', Pravda, 18 June 1953, P.4.
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'Khuhgany-Grabiteli', Pravda, 24 June 1953, p.4.
'°2 This section is based on a close study of Pravda, Leningradskaia pravda, Moshovzkaia pravda and
Prizyv (the local newspaper for Viadunir oblast') over the course of 1953 and 1954.
'°3 'VoryNakny', Lenzngradskaia pravda, 23 June 1953, p.4; 'Grabitei', Leningrad.ckaiapravda,
25 June 1953, p.4; 'Prestupniki Nakl7my', Leningrads kaia pravda, 28 June 1953, p.4.
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newspaper Prizyv were somewhat slower to adapt to the new trend, but over the
course of the coming half year they would also report on the bands of criminals
making the city streets unsafe. Moskovskaia pravda had not contained a single crime
report between March and August, but six appeared in the final four months of the
year. Similarly, Prizyv published four reports from the courtroom between October
and December, compared to one article in the first half ofthe year.
The rubric 'From the courtroom' (Iz zala suda) was not in itself a new invention. Not
only had it been common in the pre-revolutionary boulevard press, the column had
also appeared in the Stalinist press.'°4 However, crime reporting before June 1953 was
only intermittent, and the crimes described posed little real threat to citizens' safety.
In February 1953, for example, an article entitled 'Criminal gang' referred to a racket
stealing and selling on watches, but the watches were pilfered from a factory, not
snatched from passers-by; 105 a second article reported on the theft of a flre-engine.'°6
The 'From the courtroom' column was now radically reworked to become a forum to
discuss crime, and even to voice the fears of respectable Soviet citizens. A typical
report recounted how on Sundays throughout the summer of 1953, a band of 14
criminals terrorised scores of Leningraders as they spent their well-earned leisure time
relaxing on the Karelian peninsula.'°7
Crime reporting has a didactic element. In his study of the British press, Steve
Chibnall writes that crime news is a means to provide the public with their 'moral
'°4 Louise McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime: The Development ofa Mass-
Circulation Press (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
'°5 'Sbaika prestupnikov', Moskovskaia pravda, 7 February 1953, p.4.
1% 
'Plody beskonlrol'nosti i rotozeistva', Moskovskaiapravda, 12 February 1953, p.4.
107 'Llkvidatslia shalki banditov', Leningradskaiapravda, 10 November 1954, p.4.
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instruction'. According to Chibnall, 'More often than not, the columns oflaw-and-
order news are peopied by heroes and villains, personifications of good and evil
acting roles in a symbolic drama."° 8 In distinct contrast to the overall direction of the
socialist legality campaign, the back-page crime reports did indeed offer a symbolic
confrontation between good and evil. As such, the articles showed a lack øf
consistency within the 'official' approach towards criminals. At odds with
Gorshenin's public promotion of 'socialist legality' and 'humanity' in April, these
smaller articles articulated a more severe approach towards offenders. They thus
suggest that the press was not only a channel of communication from the authorities
to society, but also vice versa. Many of the concerns articulated by citizens in the
letters they composed in the spring of 1953, were now voiced in the press. At this
point, Soviet journalists seemed to concur that crime was a real threat, and! that
criminals were inherently irredeemable, and consequently belonged firmly outside of
society.
Mirroring the rhetoric of letters addressed to the government in the spring of 1953,
these articles employed the term bandit, with the headline 'Bandit punished' repeated
many times over the coming months. In September 1953, Leningradskaia1pravda
reported the case of Vinogradov, released from prison by the amnesty in 1953.
Although sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for theft and not banditry, he is
called the 'bandit' throughout the text.'°9 Similarly in December, L. Reiribcrg and V.
Stcve Chibnall, Law-and-Order New,: An AnaysL of Crime Reporting In the Bntith !Pre$s
(London Tavistock 1977).
'°9 'Banditnak'2n',Leningradskaiapravda, 27 September 1953, p.4.
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Shangin, also beneficiaries of the amnesty, were branded bandits, though they bad
been sentenced for theft."°
Further reflecting public antipathy and indignation, the articles firmly portrayed
offenders as outsiders. Even where the amnesty was not directly mentioned,
references to 'return' served to identify the offenders as aliens. One article began,
'Having returned from places of imprisonment several years ago, Kazimir
Krukovskii...'; a second mentioned that the criminals 'returned last spring to
Moscow'; a third that they arrived in Leningrad in the spring." The criminals
worked in bands, preying on the city, but not a part of it. On 2 October 1953,
according to Moskovskaia pravda, four criminals met on the platform of the Moscow-
Kursk-Donbass rail depot, drank, and then set off for Moscow, with the intention of
committing a robbery at Kursk station. Once in Moscow, however, they decided to
'travel' (puteshestvovat') around Moscow on the tram - and robbed the conductor."2
Corroborating Antonova - the letter-writing tram driver from Moscow - the article
asserted that trams were unsafe places; moreover, by presenting them first on the
platform of a provincial station, and then in Moscow as some sort of nefarious tourists
visiting the capital, the narrative also supported Antonova in her desire to portray the
source of crime as external to urban Soviet society.
The possibility of rehabilitating criminals was also challenged in the short biographies
included in the crime reports. Tracing their deviance back to childhood, the journalists
"°Grabitei poimany', Leningradikaia pravda, 4 December 1953, p .4.
'Bandityn7any',Leningradskaiapravda, 23 June 1953, p.4; 'Shaikavorov-retsidivistov',
Pravda, 4 December 1953, p.4; 'Grabitei', Leningradskaia pravda, 27 December 1953, p.4.
H2IBandity nakazany', Moskovskaia pravda, 2 December 1953, p.4.
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implicitly suggested that they had been born criminals. Of Vinogradov, the reader
learned:
His biography is simple. He was born in 1928. He didn't want to study,
nor to work like all the others in his generation worked during the war. A
healthy young man, he lived off his Mummy and Daddy. He preferred
idleness, hooliganism on the streets and in cinemas, and fights to
honourable work. At sixteen, Vinogradov was sent to prison for the first
time. Since 1944 he has been sentenced six times and to a total of 28 years
in corrective labour camps."3
No excuses were offered, no extenuating family circumstances put forward to explain
his crimes. In contrast to the promises of greater humanity and legality made in the
press in the spring, these biographies refused to accept the possibility that a criminal
might be reformed or 'corrected'. With apparent delight, the articles would gloat over
the number of years a criminal had spent within the camp system as if this offered
indisputable proof that he could never escape the criminal life. The articles derided
the idea that a criminal might return as part of the amnesty to become a valued
member of society. After recounting the sad facts of his life, the report on
Vinogradov's case shifted from the court scene to an imagined family scene:
The amnesty offered Vinogradov the chance to start a new life - to
become an honourable worker.
- Work? No way! - Vinogradov told his mother, when he arrived in
Leningrad last summer.
By juxtaposing Vinogradov's scorn with the idea of a 'new life' and redemption
through labour, the article undermined the official reading of the amnesty.
Throughout 1953 and 1954, crime reports used a combination of rhetorical strategies
to cast criminals as marauders, pillaging and ravaging Soviet society. Disregarding its
promises of readmission promoted on the front pages under the umbrella of 'socialist
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legality', newspapers articulated an intolerance of Gulag returnees in terms similar to
those found in citizens' letters.
Conclusion
During 1953, readers already began to suspect that the socialist legality campaign
signalled a major break with the past. When the press referred to the existence of a
cult of personality in their accounts of Beriia's arrest, some readers believed it might
be an allusion to other leading figures. Some rank and file party members began to
suspect that the discussion of a personality cult, and the new insistence on collective
leadership, did not only implicate Beriia. They hesitatingly began to detect a
posthumous attack on Stalin. At the local party meeting in Kalinin district of Moscow,
they asked: 'What are the mistakes in propaganda about the cult of personality?
Which personalities exactly are they talking about, and how concretely did this cult of
personality propaganda manifest itself?" 4 Another party member was prompted to
ask 'Why is it that recent Pravda editorials haven't been using quotations and extracts
from Stalin's speeches and books?" 5 Some perspicacious people thus realised that
official veneration of Stalin was waning.
On 5 March 1954 there was scant recognition of the important anniversary. Even
though the press published some material on Stalin, many members of the Soviet
113 
'Bandit nakzan', Leningradskaia pravda, 27 September 1953, p.4
"4 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 4, L20
"5 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 4, L 20.
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public felt that the coverage was far from adequate.' 16 Letters flooded in from people
of all ages, from pensioners, workers' collectives, and groups of schoolchildren and
students, all lamenting the 'silence' of the newspapers and radios."7
Many seemed acutely aware of the breakdown of the public culture that bad bound
Soviet society under Stalin. An anonymous group of workers indignantly addressed
Molotov, demanding to know why no mourning session had been held at the Bolshoi
Theatre, why Stalin's works had been changed, and why when they rushed to the
loudspeakers that morning had heard but three words on Stalin's life." 8 Over the past
thirty years, a public culture had been created in which birthdays and anniversaries
were sumptuously commemorated, and failure to observe such rituals could not pass
unnoticed. Throughout the letter they constantly compared the ongoing
commemoration of Lenin with this creeping elimination of Stalin. In another letter,
Lena Kareva, a young Komsomol member, reflected on the past year and the key
dates that had gone unmarked, expressing especial outrage that his birthday on 21
December was not even mentioned in the newspapers or on the radjo. 9 So
unequivocal until a year ago, the Soviet symbolic world was becoming confusing.
Failing to direct the population to new meanings, the authorities simply started to
dismantle the rituals surrounding Stalin. The result was a hybrid, with abundant
images of Stalin continuing to decorate public places, yet the blatant disregard for
important ceremonies and anniversaries, making their meaning unclear.
116 On 5 March 1954, Pravda did carry a front page article and portrait of Stalin, but the anniversary
was largely overshadowed by material relating to the Virgin Lands project. '1. V. Stalin - velikii
prodolzbatel' dela Lenina', Pravda, 5 March 1954, p. 1.
"7 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1466,11.73-78; RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1448,11.20-21; RGASPI f. 82, op.
2., d. 1455, L 77; RGASPI f. 82, op. 2., d. 1458,1. 15.
'is RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1466,11.. 79-80.
1t9 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1448,11.20-21.
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As a result, doubts over the new leadership were common. V. L Savchenko, a
pensioner who prided himself on having ought in WWI, the civil war and WW1I,
claimed that everyone was upset and thought that the new attitude to Stalin was
evidence of problems between the country's leaders (mezhdu r,skovodstvom, shto to
ne laditsia). 12° Initially ready to blame Beriia for the disrespect shown Stalin, by early
1954 one group of workers could only express bewilderment that the situation had not
been rectified since the July arrest.121
As has been suggested throughout this chapter, the preferred explanation was to
imagine covert enemies at work. Largely unresponsive to the socialist legality
campaign, members of the public voiced their desire to return to the rituals of public
castigation and vilification fostered under Stalin. In response to the mass exodus from
the Gulag, they expressed sometimes violent opposition to the notion of 'humanity'
promoted in the press, and derided the regime's claims that society itself was
sufficiently robust to withstand this return of the banished 'other'. Their letters, which
could only articulate dissatisfaction or disagreement by reverting to the hostile
rhetoric created by the Stalinist press, thus revealed the powerful nature of a
woridview based on Manichean beliefs.
'° RGASPI f. 82, op. 2., d. 1458,1 15.
121 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2. d. 1466,1 80
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Chapter II
Rovin!. Returnin2, Writin!
My nKither starved to death
My father got it in the war
As for me, the guards drive me
Across this tortured land
- Zek song'
My whole life came flooding back in that year
When from the depth of the seas and canals
My friends all at once returned
- Ol'ga Berggol'ts, 'Tot god', 1955 2
Throughout 1953, the party sought to re-establish a meaningful hegemony over public
culture. Trying to make sense of this changing world, members of the public provided
their own interpretations. As both political and criminal zeks returned from the 'little
zone' of the Gulag to the 'big zone', a third voice began to be heard. Speaking the
vernacular of the Gulag, fonner prisoners brought their own understandings of Soviet
life to the emerging debate.
In a chapter of The Gulag Archipelago entitled 'Zeks as a Nation', Solzhenitsyn
describes the common attributes binding the community of prisoners. They had their
'Gerald Stanton Smith, Songs to Seven Strings: Russian Guitar Poetsy and Soviet 'Mass Song'
Btoommgton, md.: Indiana Umversity Press, 1984), p. 75.
Ol'ga Berggol'ts, 'Stikhi dnevnikov', Novyi mir, 1956.8,26-30 (p. 28).
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own economic way of life, a shared psychology, and their own language, he claims.
Solzhenitsyn describes 'matiorshina' (foul language) as that 'special form of
expressing the emotions which is even more important than all the rest of their
language because it permits the zeks to communicate with one another in a more
energetic and briefer form than that provided by the usual linguistic means'. 3 When
zeks came back from this 'native land' to their homes and families, they often
continued to converse in this special language. Even Moscow intellectuals returning
from the camps spoke differently. In her memoirs, the dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva
wrote of two friends who served time in the Gulag as young men in the late 1940s:
Wiffiams and Gastev had advanced a theory asserting that the word blya,
short for 'slut', is essential for making the Russian language flow. Blya
could be divorced from its meaning and inserted in any place of any
sentence, as in, "I, blya, was raised by a bonne," or "I, blya, was raised by
a bonne, blya," or "I, blya, was, blya, raised by a bonne, blya," and so
forth. Sometimes they sounded like drunks at a Moscow beer dive.4
Though they were academics who enjoyed 'advancing theories' and came from elite
families where children were raised by servants, they now spoke - quite intentionally
- like the uncultured masses. In Alexeyeva's mind, there was an implicit division
between the educated classes and those who might hang out in the 'beer dives'. The
experience of the Gulag had at least partially undermined the 'culturedness' of the
young well-to-do intellectuals.
The Gulag not only cultivated different forms of everyday speech, but also provided
its own semiotic codes. Many prisoners came home their bodies indelibly marked
3 Aleksandr I. Solzherntsyn, The Gulag Archpelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literaiy
Investigation, trans. by Thomas P. Whitney, 2 vols (New York: Haiper and Row Publishers, 1975), n,
pp. 502-533 (p. 505).
4 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming ofAge in the Post-Stalin Era
(Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1990), pp. 88-89.
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with the Gulag's own system of signs. To the initiated, tattoos could convey much
about a man's life and experience, including sexual preference, marital status, the
number of prison convictions served, membership of a thieving fraternity, and so on.
To the uninitiated they represented an incomprehensible language. 5 When a prisoner
such as Konstantin Petrukhin, released from the Gulag by amnesty in 1953, got drunk
at the station buffet in 1953, he chose to rip open his shirt and parade his tattoos
through Moscow's Kievskii vokzal. With this act, he dramatically reminded Soviet
citizens of the existence of a dangerous and impenetrable other world.6
Witnessing similar incidents of drunken rage occurring throughout the middle of the
decade, citizens might realise that the Gulag also provided an alternative political
language. From the judicial cases of former zeks convicted for political crimes in the
1 950s, we discover that those nourished by Gulag culture expressed dissatisfaction
with the regime in quite different ways from other members of society. Other
insubordinate citizens might, for instance, slander Stalin on the grounds of his
nationality, expressing anger that the Soviet Union had a Georgian at its head. 7 A
Gulag veteran, however, had quite different 'mental tools'. 8 Invariably under the
5 Nancy Condee writes that information about the tattoo subculture was hard to glean in the Soviet
period, but 'since the fall of conur.irnsm in 1991 several small compilations of prison tattoos have
appeared, all sections of larger compendia of prison culture, including argot, proverbs, card games,
coded toponyms, hand signals, cryptography, ciphers encoded speech, a prison Morse code, cpistolaiy
etiquette, and other sign systems'. Nancy Condee, 'Body Graphics: Tattooing the Fall of Communism',
in Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Se and Society Since Gorbachev, ed. by Adele Marie Baker
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), pp 339- 361.
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, ci. 43168.
7 The Procuracy archives offer one example. In May 1953, Aleksandr Minakov, an invalid war veteran
in his mid-forties, finished work at the local market and proceeded to the station buffet where he got
drunk. He allegedly went onto slander Staim on the grounds of his nationality, ciniming that the Soviet
leader should be Russian, not Georgian. GARF £8131, op. 31, ci. 43260, L 3-6, 12-13.
'In his study of French culture of the sixteenth century, Febvre frames the question of unbelief in the
following way: Did individuals have access to the necessary 'mental' tools needed to express an
alternative woridview? He argues that if language - as the property of the collective - lacked the
necessary lexical items and the syntactical structures, then an individual would be unable to form a
coherent atheist argument Lucien Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sirteenth Centuiy: The
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influence of alcohol, some former prisoners aggressively denounced Soviet power by
embracing its nemesis: the USA. Three cases can offer insight into this Gulag
counter-culture. Imprisoned initially for theft or hooliganism, Aleksei Ivanov, Viktor
Veselov, and Boris Dogadin, were all amnestied and then re-arrested in the period
1953-1955 for allegedly anti-Soviet activity. Their words demonstrate the political
language provided by the Gulag.
Aleksei Ivanov, or Aleksandr Tikhonov as he was also known, 9 a young, semi-
illiterate Russian originally from Leningrad with three previous sentences for non-
political crimes, was released in late May 1953 by the amnesty. Unable to fmd work,
be was still roving across the country when he was arrested at Manzovka station in the
Far East five months later. According to the witness Koshelev, he appeared on the
station platform drunk, tried to commit a theft, and then brandished a knife. He was
arrested by the station police and escorted to their unit for further questioning. Asked
to state his profession, he replied that he had a good specialism - robbing and 'killing
citizens'. Complaining that in the Soviet Union he was refused work, he announced:
'I hate the Soviet Union, I would sell it for one kopeck. I love America and Truman.
Soviet power 'rewarded' ['nagradila me with tuberculosis. In the Soviet Union
young people are hounded into camps and prisons." 0 His anger was directed against
the authorities that had imprisoned him and his peers, damaged his health, and now
denied him the means to earn a living and he articulated a fierce contempt for the
values of Soviet society such as productive labour. Even more subversive was his
admiration for America and the President. Rejecting Soviet power absolutely,
Religion ofRabelaLs, trans. by Bcatrice Gottheb (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982),
p. 355.
9 Many criminal-recidivists took on different names to hide their identity at various points.
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Ivanov/Tikhonov welcomed America and Tniman as the antithesis of everything
Soviet.
His case was not unique. As ex-zeks hung about stations, harassed by the police and
under suspicion from other citizens, they easily entered into drunken rows. In one
such case, Viktor Veselov raucously shared IvanovfFikhonov's binary world-view, in
which the paradise of capitalist America opposed his Soviet hell. In September 1953,
as a 24-year-old recently released from the Gulag, Veselov was drinking beer with a
new acquaintance at a station buffet in Kuibyshev oblast', when he became rowdy,
attracting the attention of the police. When the police hauled him into their office to
check his documents, Veselov spat in the face of one police officer, kicked another,
and shouted 'Down with Soviet power' and 'Long live capitalism!" With its
ubiquitous slogans, the language of revolution had created the template for Veselov's
protest; the Gulag - itself the mirror of the Soviet world - had taught him to invert
those official values.
The case of Boris Dogadin, another young man in his early twenties with several
years' Gulag experience under his belt, provides another example of this violent pro-
American and pro-capitalist sentiment prevalent amongst former prisoners. In court in
May 1954 on a further count of theft, and facing a twenty-year sentence, Dogadin
began cursing Soviet leaders, shouting that he had been sentenced unlawfully.
According to a witness, he went on to claim that Truman would come to free him and
10 j4PJ f. 8131, op. 31, d. 43332,1. 18.
"GARF L 8131, op. 31, d. 60332, IL 5-8. Vesclov was Russian, from a peasant family in Omsk, and
had been sentenced for vaiious non-political crms including theft and attempted escape from the
Gulag. Backinthe Gulag in 1954, hebecamean activeparticipantmacamp riot
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slaughter everyone, and, finally, that 'the Trumanites will come and they'll hang
everyone' in the Soviet govermnent.12
The parallels between the cases are striking. When goaded, these ex-zeks rallied
behind the same idols - America and capitalism. MI incarcerated within the camp
system during adolescence, they were raised in a radically anti-Soviet environment
Released back into society, they projected themselves as atheists, radical non-
believers. Though Harry Truman had vacated the White House in 1953, the name
'Truman' continued to resonate in the cosmogony of the zek as a mythical figure, an
avenging angel who would come to save Soviet unfortunates. In zek culture, change
was only imaginable through a violent showdown between opposing forces. Political
ideas could be condensed into slogans 'Down with...' or 'Long live...', reduced to a
binary conflict between America and the Soviet Union, between Truman and
Bolshevik leaders. It has recently been argued that 'unbelief was problematic within
the Stalinist system. Jochen Helibeck has claimed that people lacked 'an outside
frame of reference' that would allow them to articulate dissent, and he argues that his
diarist, Podlubnyi, 'used the Holy Scripture against the Church in legitimating his
unbelief.' 3 Ivanov/Tikhonov, Veselov, and Dogadin do something rather different.
Although they certainly drew on beliefs propagated by official culture, they did not
evaluate 'real' actions against the foundational scriptures, but instead engaged with
the official texts themselves. Although they followed Soviet cosmogony in believing
the world to be divided into two conflicting forces, they chose to embrace the 'pole'
that had been officially rejected and demonised. This was the kind of radical break
' 2 GAJF £ 8131, op. 31, d. 50509, II. 22-25.
u Heilbeck, 'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul', p.105.
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identified by Iurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii, who claimed that in Russian culture
the 'new does not arise out of a structurally "unused" reserve, but results from a
transfonnation of the old, a process of turning it inside out'.' 4 As Soviet ideology
divided the world into a set of pairs - the new versus the old, the big zone versus the
little zone, Russia versus the west - it provided, in the form of the rejected values,
ready-made formulas for dissent.
The Gulag system, and the rigid division of the Soviet world into the 'big' zone and
the 'little' zone, offered the most palpable manifestation of Soviet binarism. Camp
etiquette valued drinking, violence, and swearing - all acts that clearly challenged
Soviet kul 'turn ost . The Gulag produced its own underground culture, both in the
form of camp songs and tattoos, and its own radical politics. All that was demonised
in the official Soviet belief system was here passionately venerated. The releases of
the early to mid-1950s brought elements of this other world back into the big 'zone'
of Soviet society.
Much of this dissertation is devoted to showing how society tried to cope with the
threat of this dangerous 'other'. This chapter, however, looks at how the returnees
themselves tried to present their own experience. Though they might be acculturated
to the Gulag to a greater or lesser extent, prisoners in 1953 still hoped to return to the
Soviet fold. Through the act of petitioning, prisoners of all categories - from victims
of political terror such as Williams and Gastev, to young thieves and hooligans like
'4 According to Lotman and Uspcnskii, the antithesis 'the old versus the new' was often transformed in
medieval culture into 'the Russian land versus the west', as evil was thought to have come to Russia
from outside as the result of contact with heretics. This opposition to the west was retained in a revised
form in the binary culture of the Soviet period, and in the Cold War era, America became the ultimate
symbol of anti-Soviet culture. See Lotman and Uspenskii, 'Binary Models', p. 33.
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IvanoviTikhonov, Veselov, and Dogadin - sought to explain their experience of the
'other world', and to create life-stories that would allow for their readmission. This
chapter looks at the dramatic rise in petitioning from prisoners and their families, and
examines the narrative strategies they employed.' 5 Their texts were an important - if
challenging - contribution to the dialogue that was emerging between state and
society in the wake of Stalin's death.
A New Wave of Petitionin!
As soon as Stalin died, there was a marked increase in petition-writing.' 6
 The number
of appeals received by bodies such as the Party Control Committee (KPK) and the
Supreme Soviet had been increasing gradually since the end of the war, but
snowballed in 1953 and j954•7 Statistics from the Supreme Soviet show that the
boom started as early as March 1953:
"In many cases it is not possible to trace the official response to these petitions. Due to legal
restriction on accessing personal material, for example, I was not able to see party members' individual
files. The letters I use were mostly from a collective file located within the Supreme Soviet's petition
department. I chose to concentrate on the narrative strategies employed by petitioners rather than on the
outcome of individual cases here, though in subsequent chapters I explore the state's response to such
writings more broadly.
"Kathleen Smith also notes this increase. Kathleen Smith, Remembering Stalin's Victims: Popular
Memory and the End of the USSR (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 25.
'7 The number of appeals received by the Supreme Soviet for example, had increased from 288,241 in
1950 to 337,007 in 1952 (GARF £7523, op. 69, d. 174,19). Within the Supreme Soviet Presidium, a
special working group (Gruppa p0 podgotovke dlia nzcsmoirenii v Prezidnme khodotaLrtv o
pomilovanil) processed petitions.
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Number of petitions received b y the Supreme Soviet in 1953 18
From relatives From those convicted
January	 3616	 11,885
February 3913
	
11,582
March
	
4960
	
13,308
April
	
10,682
	
18,306
If they were already heartened by Stalin's death, the March amnesty encouraged
prisoners, former prisoners, and their families to hope for even greater change.
Officials within the central organs were disturbed by the rapid increase in petition-
writing, not least because of the extra work-load it gave them. One bureaucrat
commented wryly that the amnesty seemed to have done little to halt the flood of
letters.' 9 In fact, quite the opposite occurred. Even those sentenced for counter-
revolutionary crime - manifestly excluded from the amnesty - seem to have been
encouraged by it, and such cases became the fastest growing area of the commission's
work, with 7787 cases processed in December 1953 compared with 2107 cases in
January 1953.20 Reports from the Party Control Committee reflect similar patterns. In
1954, the committee tabulated the number of letters they have received from
individuals over the past decade:
'3 GARFf 7523, op. 69,d. 176.
"The deputy of the section, Kozhanov, wrote to Voroshilov in Ail 1953 complaining of overwork
andnotingthattheamnestyhaddonenothingtoeaseitGARFtl523,op.69,d. 174,L9.
GARF £ 7523, op. 69, d. 176.
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Number of petitions received b the Party Control Committee 1945195421
Year I Petitions received
1945	 8010
1946	 9350
1947	 13330
1948	 19413
1949	 23158
1950
	
33579
1951	 34568
1952	 41216
1953	 70326
1954
	
53143
Although the internal report claimed that the peak of 1953 was due to a rise in party
activism following the XIX Party Congress, it seems questionable that a congress so
conservative in tone produced such widespread optimism. Instead, it seems more
likely that Stalin's death, and the new course taken by party leaders in the following
months, were read as an important marker of change. While those who felt at ease
within the Stalinist world feared this mood of impending change, those who lived
beyond the bounds of society greeted it more warmly.
In composing their lives as texts, a growing numbers of prisoners took the raw
material of their life and constructed a narrative that they believed would display their
credentials as good Soviet citizens. As they moulded their lived experience into a
form they hoped might please the authorities, their narratives illuminated some of the
authors' beliefs about both Soviet power and history. These petitions thus give insight
into the mental world of some of society's outcasts - criminal-recidivists, victims of
21 RGANI L 6, op. 6, d. 1009,11.4-10.
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repression, vagrants, hooligans, and political dissenters. Of course they do not offer
transparent access to the way prisoners might articulate their identity and experience
in different contexts - to fellow zeb, to relatives, or, indeed, to local policemen
during a drunken train journey. They do, however, reveal how the writers understood
official ideology and how they thought their experience of 'the other world' could be
incorporated into a viable life-story.
While Soviet citizens did try to 'speak Bolshevik' in their interactions with the state,
there was no single textbook which offered them mastery over this language.
Exploring the practice of depriving rights and selectively reinstating rights to certain
categories of undesirables in the 1920s and 1930s, Golfo Alexopoulos finds
significant variation in the petitions of Iishentsy (the disenfranchised), writing that
'although lishentsy reproduced the official discourse in their petitions, these
reproductions are not exact. Lishentsy manipulate the script and depart from it as
weIl.'22Although she identifies six genres of petition, Alexopoulos focuses on two
main forms: first, a 'lament' in which the petitioner is pitiful, desperate, ignorant, and
deserving of the reader's sympathy; second, the presentation of a Soviet self,
complete with boasts of loyalty, service, and work achievements. Both forms
possessed an echo in the 1950s, but the passage of time had introduced new elements.
Like those disenfranchised as class aliens in the early Soviet period, some prisoners
and former prisoners wrote petitions of 'lament'. One old lady pitifully wrote that:
'All of us old people revere you Kliment Efremovich [Voroshilov] as a god, and we
Golfo Alexopoulos. 'Rights and Passage: Marking Outcasts and Making Citizens in Soviet Russia',
1926-1936' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1996), p. 298.
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have great hope in you as a pure Russian. Please don't reject this plea from old
people.'23 A younger woman also petitioned Voroshilov, cataloguing the cycle of
misfortune that had been her fate: she was an orphan, unfairly repressed during the
war, her husband had died, her son had TB, her mother was ailing, and her political
record meant she could live neither in Leningrad to support her mother, nor m
Moscow to get treatment for her son. She wrote plaintively, 'My son already asks me
whether I'll start laughing soon, and what can I answer him?' Playing on Soviet
commitment to childhood happiness, she implored him to review the case. Elements
of 'lament' thus did appear in the petitions of the 1950s, but they were more rare than
in the 1930g.
When the disenfranchised of the 1930s wished to present a 'Soviet self', this
invariably meant claiming they were proletarians and industrious labourers: the
syllogism 'I work therefore I am a worker' was implicit. Writing a Soviet self in the
1950s, however, was more problematic. The criminal, for instance, faced the difficult
task of showing how he had erred so absolutely from the 'correct' path when he had
been born and raised during the blessed era of Soviet power. Meanwhile, the
'political' prisoner wished not merely to show that he was a good worker, but that he
was a communist of the first order, an ardent believer in the communist cause. As a
result, we find a great variety of styles in the wave of petition-writing that unfurled in
the early to mid-1950s. A classification of petition genres is possible, and at least five
different categories can be identified, in addition to the 'lament'.25
GARF f. 7523, op. 107,d. 123,1.16.
' GARF £7523, op. 107, d. 123,1 59.
Sheila Fitzpatrick has approached citizens' letters like a 'botanist exploring the variety of plant life in
an unfamiliar terrain', noting down new 'species' and giving them a name. Fitzpatrick, 'Supplicants
and Citizens', p. 81.
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The first of these, the 'Voice of America' petition, suggests that by the 1950s, the
Soviet world was not hermetically sealed, and that at least some individuals did now
have access to 'an outside frame of reference'?6 For example, Vladimir Savin,
sentenced in 1949 for theft, later released by amnesty, and subsequently reconvicted
for writing anti-Soviet leaflets and listening to Voice of America, disputed his
sentence on the grounds that it was expensive and the money could be better spent
helping 'the people'. He claimed that his incarceration was costing the state 640
roubles a day, or 14,600 roubles a month. Although Savin did not cite the source of
such figures, it suggests the influence of a more western, pragmatic conception of
incarceration and its merits for society.27
A second category could be labelled the 'petition of outrage'. For example, in April
1955 a victim of repression, Prokurovaia, wrote to Voroshilov in great indignation
over the loss of personal belongings confiscated by the MYD upon her arrest in 1941.
Although she received some compensation, she considered it inadequate, and attached
a detailed inventory to her letter. The total value of the confiscated items came to
12,632 roubles, and the list included a car, table clock, an expensive alarm clock,
carved daggers, 200-300 records, and a commode in carved red wood with a marble
26 ce of America was an anti-communist station set up in 1953 with the mtention of destroying
communism from within. Although planned beforehand, its launch coincided almost exactly with
Stalin's death. Gene Sosin, Sparks ofLiberty: An Insider's Memoir ofRadio Liberty (University Park,
Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
27 0n1y 16-years-old when he was first sentenced for thefl Vladimir Savin was released by amnesty
and returned to the city of Kirov, where he failed to find either permanent accommodation or work He
turned to writing leaflets and marked the Mayday celebrations in 1955 with an indictment of the
hardships experienced by returnees. He wrote: 'Comrades! We will transmit the latest message from
Voice of America. We are celebrating IMay, drinking and enjoying ourselves, when thousands of
unfortunate Russian people don't have a crust of bread. Look at the stations at how many unfortunates
released from imprisonment are dying of hunger there because no one will give them work' He seema
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top. The defiant tone of her letter and her brazen concern for the loss of material
wealth was, however, most unusual.28
Three further categories were far more common, and these shall be analysed in greater
detail. First, some based their petitions not on notions they found in the illicit foreign
press, but on the concepts of socialist legality they discovered in their own Soviet
press in 1953. Second, some - primarily young offenders - constructed narratives of a
flawed upbringing, emphasising the unfinished nature of their biography and
expressing hope that redemption was still possible. A final category, the exclusive
domain of the purge victim, was the tale of noble suffering, in which the ordeal
endured was not a source of outrage or bitterness, but rather the confirmation of the
victim's own saintly devotion to the revolutionary cause.
The Lure of Socialist Le2alitv
The prisoner or former prisoner who read Soviet newspapers in 1953 found the first
clues to understanding his exclusion from Soviet society. Convicted repeatedly as a
thief and hooligan, Konstantin Petrukbin had been released from the Gulag by the
1953 amnesty, and now worked as a labourer mixing concrete in Moscow. He was
soon re-arrested, however, accused of cursing political leaders and parading his
tattoos of Lenin and Stalin in the middle of Kiev station. In his petition, though, be
argued that he had been politically correct in his drunken shoutings. He disputed the
sentence on the grounds that the principal witness, his neighbour in the station buffet,
to have been influenced by listening to foreign radio broadcasts, but he also brought his own
experience of exclusion and suffering to make his case. See GARF 8131, op. 31, d. 67339, L 13.
25 GAP.F f. 7523, op. 107, ci. 123,11.49-53.
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had provoked the outburst by praising Beriia. 29 Previously regarded as an illicit
outburst against a leading party figure, Petrukhin's rant against Beriia now became a
just and righteous attack on an enemy of the people. Petruithin could now cast himself
as a defender of official policy and a member of the newspaper-reading Soviet public.
Victims of political repression commonly interpreted events in the Soviet press of
1953 as the key to understanding why they had been wrongly banished from Soviet
society. Addressing the Supreme Soviet, one anxious Moscow mother desperately
implored Voroshilov to review her daughter's case. 3° Teumin had already written to
many different places without result, but now believed that events reported in the
press presaged a new course:
Considering that the investigation of my daughter's case took place at a
time when accusations against the doctors and other public figures (like
Mikhoels) were being fabricated, and that when she was arrested enemies
of the people like Abakumov and others - later unmasked - were in
charge of the MGB and the investigation department, I ask you to
reconsider the case.
The mother went on to remind Voroshilov that if her daughter had signed a
confession, it was obtained by 'methods forbidden by Soviet laws'.3 ' Teumin's
Jewish name perhaps explains why she drew particularly on the case of the Kremlin
doctors and Mikhoels. She was not alone, though, in thinking that by accusing leading
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 43168. Perhaps because he had succeeding in re-establishing some kind of
normal life-style - he lived in the capital and was in employment - Petrukhin felt at ease medelling his
defence on the latest political fashions, identifying himself as a newspaper-reading Soviet citizen.
Details from his biography suggest in fact that his status as politically 'correct' Soviet citizen was
insecure. He had three previous sentences for theft and hoohganisni and a son living in Aleksandrovsk
- a city renowned as a haven for former zeks; these facts suggest that until recently be had been living
on the margins of society.
' She wrote that her daughter joined the Komsomol at 15 and the party at 20, and held no other
interests She was arrested in 1949, aged 44. GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, L 39.
GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, 11. 39-40.
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figures in the security services, the socialist legality campaign pointed to the
imminent release of more victims.
For most petitioners, the key event of 1953 was the arrest of Benia. In April 1954, A.
A. Kalmykova began her petition to Mikoian with a reminder that reports on the radio
and in the press in July 1953 had revealed senior figures within the MOB and the
MYD had long been using criminal methods. She continued:
There is no doubt - and I say this with great certainty - that one of the
victims of the vile provocation and the slanderous actions of Beriia and
his accomplices was my husband Betal Kalmykov and indisputably, in
connection with this, I was also a victim of the arbitrariness and
lawlessness [proizvol i bezzakonii] created by Beriia.32
The nieclia's treatment of Beriia's arrest had given petitioners 'approved' linguistic
terms with which to make sense of their ordeal. By accusing Beriia of arbitrariness
and lawlessness (proizvol i bezzakonii), Pravda enabled Kalmykova to explain why
she and her husband had been repressed.33
Due to her immediacy to those in power, Kalmykova could hold Beriia directly
responsible for the injustices committed. In 1938 Kalinykova's husband had held the
prestigious position of the party obkom secretary in the Kabardin Autonomous
Republic and the family had very close connections to the Ordzhonikidze family - in
fact Sergo Ordzhonikidze's wife took responsibility for the Kalmykov children after
the arrest of their parents. In her narrative, Beriia's personal hatred for Sergo
Ordzhonikidze led to the arrest of the Kalmykovs?' The wife of the former first
secretary of the Komsomol, Aleksandr Kosarev, likewise wmte a version of her
RGAN1f 5, op. 30, d. 78, 1. 66.
" 'Nesokrushimoe edinenie partii, pravitels'stva, sovetskogo naroda', Pravda, 10 July 1953, p.1.
104
husband's arrest in which Beriia played the leading role. Kosareva explained that
Beriia took offence to a politically risque toast Kosarev made in front of guests and
had contrived Kosarev's downfall within four months of succeeding Ezhov. He even
carried out the arrest in person.35
In February 1955, a certain N. E. Korviakov began his petition to Voroshilov in terms
that were remarkably similar to Kalmykova's opening line. He too used the terms
'arbitrariness' and 'lawlessness' furnished by Pravda in its attack against Beriia:
I will tell you something about my 'case'. This tale, in my opinion, should
show you the arbitrariness [proizvol], lawlessness [bezzakonil], and the
bureaucratism that exists in our system, and especially in the judicial-
procuracy sector.36
However, Korviakov was not a figure of such prominence as Kalmykova or Kosareva,
and he had to show greater invention in the writing of his petition. 37 A lawyer and
journalist before the war, he had been arrested in 1944 for allegedly taking goods
from the 'Moscow Benefit Fund for War Invalids', and selling them on the black
market; now released, but not rehabilitated, he could not find work. In his letter he
claimed that the case was the result of forgeries created by investigators in the
Moscow Procuracy. In his case, Beriia personally played no role. Although he tried to
model his letter on the press articles attacking Beriia, he was obliged to incorporate a
larger cast of villains. He wrote:
34 RGJ	 (.5, op. 30, d. 78,11.66-69.
"A. N. Iakovlev (ed), ReabilitaLciia: Kak eto bylo. Dokumenyprezidiuma TsKKPSS i drugie
materialy (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond denkratiia, 2000), pp. 79-90. This is a copy of an archival
document, referenced APRF £ 3, op. 24, d. 439,11.31-32.
'GARFf.7523,op. 107,d. 186,L4.
The fact that Kalmykova's petition was treated by the Central Committee and preserved in the
archives at ROAN!, whilst Korviakov's petition was reviewed within the regular mechanisms of the
Supreme Soviet and preserved in the more extensive archives at GARF is symbolic of the difference in
their status.
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I didn't doubt for a minute, that I was not dealing with Soviet judges tbut
with the objective or subjective accomplices of enemies of the people.!, a
patriot raised during Soviet power (I am now 44), realised that to labdi an
innocent Soviet citizen and invalid from WWII a counterrevolutionaiy
and enemy of the people could only be the work of (actual) enemies olthe
people and their accomplices.38
Guilt extended beyond the single figure of Beriia to the 'Soviet judges' who
sentenced him using falsified documents. Korviakov realised he was on shaky ground,
and his idiosyncratic term for the judges - 'objective or subjective accomplkes of
enemies of the people' - points to some uncertainty did he have the right to point the
finger at a whole group of people? In the second half of the letter, he went on to
accuse the head of the Supreme Court, Anatolii Volin, of malpractice, claiming that
he had been charged with reviewing his case, but was too scared to rehabilitate him.
As a war veteran, Korviakov believed himself to be an upstanding Soviet citizen. If he
had been cast out of society, the press campaigns of 1953 suggested to him that
'enemies' within the MVD or judiciary were to blame. In blaming Soviet judges and
Volin personally, Korviakov in fact went much further than the prescriptioia of the
socialist legality campaign had allowed. He independently identified his own enemies.
I suggested in Chapter I that the public often interpreted Beriia's arrest as an
invitation to whip up collective hysteria against the enemy 'other'; petitioners such as
Korviakov were no different. They too imagined a world where Soviet peqple were
locked in mortal combat with their enemies, and they sought a reversal of fates: the
victims were to be rehabilitated and welcomed home, their accusers arrested,
sentenced, and cast out.
' GARF L 7523, op. 107, d. 186,1.4.
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A second example is provided by the case of Ivan Cherkasov. In May 1955,
Cherkasov composed a letter to the man he held responsible for his arrest, an engineer
named Shteinman. As he did not know Shteinman's address, Cherkasov was 'obliged'
to send his letter via the chief Military Procuracy Cherkasov clearly hoped for
intervention in the case. He wrote that he had 'naively' hoped that after Beriia's
arrest, 'what was left' of Shteinman's conscience would drive him to confess his own
crimes to the appropriate authorities.39 He went on to ask Shteinman to assist in his
application for rehabilitation and release from exile, begging him to right the wrongs
of the past. The letter was clearly intended not for Shteinman, but for the authorities.
Indeed, he was not soliciting help from Shteinman, but threatening him:
If my letter falls into the hands of someone tough, strong-willed,
influential, and completely dedicated to the party then you will be forced
to confess and you will be required to tell the truth about how you hunted
down party members.4°
Although Cherkasov seems fearful to address the party directly, the letter to
Shteinman was a transparent device with which to request not only his rehabilitation,
but also retribution. It included a very detailed account of the events that led to his
arrest, as if to help the party in any forthcoming investigation. In a second letter,
Cherkasov explained how he had already brought another guilty party to reckoning.
He recounted how Shteinman's accomplice, Pronchenko, had already been summoned
to the factory's party committee for questioning. When Pronchenko confessed to his
guilt, Cherkasov forgave him.4' Cherkasov did not only want his own readmission
into society, but also for those guilty of miscarrying justice to be identified and treated
by the party.
RGANI £5, op. 30, d. 232, L 71.
4°RGANI £5, op. 30, d. 232, L 74.
41 RGAN! £5, op. 30, d. 232,1. 66.
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Modelling their texts on clues they found in the press, some victims of political terror
blamed individuals for their misfortunes and sought retribution. While former
members of the party elite such as Kalmykova and Kosareva could blame Benia
alone, others like Cherkasov and Korviakov identified a wider cast of villains bearing
responsibility for their suffering. The socialist legality campaign offered the first
official explanations for why rightful members of the Soviet community had been
excluded, yet it had an inherent danger. Even if the tone of the press was less
invective than in the past, explanation based on identifying the 'enemy' had the
potential to renew the practices of the Stalin era, presaging renewed purging and
punishment. In fact, an extensive witch-hunt of low-level apparatchiki never in fact
materialised. Alternative ways of explaining the past followed in which there was no
requirement for a new round of purging.
The Unfinished Bildun2sroman
The petition letters of men like IvanovfFikhonov and Dogadin offered a very different
way of making sense of the past. Rather than protesting their innocence, they believed
that they had not been fully immersed in Soviet culture and had not received a proper
upbringing. They presented the war as a rupture in Soviet hegemony that had denied
them the necessary acculturation. The war explained how it was possible for men born
during the Soviet era to have been drawn towards the negative values of the 'other'
pole.
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Ivanovfrildionov's petition letter is a long and detailed account of his life. He began
by supplying both his names, his place and date of birth (either 1928 or 1931), and
then continued:
I was born in Leningrad where I lived with my mother and father until the
war in 1940 with the German occupiers. Then I was evacuated to
Cheliabinsk in the Urals. I was left without the supervision of family or
friends who could have put me on the true path in life, so that I could have
lived and through work been useful to the Fatherland.42
From the outset he tried to fit his life of deviance and felony into the narrative of
Soviet history. A normal Soviet family life was destroyed by the German invasion,
and he was deprived of the environment that would have made him a good citizen. In
keeping with Soviet eschatology, he recognised a 'true path in life' and regretted that
fate - in the form of the German offensive - had diverted him from it. Embarking on a
life of theft at the age of twelve when he was too young to realise his error, he had
become an outsider. He recounted in detail releases from the camps, his desire to
return to Leningrad, the obstructions that the authorities put in his way, and his
feelings of loneliness and isolation. After his last release from the camps as part of the
1953 amnesty, he sought work in the mines in the Far East but was refused a passport
by the local MVD. He wrote in his petition: 'With sadness in my soul, I was once
more to roam the different provinces of the Soviet Union like a gypsy, until I received
another prison sentence for something or other.' 43 Playing on his role as an outcast,
his petition ended with a plea to be allowed back into society. He asked whether he
was really worthy of a 58/10 sentence, which he believed was normally applied to
people who betrayed the Motherland and killed Soviet citizens in occupied territory
during the war. In contrast he was without family and semi-literate. Promising to
' GARF f. 8131, op. 3!, d. 43332,1.27.
'3 GARF(. 8131,op.31,d.43332,L28.
109
work hard, he proclaimed 'I will show that I am not a lost person'. Realismg that at
present he belonged to the 'other world', he hoped that he would be readmitted in
recognition of the fact that for him the war had precluded a normal Soviet upbringing.
Whilst Ivanov/Tikhonov spoke as a sinner seeking redemption, Vladimir Podavalov,
another young prisoner released in 1953, initially denied that he had said or done
anything untoward. Only 22, Podavalov was travelling back to his parents' home after
release, when he became embroiled in a drunken argument with a group of demobbed
soldiers in the same railway carriage, and, once arrested, he allegedly cursed Soviet
leaders and praised America. The first part of his letter indignantly detailed the long
train journey and the dispute that led to his wrongful arrest. After drinking vodka with
a lieutenant he met at a station, he had accompanied his new friend to a carriage
where a group of demobbed soldiers were drinldng. The soldiers robbed him of 700
roubles. When he accused them and threatened them with prison, they retorted that he
was coming from prison, and that they could easily get him sent straight back.45 In his
reading of the incident, he was marked from the outset, an easy target with no chance
of self-defence. However, the second half of his petition took an entirely different
strategy, sketching a life of exclusion with close parallels to Ivanov/Tlkhonov's
autobiography. Questioning whether he could really be considered an 'enemy of the
Podavalov had a rather strange vision of America, allegedly based on an unlikely encounter with
American workers who were mining uranium near to the place where he bad laboured as a prisoner. He
learned from theni that all Americans lived very well - 'better than any Soviet mamgcr': 'Each one has
his own car, suits, and nice hats. They work for 10 days, then they're able to get drank [pianstvovat']
for haIfa year, whilst here people work really hard but all the same have nothing' Podavalov dreamt of
cars and nice clothing as signs of the wealth and status denied to him, and as be drank vodka on his
triumphant journey home, he imagined tolerance for a way of life frowned upon by respectable Soviet
society. Yet he could not picture living the good life in an improved Soviet, or even Russian, world.
Podavalov seemed to believe this 'good life' was only possible in the ntastica1, husgined world of
America. GARFf. 8131, op. 31, d. 43334,11 11-13.
GARF t 8131, op. 31, d. 43334,16. He says that they then resirained him, while one of the group
went to find the police and denounced Podavalov for anti-Soviet agitation.
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people', he embarked on his own life-story. Born into a white-collar family in 1931 in
Novosibirsk oblast', he moved with them to Barnaul at the age of five. The war
intervened, broke up the family, and cut the young Podavalov loose. In 1941 his
father went to the front, his brother followed in 1943 and was killed; a worker from
the age of eleven, he found life very difficult. 'In my stupidity at that time I ran away
from my mother and I lived alone, wandering across all of the Soviet Union', he
wrote. In explaining how he ended up in the Gulag, this incident is irrelevant: the
war ended, his father returned and somehow succeeded in tracking down Podavalov.
He returned to the family and worked as motor-mechanic until he was called up to the
Soviet army. Military service progressed well until one night in 1950 when he got
drunk and fell asleep during the night watch. The misdemeanour cost him three years
in the camps. Although his 'crime' and arrest were in no way narratively contingent
upon his wartime exile, he foregrounded this experience because it enriched the
petition. Remembering a childhood exclusion created by war, Podavalov pleaded for
the chance to be re-included into Soviet society.
Other narrators blamed their corruption on the Gulag itself. In his petition, Dogadin
asserted that exclusion from society, and the influence of hardened criminals at an
impressionable age, taught him the language he used in court. He wrote to
Khrushchev:
I was sentenced several times for theft From the children's colony, I
ended up in the adult camp with fascists, where I learnt the words I said in
court. From the age of fourteen I have been in prison, with only a nine-
month break between 10 May 1953 and 9 December l954.
GARFf. 813l,op. 31,d.43334,L 7.
47 GARF £ 8131, op. 31, d.50509, 1. 19.
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Dogadin recognised the Gulag as an alternative kind of cultural upbringing.
Reflecting the importance officially assigned to the 'happy childhood', Dogadin
claimed that if he had be come a criminal it was because he had been acculturated to
the harmful environment of the Gulag at such a young age.
Even less hardened criminals employed the same strategies as these old-timers. Viktor
Topolev, born in 1929 in Moscow province, was sentenced to five years'
imprisonment in February 1953 for the theft of an overcoat, two pairs of gloves, and a
cheese. Although he claimed that at the time he was experiencing extreme financial
hardship while waiting for his first wage packet after demobilisation, he chose to
centre his petition on war-time suffering. His petition began:
My two brothers were killed at the front in the Great Patriotic War, my
father hung himself in 1941. My mother, who worked in the thread factory
in the town of Reutovo, was evacuated along with her factory to the city
of Alma-Ata and, unable to bear these heavy blows of fate in 1943, she
lost her mind and spent two weeks in hospital where she died.
Rather than focusing on the emotional distress these events might have caused him, he
preferred to talk of them in terms of the 'upbringing' they had denied him. The war
had deprived him of the moral environment that would produce a good Soviet citizen:
I ask the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR to consider my request
for mercy and to take into consideration the circumstances laid out here,
and my heavy and unhappy childhood. At an early age I was deprived of
my parents and my elder brothers, and I grew up amongst strangers, and
didn't receive an appropriate upbringing, experiencing all possible
deprivations, both material and moral.4
The immediate hardships that led him to steal in 1953 were rapidly glossed over,
despite the fact he had been totally penniless, Topolev believed they provide scant
justification for his crime. Only an inadequate upbringing could explain why he was
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so morally weak as to succumb to the lure of crime. Again it was the war that had
prevented him gaining a 'Soviet' education.
Narrating a failure to come 'to consciousness', these autobiographies are fashioned as
a type of unfinished Bildungsroman. Youth, the age which holds the meaning of life
in the European Bildungsroman, is also the key to understanding lihese men.49 The
petitions inevitably excused their crimes as the rash errors of youth, assuring the
reader that the petitioner was now mature and had seen the error of his ways.
Dogadin, for example, wrote that 'it was all because I was young then', while
IvanovfFikhonov explained that 'being young' he ignored his duty towards his
country.5° In a sense, their narratives were similar to a socialist reslist novel where the
young hero undergoes a period of self-doubt, error, and challenge, before coming to
full-consciousness. Yet as convicted hooligans and thieves, their crimes far exceeded
the limited remit of deviance that the socialist realist template allowed. Their petitions
thus tried to explain why they had failed to achieve satisfactory socialisation.
According to Franco Moretti, the Bildungsroman took a hold on modem European
culture at a time when life patterns became less predictable, when young people were
less sure what shape their future would take. Thus the main body of the book deals
with the hero's peregrinations and his quest to find 'himself', until he accepts the
'comfort of civilisation' and becomes at peace with himself through a sense of
belonging to the wider community. The hero realises that 'I exist iind I exist happily
" GARF f. 7863, op. 22. d. 2564, L 2.
Franco Moretti, The Way of the World: The Bildung3J-oman in European Culture (London: Verso,
1987), pp. 4-5.
50 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 50509,1. 19; GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 43332,127.
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because I have willingly agreed to be determined from without'. 5' Ivanov/Tikhonov,
Podavalov et al. argue passionately that they want - indeed need - to be determined
from 'without', but society had failed them, casting them out and depriving them of
normal socialisation. To level such accusations at the Soviet state was of course in
itself daring, and was only narratively possible if the failures happened during the
national trauma of war.
Throughout their picaresque tales, a 'correct' path from which they were diverted is
implicit. The existence they recount is circular - expelled from their family home,
they wander peripatetically between prison camps, places of exile and the occasional
provincial rail station - but their petitions embodied the hope that they might soon
reach their final destination. These petition letters were not finished autobiographies,
but works-in-progress. Hope remained that the authorities would intercede, allowing
them back into society to enjoy its corrective and educational influence. The letters
often finished with a very personal appeal to those they addressed, pleading to be
allowed to return to the true path, and promising to justify the faith shown in them.
IvanovfFikhonov begged: 'I ask you as a Soviet citizen to be allowed to work, while I
still can, in a factory or works.' 52 Another wrote: 'Again I ask you to pardon me and
let me return to free work, to my wife and child, and I will work honestly [chestno]
without sparing myself, and justify your faith in me.' 53 All the petitions anxiously
repeated that if their authors were allowed home, they would work hard and be good
family men. Unlike the petitions of purge victims, they did not imagine a triumphant
51 Mofti, The Way of the Worl4p.21.
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 43332,1. 28.
" GARF L 7863, op. 22, d. 2325,1,5 (petition letter from ha Skuratov). Iurii Konstantinov concluded
in a very similar fashion 'I promise and swear to you that I will justify your faith in me through honest
[chesinyl] and useful work'. GARF f. 7863, op. 20, d. 1274,1 8.
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or heroic return, but instead expressed a determination to become 'ordinary' members
of society. Promising to embrace the Soviet values of family and work, they sought to
convince their readers that they had now accepted the 'comfort of civilisation' and
were at one with the values of the social world.
The 'unfinished Bildungsroman' can be seen to draw on elements from within Soviet
cultural heritage. Far from an invention on the part of the petition-writer, it reflected a
strand of Soviet culture which had flourished up until the great break of the purges.
The possibility of redemption and healing within society had once been a viable way
of treating the offender. As the Gulag population fought for its reintegration into
society, it asserted that re-education was possible, that the social misfit could once
more become a valued member of society. Normally too late to deny their wrong-
doing, they played the role of the repentant sinner, borrowing old myths of re-
education and personal transformation. Naturally they borrowed selectively from
these early Soviet narratives of re-education, for while Gor'kii might have his social
misfits transformed through labour on the Belomor canal, petitioners were adamant
that re-education had to happen within society itself. In their petitions, the Gulag was
in fact a site of further corruption, and they could only be brought back to health
within society. Frequently denying that they could be considered 'enemies of the
people', they presented themselves not as opponents of Soviet power, but as the weak
and not fully formed, still in desperate need of society's redemptive force.
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The Martyr Prince
Nikolai Kochin typed a fourteen-page petition to Voroshilov in September 1954•M
Explaining his reasons for writing, he made no reference to the political changes of
the past 18 months, implying that as soon as release from the camps granted him the
opportunity, he sought re-examination of his case. The impetus came from within.
Although he was angered at the mistreatment he received at the hands of his
interrogators, Kochin showed no desire for retribution. He seldom referred to the
names of those responsible, and made no requests for the guilty to be brought to
justice. Thus he neither relied on the rhetorical props of the media, nor presented
himself as one of society's 'unfortunates'. Instead, he wrote his life-story as that of a
true revolutionary. Kochin's autobiographical petition narrated his life from birth to
the present day. With much of his petition devoted to the torment of interrogation, the
ordeal of the camps and forced labour was compressed into elliptic phrases like: 'I
lost ten years of my life.' 55 He chronicled the brutal treatment meted out during the
investigation, but the main focus was on his struggle with the investigators to write
his testimonial. Above all else, he railed against the re-writing of his life, arguing that
the investigator turned his biography 'into one black blot [chernoepiatno]'.56
Through the act of petitioning, he took the opportunity to take back the authorial
rights over his own life.
His petition began by asserting his revolutionary credentials under the subheading 'A
little bit about myself. Born in 1902, he was the son of a peasant family from Gor'kii
province. He embarked on Soviet work at the age of nineteen as a member of the
54 TJ	 f. 85, op. 1, d. 491,11 16-29.
TSADKM f. 85, op. 1, d. 491,128.
5'TsADKM f. 85, op. 1, d. 491,122.
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village ' poor committees' and later fought against kulaks, counterrevolutionaries,
saboteurs, and speculators in the village. As personification of the Bolshevik
revolutionary, he was upwardly mobile, receiving an education at the pedagogical
institute which allowed him to return to the provinces as a teacher in 1924. His life
provided material for various novels and tales, and in the 1930s he became a writer
and member of the Writers' Union. In the most exemplary of Soviet narratives, his
transformation reached its zenith in 1939 when he was awarded a state prize for
literature, joined the party, and was elected a deputy of the Gor'kii oblast' soviet.
As he chose to present it, Kochin's story reflects socialist realist narrative, though in a
very different way from the autobiographies of Ivanov, Podavalov et a!. for his tale is
of a young man successfully coming to consciousness. Unlike their tales of heinous
deviation from the correct path, any erring committed by Kochin was always well
within the bounds allowed to a socialist realist hero:
I have never claimed to be someone who never makes mistakes, or who
has no doubts and hesitations. I didn't become [sformirovat 'sia] a
Marxist-Leninist straight off. I didn't immediately overcome the many
vestiges of the past within me [ne srazupreodolel v sebe mnogie
perezhitki]. But I was never for a moment a counter-revolutionary.57
With a certain pride, Kochin narrated his early life as a process of inner
transformation, the act of becoming a revolutionary. A very similar story emerges
from the petition of A. La. Sverdlov, even though he was born and bred a Bolshevik.58
Proclaiming his utter devotion to the party, Sverdlov admitted to having erred as a
youth, when he joined the Trotskyists in 1927. Even after he parted company with
them, he failed to 'save' himself immediately from certain personal inadequacies.
TsADKM £85, op. 1, d. 491, L 27.
55 He was the son of the leading revolutionary lakov Sverdlov.
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Despite noble birth, he still struggled to become a revolutionary, repeatedly having to
recognise his mistakes as he strived to become the fine example of a communist he
now believed himself to be.59
Katerina Clark suggests that the early socialist realist hero shared similarities with
figures from various genres of the old Russian written tradition, including
hagiography and sections of the chronicles which recount the secular virtues of
princes, especially their sense of honour, duty, valour, and service. 60 Clark identifies
three symbolic patterns surrounding the revolutionary hero in early radical fiction:
first, the hero is a relatively naïve person who comes to see the light; second, he is a
member of a revolutionary family; third, he experiences some kind of martyrdom,
possibly with a quasi-religious death and resurrection motif. Kochin may have been
unusual in narrating so coherently the transition from peasant to conscious
communist, yet many petitions included at least some of these elements identified by
Clark as features of the early Bolshevik hero. Despite their ordeal, these survivors
presented themselves not as victims, but as heroes. In their petitions they emerge as
highly honourable revolutionaries, tied into the revolutionary movement by strong
kinship or family bonds, and ready martyrs to the Bolshevik cause.
Claiming their rights to rehabilitation, many petitioners presented themselves, or their
relatives, as honourable and dutiful heroes. In October 1954, N. Z. Pertsovskii wrote
to Voroshilov with a request for the rehabilitation of his late father, who was arrested
in 1938. In his petition he made no demands for any sort of material recompense, but
Iakovlev, Reabilitatsua: Kak eto bylo, pp. 66-69 (APRF f. 3, op. 58, d. 224,11.93-98).
60 Clark, The Soviet Novel, p. 47. She suggests, for example, that these qualities are found in Pavel, the
hero of Gor'kii's Mother.
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expressed concern only for his father's honour, writing 'my conscience cannot be
clear whilst my father's honour is still stained by these serious accusations'.6' Despite
the brevity of her letter, the issue of honour recurred twice more.62 Employing sirmiar
language, L V. Kirenko applied for both her own rehabilitation and the rehabilitation
of her late husband, who bad been a senior engineer within the military, writing: 'I
consider that it is my duty to clean the honour of my husband, even posthumously, as
I know how much he valued his stainless [nezapiatannaia] honour.'63 The privations
she experienced obliged Kirenko to plead for practical aid in the process of finding
work and registration, but for her dead husband the issue at stake was only his honour
(chest 64
Indeed, many found it agonising to think they had acted against the dictates of
communist honour. Kochin repeatedly stressed his remorse for the false testimonials
he signed under duress, for he believed that nothing could 'excuse a communist
signing faise documents, not even torture'. 65 Whilst ordinary mortals might succumb
to physical torment, a communist belonged to a higher order and should have absolute
fortitude. Those who did refuse to sign false confessions used it as further proof of
their heroism. S. Filipovich, a doctor who had once worked for Voroshilov, sent him
61 GARF L 7523, op. 107, d. 123, L 20. She was notified the following year that her father had died m
1943, and had now been posthumously rehabilitated (d. 123,122).
GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123,120.
GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123,1 83.
' The adjective 'chesinyl' and adverb 'chestno' are stalwarts of the Soviet lexicon. Meaning to be
honest or fair, they are used frequently to denote actions or people considered 'correct' and in
accordance with society's va1ues A 'chestnyi clielovek' could be translated as a 'respectable person'
and 'cheitno rabotat" sinçly means to labour in accordance with society's norms - rather than any
sort of dubious means. The noun 'chest", however, retains a quite different meaning - honour. The
might to honour is exclusive, and renmins the preserve of an elite. Thus when the relatives ask for their
relative's honour to be cleaned, they in fact want him restored to the honours list, asserting his status as
someone unusual and heroic.
'5 TsADKMf.85,op. 1,d.491,1. 19.
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an intimate letter in April 1953, reminding him that they had worked together between
1924 and 1938:
In the fifteen long and heavy years since then, I have always remembered
you saying that anyone who tells you an untruth, whatever it might be,
loses your trust forever. Now I can repeat to you, that I only ever told you
the truth.
He continued: 'The desire always to be truthful in your eyes gave me strength in 1938
to resist the 'refined' methods investigators used to force me [izoshchrenü
vymogatel 'sty] into giving false testimonial against myse1f.' Reminding Voroshilov
of their comradeship, he hoped to bolster his chances of rehabilitation. His
focrnulations suggested the existence of an honour-code between Old Bolsheviks,
where commitment to 'truth' was an unbreakable law. Although it would seem that
Voroshilov had offered no practical assistance against the repression, Filipovich's
petition insisted on the existence of kinship bonds linking Bolsheviks and sustaining
them in their most extreme suffering.
Just as the early revolutionary hero belonged to a radical 'family', the letters of
repressed communists fiercely asserted their membership to a closed community.
Sometimes their entitlement came through blood ties. Kirenko, for example, wrote
that she was descended from a family of teachers and that between 1898 and 1911
their apartment had served as a safe house for political exiles on the run and as a store
for illegal propaganda, including the underground Bolshevik newspaper Irk-a. 67
 The
wife of a communist repressed in 1937, Antonina Veiner, informed Voroshilov that
her husband's mother was a Bolshevik, and that her father was a Baku railway worker
66 GARFL 7523,op. 107,d. 123, Li.
'7 GARFf7523,op. 107,d. 123,184.
120
and party member from 1905. In both letters, genealogy was used to strengthen
revolutionary credentials. In other cases, the journey towards revolution forged these
tight bonds. Barkhonov, a senior figure within the military management in 1938, was
supported in the petitioning process by Army General Khrulev, who wrote: 'I know
Barkhonov from childhood, when we used to go together to the local zemstvo school
and my brother and I used to stay over at his home. I knew him later when he worked
with my father at the Putilov works.' 69 A childhood friendship initiated in the local
school for poor children, flourished in adulthood at the Putilov factory - a key site for
the forging of the revolutionary spirit before 1917.
The revolutionary hero of early Bolshevik fiction was expected to lead an ascetic life
of extraordinary dedication and self-deprivation. Clark writes that while the hero in
mature socialist realism was 'a bogalyr figure', 'a dynamic figure, a veritable
perpetuum mobile' and a 'vessel of inexhaustible revolutionary energy', his precursor
in pre-revolutionary radical hagiography had been 'the typical martyr prince'.70
Although Soviet prisoners were far from inactive for much of their incarceration, and
the years, even decades, of forced labour offered plenty of material for strenuous and
dynamic scenes, most petitioners preferred to present themselves as 'martyr princes'.
They wrote highly abridged versions of their sentences, often nothing more
loquacious than 'I honestly served 17 years in the camps' or 'I spent ten years
working honesty in prison'. 7' It was their experience of incarceration and torture that
strengthened their life-stories as saintly revolutionary heroes. In the late tsarist era,
prison was an inevitable chapter in the autobiography of a committed radical, and,
'GAPJL7523,op. 107,d. 123,11.9-11.
GARF £7523, op. 107, d. 123,1 13.
1 Clark, The Soviet Novel, pp. 72-3.
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paradoxically, the solitary cell as symbolic site for the fonnation of true revolutionary
identity seems to have retained its potency. 72 Solitary suffering furnished the prisoner
with saint-like virtue. Many of the petitions focus their narratives on the harrowing
experiences of Lefortovo and Butyrka, rather than within the camps. It was in the
torture chambers, where their right to be called a communist was doubted and
disputed, that their faith was most sorely tested. In their narratives, survival required
mental and spiritual strength rather than physical might. The faith of the purge victim
was thus absolutely central to his identity. Kochin, for instance, described all that he
has lost - a decade of his life, his health, reputation, citizenship, family, and friends,
work - but then assured the reader:
But not for a moment did I lose faith in the cause of communism, which I
have served all my life. I didn't lose confidence that justice would
triumph, and being in prison didn't turn me against Soviet power even for
a moment. I didn't become bitter for I found inside myself the strength
and integrity of a confirmed consciousness [ubezhdennogo soznanuaJ,
which makes one recognise the inexorable motion of history and its
unavoidable costs [izderzhld].73
He wrote that even prison failed to rock his faith in the party, and in the darkest of
circumstances he was aided in his battle against internal demons by belief in the
Marxist-Leninism creed. If anything, his time banished to the wilderness made him a
stronger Bolshevik.
In radical Bolshevik fiction, the positive hero should ideally be ready to make the
supreme sacrifice of his life. If he died, the event was commonly followed by a
secularised version of the Christian death-and-transfiguration pattern, with the hero's
GARF £ 7523, op. 107, d. 123,1 14; TsADKM £ 85, op. 1, d. 491, 1 28.
Susan Morrissey, Heralds ofRevolution: Russian Students and the Mythologies ofRadicalism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 34.
TSADKM f. 85, op. 1, ci 491,128.
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'resurrection' symbolised, for example, by a comrade-in-arms taking up his banner.74
Some petition-writers hoped that their exclusion could be interpreted as a symbolic
death, their return as rebirth. Barkhonov, released early for good work, wrote: 'I was
born on earth a second time, everything is new for me, even buses'. 75 For others,
however, 'rebirth' was only possible when their honour was restored, and they could
take their place in the revolutionary family. After eight years in prison and six in
exile, Aleksandr Langovyi returned to Moscow, but only rehabilitation could offer
him rebirth. He explained: 'For 16 years I was disgraced [oplevannyi - literally, spat
upon] and every further month of bureaucratic red tape lies on my soul like a stone,
especially as I still hope to be born again as a human being [vozrodit 'sia
chelovekom]. '
Allowed home, returnees clamoured for the restoration of their honour and their party
cards. in writing their petitions, they were interested not only in what they hoped the
party might do for them, but also in what they might offer the party. Langovyi wrote:
'I am 59 years-old, I have aged considerably, but I am mentally hale and hearty
[dushevno bodr], and in those years that are left tome I would like to work with all
my strength for the cause to which I have devoted all my life.' 77 Even while waiting
for rehabilitation, Kochin devoted all his time to writing his next novel. Not only did
he think he could still serve the Bolshevik cause, he dared to believe that his
experiences over the past decade gave him more legitimacy as a writer: having
worked as a prisoner in the state farms (sovkhozy) of Karaganda oblt'he considered
himself to be in a better position to write about the Kazakh steppe than any other
74 CIark The SOVIetNOVe1, p.49.
75 GARF £ 7523, op. 107, d. 123,1 14.
GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, 1 33.
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writer. He signed off his long petition with a plea to be allowed to be useful to society
in the last years of his life. Both as symbols of the party's resurrection and as valuable
cadres, the former enemies hoped to serve the revolution.
Elena Stasova, Lenin's former colleague and a senior Old Bolshevik aged over eighty
years, received many letters from repressed communists. 78 In this less formal forum,
the returnees might be more explicit about the difficulties they encountered in daily
life, but they were just as passionate in their loyalty to the revolution. A former
Bolshevik named Rikhter had been in correspondence with Stasova since 1944, and
it was to Stasova that he articulated both his frustrations and aspirations upon return
from the camps. Released from the camps in 1954, he was rehabilitated at the end of
the following year. He lived in a small room of 6m 2 in Novgorod, and was
disappointed that staff at the gorkom and obkom failed to treat him with sufficient
respect:
I try not to lose heart and be patient, but a bitter taste remains: I expected
that after 18 years of undeserved suffering, I would have a right to a
minimum of sensitivity, and not to repeated questioning and
interrogations, which painfully touch unhealed wounds.8°
After almost a decade of correspondence with Stasova, he did not hesitate to share the
tribulations he faced, and his annoyance with the hostile attitudes occasionally shown
by local authorities. Yet none of this led him to question the party - quite the
GABF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123,1.34.
'9 When it was hoped that a senior Bolshevik might remember a former colleague, he might be targeted
more personally. As we have seen, letters addressed to Voroshilov as head of the Supreme Soviet often
had a quite personal quality. Victims of prisoners might also nurture an informal correspondence. E. D.
Stasova, a senior Old Bolshevik, corresponded with a number of communists who were repressed and
released in the mid-1950s.
'9 He wrote asking her to support his demand to be allowed to go and fight in WWIL She refused,
arguing that she did not know him sufficiendy well to grant such a request Their correspondence
continued, however, and appears to have become mure intimate.
80 RGASPIL 356, op. 2, d. 34, IL 11-12.
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opposite. Patiently battling against these further injustices was also part and parcel of
the extraordinary test of faith he had endured for so long. Throughout 1955, he
admitted to thinking only about one thing: 'I have been patient and will continue to be
patient, but I will never stop striving for the main aim of my whole life: returning to
the party.' 8 ' Elsewhere he talked of the importance of returning to the 'family of the
party' (v rodypartil). his battle to clear his name could thus not be satisfied by legal
rehabilitation alone. Until the party admitted him, the tonnent would continue, and he
claimed: 'Compared to Vorkuta, I feel much better here, but it is painful that I, a new
person, am still cut off from social life.' 52 Although he wanted to believe that he had
been reborn, he would feel himself an outcast until the party recognised him fully.
Sofia Shpits, Stasova's former colleague, became another of her regular
correspondents in l954. Rehabilitated as early as 1953, her life was governed both
by daily privations and ill health on the one hand, and by an overwhelming faith in the
party on the other. She wrote:
Nineteen years have passed. From a young woman and passionate
revolutionary I have been transformed into an old woman whose health is
shattered. Every month, every day, it becomes harder to go to work. I
don't have any relatives or anyone close to help me.
My rehabilitation is a bright ray of sunlight in front of the sunset. It is a
victory for truth. I am a sick person, and there is already little left to live
for.M
In the epistolary exchange that followed, the hope of reinstatement into the party
became increasingly important to her. As the pension she was eventually granted was
insufficient to allow her to stop working, life continued to be onerous, but in the
' RGASPI £ 356, op. 2, d. 34,1 17.
'2 RGASPI f. 356, op. 2, d. 34,135.
The correspondence began when Shpits asked Stasova for information concerning their work in the
1930s which the authorities required to assess her pension.
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autumn of 1955 she excitedly announced to Stasova that she had written to the Central
Committee: '1 want to tell you that I can't stand by on the sidelines any more. I must
be in the party once more and again bear the distinguished title of member of the
Communist Party.' 85Worried that Stasova might question her delay in addressing the
party, Shpits explained in detail the emotional distress she had experienced over the
last few months, especially as rehabilitation had brought on a nervous breakdown, the
result of years of extreme stress. Many features of her tale are typical of the 'martyr
prince'(ess) narratives. First, she interpreted her ordeal as an attack on her honour:
I don't know, Elena Dmitrevna, if you will understand that kind of state?
It was a terrible reaction. My misfortunes had dragged on for 16 years. It
wasn't just that no one had any sympathy or pity for me and no one
needed me - it was the misfortune of a clean, honest revolutionary-
communist, who had been shamed, whose honour had been cut off [chest'
orezali].
hnagining her honour 'cut off', her words revealed its very tangible reality. Second,
she promoted herself as a ready martyr for the cause, a believer whose faith knew no
bounds:
Whom could I show that I was clean, without guilt, and that I was ready at
any moment to give up my life for the cause of communism, revolution,
the working class, the fatherland, for everything that is dear to us? But I
had no one to tell, no one would believe me.
Third, she adopted a quasi-religious language, replete with burning souls, death-throes
and salvation:
For nineteen years my soul has burnt. And then when salvation came, the
organism didn't hold out, and I found myself in hospital. The spiritual
death-throes have passed [dushevnaia agoniia otoshla], and now I want to
live and with all my strength to catch up with everything that I lost, with
all my soul and burning love to deserve the title of member of the party,
our dear [rodnoi] party.
RGASPIf. 356, op. 2,d. 41,1.1.
'5RGASPIf.356,op.2,d.41,L6.
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And finally, she cast Stasova as her confessor. 'Elena Dmitrevna!' she wrote, 'Please
forgive me for writing so much, and forcing you to read what is in my soul.' 86 In her
narrative, the death-bed scene and the reading of her soul imposed on Stasova clearly
have religious overtones. We need not interpret this as some sort of 'hang-over' from
pre-revolutionary Orthodoxy, however. It is significant rather that Shpits found the
vocabulary of religious belief best to describe the total nature of her devotion. In
Shpits' letter, she voluntarily re-entered the rituals that gripped the party in the 1920s
and 1930s and forced Stasova to collaborate in what Halfln has labelled the
'communist hermeneutics of the soul'. 87 Shpits was not alone. Rather than fearing re-
trials and renewed interrogation, several petitioners, including Kochin and Sverdlov,
implored the authorities to recall them, to read their souls in the 'light of truth'.
With the exception of Kochin's, these are as yet fragmentary autobiographies.
Anxious to parade their heroic virtues, the authors were still uncertain how their
stories would end. As we shall see in the following chapter, the process of public
destalinisation would help to legitimise their life-stories, and many would begin to
write fuller and more coherent autobiographies. In 1964, when Shpits finally
produced a long and substantial petition to the party, she was able to present the
reader with a much more coherent narrative of her life both as revolutionary heroine
in Germany, where Rosa Luxemburg had been her mentor, and in the Soviet Union
first as a young party activist then, after 1936, as martyr to the Bolshevik cause.
'6 RGASPI f. 356, op. 2, d. 41, L 7.
'7 Halfin, 'The Denionization of the Opposition', pp. 46-7.
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Yet destalinisation was in itself dependent upon the noble mood of returnees. Already
in these letters, petitioners offered leaders the basis for a new narrative of the Soviet
past. Eschewing demands for retribution or pleas for pity, they interpreted the
repressions as another heroic battle on the road to communism. Even here, in the
darkest chapter of Soviet history, they found - in their own courage and martyrdom -
the seeds of a new, even inspiring, version of the past. As the nation's leaders sought
to exclude some of the antagonistic elements of Stalinist culture and to downplay the
conflict between society and its enemies, these letters suggested new heroes - noble,
spiritual martyrs to the Bolshevik cause. Promoting the notions of 'truth' and 'belief'
above all else, purge victims led the way in the return to the purity of 1917.
Conclusion
In moments of passionate conflict, some Gulag returnees attacked Soviet power by
exploiting the binary values the regime itself had propagated and by expressing their
allegiance to the 'negative' axis. As they sought readmission, however, they wrote
stories in which they identified with the values of the 'positive' axis. Yet their quite
varied narrative strategies reveal the more complex nature of Soviet culture. Official
culture did not provide one script to the aspiring Soviet citizen.
Depending on their age, experience, and personality, petitioners drew on different
myths and tropes located within the official canon. Some found the explanations
proffered by the contemporary press useful. They claimed their conviction was a
miscarriage of justice for which enemies within the MVD, the party, or legal
profession, bore responsibility. Such an approach, however, brought with it the
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spectre of a new cycle of identifying enemies, securing confessions, meting out
punishment. Two other kinds of petition narrative drew not on the present-day media,
but on the rich Soviet cultural heritage. Those brought up during the war explained
their deviance by noting the incomplete or unsatisfactory upbringing they had
received, and they appealed to the notions of 'healing' and 'correction' which had
been prevalent in the party rhetoric of the 1920s. By blaming the war, they offered the
authorities a possible explanation for the existence of criminal behaviour even after
almost forty years of Soviet power. Those who had been banished from society as a
result of political repression drew on even earlier forms of the socialist realist
narrative, presenting themselves as martyrs to the revolutionary cause. By presenting
their ordeals as proof of their absolute faith, they suggested to the authorities that the
purges might not undermine the party, but actually serve as an affirmation of its own
courage and heroism.
Entering into the dialogue of 1953, prisoners, ex-prisoners, and their families offered
their own versions of Soviet history. They challenged both the life-story imposed
upon them under Stalin, and the ones suggested by the media in 1953. Their
contribution would not be ignored. Both the 'martyr hero' of the 1930s and the 'lost
sheep' of the war generation would become important figures in the official rhetoric
of the 1950s, as the post-Stalin leaders looked for ways to lessen the binary divisions
created by Stalinism and sought to develop legitimating and fortifying explanations to
deal with the difficult legacies they inherited.
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Chapter III
Heroes and Enemies in the Secret Speech
Having returned home fmrn the party meeting, Algaia
couldn't stop worrying. She drank a vodka, then took
valerian drops, then another vodka. She lay down,
then jumped up and ran around the room, thinking,
but not understanding, how this had all happened.
Things had been said that made it impossible to live
as they had done before. Khrushchev had spoken,
Mikoian had supported him, and Molotov, Malenkov,
Voroshilov and Kaganovich had kept quiet [...] What
had happened to them? Had they gone mad? Were
they traitors? All of them?
- Vladimir Voinovich, 'Monumental'naia
Propaganda', 2000'
Khrushchev's address at the XX Party Congress dominates the historiography of the
era. Historians and contemporaries alike depict it as a radical and unforeseen volte-
face in the country's political course, which left Khrushchev's audience in a state of
unprecedented shock. The historian Martin McCauley writes:
What he had to say shocked, amazed, and stunned his audience. Their
whole world was demolished in front of their eyes [...J Khrushchev got
carried away in his wreaking of vengeance on Stalin. One delegate was so
shocked by the revelations that she was unable to raise her arm to vote
acceptance of the report.2
'Vladimir Voinovich, 'Monumental'naia Propaganda', Znamua, 2000.2,8-94, and 2000.3,9-108,
2000.2, p. 17).
Martin McCauley, Nikita Khrushchev (London: Cardinal, 1991), p. 58.
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The Soviet historian and dissident, Roy Medvedev concurs:
To the delegates and guests most of what they heard that day in the Great
Hall of the Kremlin was a revelation indeed. They listened in shocked
silence, only occasionally interrupting the speaker with exclamations of
amazement and indignation.3
All must have been fearfully aware that Khrushchev's speech marked a major and
irrevocable breach in Soviet history. Once the doors of the Great Hall opened and the
content of the speech began to circulate, the drama was replicated in miniature at
party meetings across the nation.
The 'Secret Speech' is, of course, a misnomer. Not only were the contents of
Khrushchev's midnight address widely disseminated abroad, they were made known
to all members of the Soviet Communist Party. In spring 1956, party members
assembled in every workplace to listen as local officials read aloud from
Khrushchev's 'closed letter'. There were over seven million members of the Soviet
Communist Party and 18 million members of the Komsomol, who were also privy to
the document.4 There is little to suggest that they kept such astonishing events to
themselves. A recent student project has indicated that at least two thirds of
Muscovites remember hearing about the Secret Speech m 1956? At the time, one
citizen wrote to Molotov informing him that, though the speech had not been made
3 Roy Medvedev, KhrzLThchev, trans. by Brian Pearce (Oxfor± Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 87.
4 Aksiutin, 'Popular Responses to Khrushchev', pp. 182-3.
5 Aksiutin cites from a survey carried out between 1994 and 1997 by students in the history faculty of
the Moscow Pedagogical University. 568 people who were alive in 1956 were asked what their
reaction had been to the speeck 163 said they had approved, 185 had disapproved, and 220 knew
nothing at the time of Stalin's demotion or were uncertain how to react - although the two are not the
same, they are banded together in the results of the survey. Although the statistics are questionable,
they suggest that a vast majority knew of the speech, and that posiüve and negative reactions were
fairly evenly represented. Sec lu. V. Aksiutin, 'Novoe oXX s'ezde KPSS', Otechestvennaza ,storua,
19982, 108-123 (p.120).
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public yet, everyone knew its content. 6 Even children knew of Stalin's dethronement.
Two schoolgirls informed Molotov that after Khrushchev's speech was read in the
city's factories, children heard out about it from adult conversation and the 'cult of
personality' became a 'subject of discussion at home and at school'.7
What made the Secret Speech unusual was the lack of commentary in the Soviet press
or on the radio. After organising the distribution of Khrushchev's text, Moscow was
inordinately slow to make any attempt at exegesis. Not until the end of March did
Pravda publish a piece on the cult of personality. In it, Stalin was criticised for
encouraging adulation and ignoring the principle of collective leadership, but there
was no mention of the purges or of Stalin's war-time failures. The Soviet public was
still left to make its own interpretation of the most shocking and controversial sections
of the speech.
This 'silence' provoked protest from some within Soviet society. One man wrote to
Molotov: 'I am begging you to speak out in the newspapers and to explain to the
people how they should regard Stalin, and whether their appreciation of him can
continue, or if it is necessary to evaluate him differently now.' 9 A vehement opponent
of the speech believed that the absence of public commentary reflected its dubious
political worth, arguing in a letter to Molotov:
'RGASPI L 82, op. 2, d, 1458,1 2.
7 RGASP! £ 82, op. 2, d. 1461,1 87.
$ On 28 March 1956 pages 2 and 3 of Pravda featured a long piece under the headline 'Why Is the Cult
of Personality Alien to the Spirit of Marxism-Leninism?' On 2 July 1956 the topic was blazoned across
the front cover of Pravda, but the reading of the Secret Speech was even more conservative. When
letter-writers engaged with an 'official' text in 1956, however, they did not spread out a newspaper
article before them, but rather drew on what they remembered of Khrushchev's 'closed' letter.
9 RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d, 1445,1 104.
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The fact that this letter wasn't read out on the radio and in the newspapers
like the other materials from the XX Party Congress shows that the person
who wrote the letter wasn't certain himself that it would be approved, and
it shows the criminality and the slander of the letter. At the congress you
weren't afraid to read it in front of the foreign guests, but in front of the
people you are afraid to read it at the top of your voice. You whisper like
cowards in the corners of party and Komsomol meetings.'°
Hostile to the Secret Speech, the writer's anger was re-doubled by his feeling that he,
as a non-party man, was excluded from discussions and debates surrounding it. Indeed
some party members realised that the silence surrounding the Speech had only served
to heighten the crisis. At the Sverdlov raion party meeting in Moscow, one member
asked if they should organise explanations of the cult of personality for workers and
housewives, as the press's reticence was creating rumours." After giving a series of
open lectures on the meaning of the Secret Speech, the renowned historian A. M.
Pankratova also informed the Central Committee of the need to produce more
explanatory material. Attracting over 6000 listeners and with the auditorium bursting,
her lectures clearly responded to a need within Leningrad society. Reporting on the
opinions she encountered at her lectures she summarised the questions raised in the
800 written notes submitted by those attending and warned that one Pravda article
was far from sufficient.'2
Many who entered into dialogue with the state hoped that their letters might
themselves serve as the basis for a public debate. Seeking to spark a reaction in the
press, one ordered the editors of Kommunist to publish his letter.' 3 Another suggested
his letter be published alongside the Secret Speech in order for the public to make its
'°RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1467,122.
"TsAODMf. 82,op. 34, d. 12,133.lnalettertoMolotov, anotherpartymenibeTcomplainedthatthe
speech was being read at open party meetings, and the wnter worried that housewives and the rest of
the non-working population were present Sec RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1461,188.
12 RGANI f 5, op. 32, d. 46,11212-217.
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preference in a secret ballot.' 4 Just as many were uncertain how the authorities wanted
them to respond to the Secret Speech, many also believed that their leaders were
unaware of the mood of the people. The need to enlighten their leaders justified
writing letters, and they urged their readers to listen to their opinions. Convinced that
his own views were widespread, one opponent of destalinisation suggested that
leaders should find out the true opinion of rank and file members of the party on the
subject of the cult of personality.'5 Another regretted that they did not have an
'institute of public opinion' like they did in America, suggesting his belief that the
authorities were unaware of public reactions.'6
This chapter explores the reactions engendered by the ambiguous and unexplained
document that circulated in Soviet society in early 1956. The reaction in Georgia was
the most explosive. In Tiblisi and other provincial cities, crowds insisted on
commemorating Stalin's death as they had done in previous years, and the
demonstrations were only quelled by the arrival of Soviet troops, mass arrests, and
bloodshed.'7 Elsewhere, events tended to be less violent, but party authorities were
still concerned. In Moscow, the primary party organisations were first instructed to
organise readings of the material and then urgently told to stop. The grassroots
response had caused the city's leaders such anxiety that they considered it prudent to
delay the meetings and 'prepare more thoroughly'.'5
'3 RGASPI f. 599, op. I, d. 101,167.
t4 RGPI £ 82, op 2, d. 1466,1 106.
'5 RGASPI L 82, op 2, d. 1467,1 19.
"RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1467,125.
Kozlov, Mass Uprisings, pp. 112-129.
"RGASPI f. 556, op. 1, d. 705,1 146.
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The approach taken in this study is not to divide the responses into two camps:
opponents of the Secret Speech on the one hand, supporters on the other. 19 Instead, I
find it is more productive to explore the shared beliefs that structured the responses of
both those 'for' and 'against'. Indeed, it is not only in the 'conservative' responses
that we find beliefs established under Stalin strongly influencing the public's
interpretation of the Secret Speech, but right across the political gamut.
The first set of responses engaged with issues of public culture, especially the fate of
established rituals and practices. Typically, one man told Molotov it would have been
better to leave Stalin in peace and to let him stay in the people's minds as he was
when he was alive and 'how you created him in the minds of the people'. 2° His focus
was thus the cultural artifice of 'Stalin', rather than discovery of the 'truth'. In his
study of Soviet monumentality, Mikhail Yampoisky argues that political symbols
(such as statues) create 'certain islets of eternity in the movement of time' or
'atemporal islets in the social space'. One of the achievements of Soviet culture was
the 'maximal suppression of chronological time and the creation of the illusion of
stability and stasis for the functioning of the masses'. 2' The Secret Speech
undermined this illusion of timelessness, and for many the uncertainty engendered by
the changes in public space and ritual behaviour was its most disturbing aspect.
'9 1n his seminal article 'The Friends and Foes of Change', Stephen Cohen made the division between
'refonners' who supported change per se, and conservatives who feared it. This opposition between
those 'for' change and those 'against' tends to be implicit in much of the secondary literature. My
intention instead is to suggest how divergent viewpoints may in fact share certain fundamental
—sea.
20 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1467,1. 18.
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In contrast, a second set of responses focused on the 'truth'. Brooks maintains that
'[i)ntellectuals took advantage of Khrushchev's "thaw" to champion "sincerity", the
antithesis of the performative culture.' 22
 Rejecting the 'false' narratives of the Stalin
period, the Secret Speech was proclaimed the restoration of truth. Instead of yearning
for the eternal nature of Stalin's magical world, some - and not just 'intellectuals' -
sought to discover the 'true' story of their past Terror was condemned, incorporated
into new narratives where the party drew strength from the fact that it had overcome
the 'evil' within.
It is not my intention to attribute the different kinds of response to particular social
groups. It is true, however, that contemporary commentators frequently regarded
emotional anxiety over the fate of portraits, bodies, and songs as the preserve of the
'masses'. Later in 1956 a certain Vasilii Taran wrote that 'the masses ask what to do
with the portraits and books about Stalin (for there are millions of them!) and with
songs about him (for there are thousands of them!)'. He noted that party activists
shrugged their shoulders, saying they have received no other instructions from
above.23
 There does indeed seem to be some difference between the discussions
during party meetings at raion or primary level, where issues of 'performative'
culture dominated, and those at gorkom or obkom, where the search for the 'true'
narrative was prevalent. This might suggest that the regime's symbols and rites were
more important for the less powerful within society, and that the revision of Bolshevik
21 Md Yançolsky, 'In the Shadow of Monuments: Notes on Iconoclasm and Time', frans. by Join
Kachur, in Soviet Hievgjq,hics: Visual Culture in Late Tniieth Centwy Russia, ed by Nancy
Condee (Bloomington, md.: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 93-112 (p. 97, p.104).
His perceptive comments are no doubt influenced by the 1953 article 'On Sincerity in Literature'
published in Noiyi mir - the journal that would emerge as the nxrnthpiece of the 'thaw'. V.
Pomerantsev, 'Ob iskrcnnosti v literature', Nosys mir, 1953.12, 218-245; Brooks, Thank You, p. xviii
23 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d 1461,11.46-49.
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myth was more significant for those who had more fully committed themselves to the
party. This is not, however, an avenue explored in detail.' Instead, I examine both the
discursive differences and similarities between a woridview based on monumentality,
stability and the unchanging nature of time, and one that depended on historicised
myths of the revolutionary path.
This chapter will open with a brief rereading of Khrushchev's speech. Turning then to
the broader reception and interpretation of this ambiguous document, it will examine
the great influx of letters to party leaders and the press, as well as responses at local
party meetings. All the texts - from the Speech itself to individual letters and recorded
speech acts - are examined with particular attention to Manichean beliefs, whether
they be embodied in the form of calls for new iconoclastic rituals and the collective
repudiation of an enemy, or in the eschatological quest to overcome the 'cult', to
cleanse the party of all its contaminants, and assure the purity of the future.
The Text Itself
Khrushchev's memoirs have long been one of the key sources for understanding the
significance of the Secret Speech. 25 His memoirs suggest that the prime importance of
the Secret Speech was the rehabilitation of innocent victims. His chapter on the XX
Party Congress begins by claiming that Stalinist policies were still in force until
Benia's arrest. 'No one thought to rehabilitate the people who had gone to their
This would in itself form the topic of a separate study as it would require extensive local studies on
responses to the Secret Speech.
Even a recent study such as Tonipson's Khrushchev is still heavily dependent upon Khrushchev's
memoirs, readily adopting Khrushchev's own explanations of the political process.
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graves branded as enemies of the people or to release the prisoners from the camps.'26
Explaining how Beriia's arrest led to further investigation, Khrushchev writes of his
personal shock upon discovering that Kedrov, a hero of the civil war, had been
executed as an enemy of the people and of his mounting desire to find out more about
the arrests. In his version, therefore, his motivation was almost exclusively remorse
for the innocent victims of the purges. In his account of the XX Party Congress,
moreover, the most dramatic scene is a hurried Presidiwn meeting where Khrushchev
seeks to convince his colleagues of the need to talk openly about the purges and the
fate of Stalin's victhns. He remembers saying:
'We now know that the people who suffered during the repressions were
innocent. We have indisputable proof that, far from being enemies of the
people, they were honest men and women, devoted to the party, devoted
to the revolution, devoted to the Leninist cause and to the building of
socialism and communism in the Soviet Union. We can't keep people in
exile or in the camps any longer. We must figure out how to bring them
back.'28
Battling against the opposition of certain colleagues in the Presidium, he further
argued that as newly released prisoners would soon start coming home, it would be
beneficial for the party to speak out now before the returnees began informing the
wider public of the injustices they had experienced. According to his memoir,
therefore, he was moved by guilt for the atrocities committed against them and
Khnishchev Remembers, pp. 342-343.
v Khrushchev writes that no decision had been made until the congress was well underway. In a recess
he assembled the Politburo members and entered into a fierce argument with Voroshilov about the
possibility of speaking openly about the purges. However Russian historian Iurii Aksutin dispels the
myth that the other leaders had not decided to go on with the speech right up to the last mimite, using
archival documents to show that the Presidium had approved the Secret Speech on 13 February 1956.
Aksiutin writes that 'nothing was inçrovised by Khrushchev, and there were no secret decisions.
Khrushchev followed the norma of collective decision-making.' Aksiutin is one of the leading Russian
historians working on the Khrushchev peiiod offering new versions of political events based on
archival research and - in contrast to the political science approach still doTrunant in the west - also
etpIoring the reactions of the Soviet public. Sec Aksiutin, 'Novoe o XX s'ezde KPSS'; Aksiutin and
Pyzhikov, Poststalinskoe obshchesvo; V. P. Naurnov, 'K istorii sekretnogo dokiada N. S. Khrushcheva
us XX s'ezda', Novaia I noveichaia Lctorlla, 1996.4,147-1.68.
Khn,shchev Remembers, p. 347.
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apprehension over the potential threat they posed to political and social stability. If we
return to the Secret Speech itself, however, it emerges as a more complex piece of
writing than Khrushchev chose to remember. 29
 It had important implications both for
public culture and party myth in the post-Stalin era.
One of the most important aspects was, of course, the desecration of Stalin's
reputation. While official propaganda bad proclaimed him a hero of the Bolshevik
underground, Khrushchev now questioned his revolutionary credentials; while he had
been worshiped as the nation's saviour during WWII, Khrushchev now suggested that
he had been a rather flawed military leader, responsible for the catastrophic setbacks
of 1941. More devastating still were Khrushchev's revelations about the use of terror
within the party. Khrushchev told his audience that Stalin had played a leading role in
the atrocities committed against thousands of party members. Indeed, Stalin might
even have been responsible for the murder of the leading Bolshevik, Sergei Kirov, in
1934.
Khrushchev reviled the notion of Stalin as 'superhuman' (sverkhchelovek). The whole
culture of worshipping Stalin was now dismissed as a harmful 'cult of personality'
that must be destroyed for the good of the party. The attack on Stalinist performative
culture went even further. Not only was Stalin found to be an unsuitable hero, the
existence of living idols per se was said to be harmful and contrary to Lenin's
teaching. Khrushchev reminded his audience that Lenin had counted modesty as one
of the most important attributes of a Bolshevik, and criticised the practice of idolising
A. N. Iakovlev (ed), Reabilitatsila: Politicheskieprotcessy 30-50 godov (Moscow !zdatel'stvo
literatury, 1991), pp. 19-67.
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living people. Khrushchev condemned the fact that many cities, factories, farms, and
Soviet cultural institutions were named after party figures who were still alive and
well. Although he prescribed caution, he hinted that re-naming should be undertaken.
His speech can thus be read as a tentative attack on one of the central aspects of
Soviet culture in which heroes were promoted and revered. Despite the fact that he
lauded the noble qualities of purge victims, he questioned the need to construct Soviet
identity on the basis of an opposition between good and bad, between heroes and
enemies.
In addition to the demotion of heroes, therefore, Khrushchev also queried the practice
of labelling and casting out 'enemies'. He told his audience that it was Stalin who
introduced the concept of 'enemies of the people'. 'When engaged in any sort of
polemic, this term immediately freed him from any need to provide proof of the
person's ideological error.' 30 Later in the speech he referred to the term 'enemy of the
people' as a 'formula' that allowed all sorts of abuses. Deriding Stalin for seeing
'enemies', 'double-dealers' (dvurushniki), and 'spies' everywhere, Khrushchev
undermined key terms in the established lexicon. In his attacks on Stalin, he
circumvented the usual rabid rhetoric used in the press against enemies. Accusing
Stalin of 'arbitrary rule' (proizvol) and 'lawlessness' (bezzakoniia), and of committing
abuses or distortions of 'revolutionary' or 'socialist legality', Khrushchev promoted
the language first found in the press in 1953. In the place of hostile invective, he
deliberately avoided labelling Stalin an 'enemy'. Khrushchev instead identified both
positive sides (Stalin 'played a positive role' in the ideological battles of 1928-9) and
negatives characteristics (his rudeness and despotism). By depicting a human being
140
who was neither all good nor all bad, it seemed that the era of absolute evil versus
heroic good was over. When he talked of Beriia, however, Khrushchev used more
venomous terms: 'In the organisation of several dirty and shameful affairs, the out-
and-out enemy of our party, the agent of foreign spies Berila, who had wormed his
way in Stalin's confidence, played a major role.' 31Although he wanted to break with
the poisonous invective of Stalinist culture, Khrushchev showed how important the
enemy remained in the Soviet political imagination. Although the threat of enemies
was downplayed, it had not entirely disappeared.
In Khrushchev's rewriting of party history, the enemy camp became much less
dangerous than Stalin had claimed so famously in 1937. Rather than seeing the
Trotskyists as a mounting threat the further they progressed along the revolutionary
path, Khrushchev believed that the party's opposition was almost defeated by the
mid-1930s. It was totally unthinkable, he claimed, that 70 per cent of those elected to
the Central Committee in 1934 were enemies. Based on this reading of party politics
in the 1930s, Khrushchev claimed that the party had long been moving away from the
era of conflict (bor 'ba), and as a result, he argued, the party should be oriented not
towards the extermination of deviants, but towards the goal of correction. Khrushchev
re-introduced the idea that people might err, yet not immediately be cast out as
'enemies'. Urging a return to the practices of the Leninist era, he reminded his
audience that the early years of the revolution witnessed many occasions when people
who had vacillated and erred from the party line were given the chance to return to the
party path (pu:'partiinostz). He cited the example of Lenin's forgiving approach to
3°Reabiitatiia: Politiche3kieprottessy, p. 24.
31 Reabilitatsua: Politicheskieprotcessy, p. 54.
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Lev Kamenev and Grigorii Zmov'ev after the revolution. Khrushchev's portrayal of
Lenin was complex, however, for he also admitted that enemies had existed in the
early stages of the revolution, and Lenin had shown no mercy towards exp'oiters from
the old regime. The following argument emerged: in the early years of the revolution
there were enemies, but Lenin still strove to 'correct' not 'destroy' wherever possible;
under Stalin, though the actual threat declined, fear of the enemy escalated, and with
it caine the most extreme 'terroristic' measures. In recognition of the relatively small
threat the 'enemy' represented, the order of the day was now correction, and not
punishment. Indeed the Secret Speech itself can be read as a confession of the errors
of Politburo members who had failed to resist Stalin, and a plea for universal
forgiveness.
Despite his negative assessment of the recent past, Khrushchev sought to create
legitimising myth. To this end, he drew on the tales of several victims of Stalinist
terror, including leading party figures such as R. I. Eikhe, Ia. E. Rudzutak, M. S.
Kedrov, P. P. Postyshev, S. V. Kosior, V. Ia. Chubar', and A. V. Kosarev, all killed as
'enemies of the people'. Drawing on petitions unearthed in the archives, he depicted
them as the true heirs of the revolution and reproduced the victims' self-stylisation as
'martyr princes' and embodiments of saintly devotion. Again, we find the motifs of
truth, honour, and belief. Khrushchev quoted from Eikhe's letter to Stalin:
If I were guilty of even a hundredth of the crimes they're pinning on me, I
wouldn't dare to address this dying letter to you, but I haven't committed
a single one of the crimes I am charged with, and there has never been a
shadow of baseness on my souL I have never in my life told you even a
hail-word of untruth, and now, with one foot in the grave, I am also rx,t
lying to you?2
32 Rbjljjw: Polizichesicieprotsessy, p. 35.
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Eikhe's soul was clean and pure, a martyr about to die for the cause, still full of loyal
devotion. Kedrov, referring to himself as the faithful son of the party, wrote: 'To die
in a Soviet prison labelled a despicable traitor of his country - what can be more
terrible for an honourable person [...j I believe that truth and justice will triumph. I
believe, I believe.'33
 Kedrov struggled against the 'enemy' label forced upon him, and
reaffirmed his undying faith in the Bolshevik creed. Using their own words,
Khrushchev suggested that those long vilified as 'enemies of the people' must now be
regarded as honourable revolutionaries. This image of the purge-victim as martyr and
hero was common in the petition letters penned in the wake of Stalin's death, and
Khrushchev may have been influenced not only by the letters retrieved from the
archives, but also those that arrived daily in the Kremlin postbag.
Khrushchev's Secret Speech was a multi-faceted text. Although he demoted Stalin
and resurrected the noble martyrs of the purges, this was no simple reversal of fates.
Khrushchev also brought into question the practices of mass hero-worship, and the
existence of absolute heroes and enemies. Most importantly for this dissertation, he
denied the prime place given to enemies, both in terms of the rituals, symbols, and
language governing Soviet public life, and in terms of the party's history and its
practices for dealing with internal discord.
Ambi2uous Semiotics
Stalin's funeral was the final masterpiece in the Stalinist performance, a media event
that created a sense of public solidarity and shared suffering across the Soviet Union.
Reabiliiatsiia: Politiche.skieprotsessy, p. 56.
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With Khrushchev's Secret Speech falling less than two weeks before the third
anniversary, some letter-writers remembered the funeral. For several of Molotov's
correspondents, memories of Stalin's funeral came to symbolise the demise of a
certain way of life. Reminding Molotov how he had grieved by Stalin's graveside
three years earlier, medical workers from a small village in Tiumen province said the
people felt betrayed. TM A second letter was likewise nostalgic:
Although three years have already passed since the death of I. V. Stalin,
your graveside speech still rings in my ears. You read your speech with
such pain in your heart... on the loudspeakers we could hear how your
voice shook... We all cried listening to you... we cried because our love
for Stalin was boundless.
Evoking a community of fellow mourners, the author recalled how grief had bonded
the Soviet public to its leaders. Now, however, doubts had appeared. Whereas three
years earlier letter-writers expressed their grief in grandiose rhetoric and even
elaborated formulaic poems, here the author repeatedly used ellipsis to break off her
sentences, as if failing to find conclusive meaning. She finished her letter:
And now they say - or rather they don't say, and I have to rely on
rumours, for I am not a party member, and here in the city of Bamaul
Khrushchev's letter was only read to party members - that Stalin was little
short of an enemy of the peole, and they're taking down his portraits,
burning literature and so on.
Again she voiced doubt - was it just in Barnaul that the people were denied access to
the speech? And, implicitly, was it right that Stalin should be rejected as a quasi
'enemy of the people'? Her doubts evoked issues that were common in popular
responses. As she inquired whether Stalin ought be labelled 'enemy of the people',
she probed the changing nature of political language. When she told how local people
RGASPI 1.82, op. 2,1465,11.90-91.
35 RGASPI L 82, op. 2, 1466,1. 131.
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destroyed images of the dead leader and burned his literature, she questioned the fate
of the sacred symbols and texts of Soviet culture. Her anxieties were not uncommon.
One of the most important issues was Stalin's body, perhaps because the body of his
predecessor had already acquired such significance. On display in the Mausoleum at
the very heart of the Soviet state, Lenin's body had become 'a holy relic', allowing
his powers to continue beyond his physical death.36 Visits to the Mausoleum had
become an enduring ritual in Soviet culture. If Stalin was allowed to remain alongside
Lenin after public condemnation, it risked contaminating the sanctity of Lenin's body
and undermining the purity of Soviet rites. Although Khrushchev had made no
mention of Stalin's body in the Secret Speech, many who read the speech were
desperate for an answer. At almost every lower level party meeting, the list of
questions posed by the audience included the fate of the body. At the Suzdal raion
meeting in Vladimir province, for example, one delegate asked how the question of
the Mausoleum was to be resolved, while another party member wished to know what
was going on at the Mausoleum and whether Stalin was still lying next to Lenin.
According to party reports, one of the most popular questions at factory meetings in
the city of Vladimir was whether Stalin was still in the Mausoleum. 37 As news leaked
after the party meetings elsewhere, gossip in one shop-queue held that Stalin was
going to be removed.38
For both supporters and opponents of destalinisation, the body was rich in meaning.
In a passionate defence of Stalin, one Stalingrader wrote to Molotov that the people
3'Nina Tuinarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1983), p. 173.
37 Vladimir OblasI'Party Archive, £ P-830, op. 3, d. 212, IL 65-66; II. 109-110; 11. 170.
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still loved Stalin. Pinning his hopes on Stalin's right-hand man, he entreated Molotov
to intervene: 'It's clear now that Khrushchev's band is getting ready to liquidate
Stalin's body. Speak with Mao Tse Tung, and ask him that if this should happen
would he take the body to his country on a temporary basis.' 39 For Ishchenko, a
poorly educated, middle-aged man working as a night watchman on a building site in
Stavropol, Stalin signified something quite different - a 'grasping beast' who stole
from the people. In an emotional letter addressed to Voroshilov, Ishchenko asked why
Stalin had not been wiped from history yet, and demanded that they disposed of the
body because it stank. 4° Like the decaying body of a religious man once claimed to be
a saint, the alleged smell of putrefaction betrayed Stalin as a false icon. 4 ' The
handwriting and spelling of their letters suggest that both men were diffident scribes,
yet both risked committing themselves to paper because they believed that they spoke
for a Soviet public for whom the body was significant - whether as symbol of rotting
leadership or as an icon of great Soviet power.
Although its most powerful embodiment lay in the Mausoleum, Stalin's iconography
was reproduced in public places, offices, and homes across the country. As with his
body, many were anxious to know what to do with his portraits. A frequent question
raised at local party meetings was 'What should we do with his portraits?' or
translated more literally, 'How should we be with portraits of Stalin?' (Kak byt's
RGANI £5, op. 32, d. 46,1 177.
RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1467, L 3
4°GARF £ 8131, op. 31, d. 82269, 1 42.
41 1n Dostoevskii's The Brothers Karamzov, for example, Father Zosima had been considered a great
saint during his life, and there was expectation that when he died his body would not rot like ordinary
human flesh. Within hours, however, an 'odour of corruption' was emanating from the coffin. Fyodor
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamzov, frans. by David Magarshack (London: Folio Society, 1964), pp.
361-374.
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portretami Stalina?).42 One party member asked what action should be taken with the
portraits of Staim hanging in the red corners. 43 Schoolchildren told Molotov that in
the neighbouring school, the children were taking pictures off the walls and ripping
them up. No one was punishing them. Did this mean it was right, they asked." One
subscriber to Bolshevik told the editors that many local party officials were taking
down portraits of Stalin, and this 'upsets the people' (vozmushchaet narod). She
described in detail the confusion that reigned at a local factory:
Yesterday workers from Workshop 34 came to the bursar and cursed him
for taking down the portraits of Stalin, calling him an over-zealous fool. In
my opinion they were right.
Twice a member of the factory party bureau came running up to one of the
department managers in the factory's administration and asked why he
hadn't taken down the portrait of IosifVissarionovich Stalin in his office.
The manager said that he wouldn't allow anyone to touch the portrait.45
She also described the tremendous fear experienced by the manager's wife on
learning that her husband was acting against orders. Despite his wife's warnings that
he might be arrested as a 'cult of personality' (sic), the manager was resolute that the
portrait remained where it was.
While in one workplace Stalin's loyal supporters resisted instructions from local party
cells, in another advocates of destalinisation leapt to destroy them. According to the
reports of raion officials, party members became so impassioned during the readings
of the material that they immediately began ripping portraits off the wall. Such
incidents were not rare. In the small town of Gus'-Kbrustal'nyi, for instance, two
incidents were reported to superiors in the oblast' capital of Vladimir. In the Red
Vladimir Oblàt'Party Archive, P-830, op. 3, d. 212, IL 50-51; 11. 65-66; II. 109-110; 1. 126; L 170.
Vladimir Oblast' Party Archive, P-830, op. 3, d. 212,175.
RGASPIL82,op.2,d. 1461,L87.
45 RGASPI L 599, op. 1, d. 82, L 117.
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Labour workshop, one worker took a poster of Stalin and burnt it in the stove, while at
the Lenin Club, 'hooligans' defaced a statue of the dead leader. At the Volzhskii
raion meeting in Saratov province, a man tried to remove Stalin's picture from the
foyer of the gorkom library where the meeting was being held. 47 There are clear
parallels to events in 1953, when some members of the public seized on Berüa's
arrest as the opportunity for a public hanging, and one idiosyncratic individual eagerly
suggested that Beriia be canied in a cage from town to town. Those who destroyed
portraits in their workplaces went one step further, actually performing their own
carriivalesque acts of desecration and publicly displaying their odium for the hero-
turned-enemy.
Attempting to channel this energy into more organised form, one party loyalist, a
member of the academic staff at the Institute of Russian Literature, expressed his
desire to posthumously court martial Stalin. Alekseev suggested that every party cell
should meet and collectively pass judgement on whether Stalin was a 'state criminal'.
When the communists of Vasileostrovskii raion voted on this issue, only four
supported him against a majority of 750, but the fact that his idea came to ballot at all
indicates considerable backing from the meeting's organisers. Alekseev coveted
public rituals to condemn Stalin, not only suggesting a desire for the kind of spectacle
provided by the show trials in the 1930s, but also recognition of the need for public
participation in such a performance.
4' Vladimir Oblast' Party Archive, P-830, op. 3, d. 213,1.7.
47 RGANI £5, op. 32, d. 45,1 60.
4 RGAN! £5, op. 32, d. 45,11.25-26. In November 1956 Alekseev wrote to Molotov (RGASPI f. 82,
op. 2, d. 1440,11.30-33). Here he expressed concern that the 'people' were losing faith in their leaders.
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It is apparent from their reports that party leaders were deeply concerned by the
spontaneous desecration of portraits and statues, acts perhaps worryingly reminiscent
of the anarchic destruction of Imperial monuments and symbols following the 1917
revolution.49 Katherine Verdery has suggested that tearing down statues 'not only
removes that specific body from the landscape as if to excise it from history, but also
proves that because it can be torn down, no god protects it.' 5° Some officials perhaps
feared this was the case, anxious that iconoclastic acts presented a lack of respect for
the authority of the party. However, Mikhail Yampoisky offers a rather different
interpretation of such acts:
Attacks on monuments, characteristic for certain stages of change in
Russia, cannot, in my opinion, be described in terms of pure iconoclasm.
Rather, they express the deep dependence of the masses on the monument
they are attacking.5'
With valiant efforts to save monuments alongside attempts to desecrate them, the
reactions of the Soviet public in 1956 illustrate the very great importance attached to
such symbols. Moreover, they suggest an unwillingness to follow Khrushchev in
viewing Stalin as a composite being who had both positive qualities and flaws. The
attention paid to public rituals not only shows their importance in daily life, it also
suggests the immutability of concepts such as 'hero' and 'enemy'. In Soviet
cosmogony, there could be no ambiguity. Stalin was either a true hero maligned by
his enemies, or the tiber-enemy gloriously unmasked. Rejecting his portrayal as a man
who both committed errors and achieved great feats, citizens demanded that he either
In 1917 and 1918 portraits of the monarchy were born on huge bonfires as part of the destnictive
force of revolution. Christel Lane, The Rites ofRuJeiv: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case
Cambiidge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 2O0, Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, pp. 64-72.
Katherine Verdeiy, The Political Lives ofDead Bodies: Reburial and PosLcociahst Change (New
York Columbia University Press, 1999), p.5.
51 Yampolsky, 'In the Shadow of Monuments', p. 105.
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be reinstated as the personification of 'good' or be conclusively unmasked as the icon
of 'evil'.
Endeavouring to lay to rest the concept of the 'enemy of the people', Khrushchev had
criticised the conduct of political life based on defamation and annihilation. Although
he found it difficult to discard the passionate rhetoric of Stalinist culture in his
venomous attack on Beriia, Khrushchev sought to criticise Stalin without labelling
him an enemy. Many within Soviet society, however, were unresponsive to
Khrushchev's revision of the concept of 'enemies of the people'. Instead, they
understood criticism of Stalin as the prelude to fuller denunciation and public
condemnation as an enemy of the people. While Khrushchev repeatedly used the
terms 'lawlessness' (bezzakonie) and 'arbitrary rule' (proizvol) to refer to Stalin's
actions, they are notably absent here. For many Soviet citizens, the crucial question
was rather whether Stalin was an enemy or not.
Believing that the Secret Speech required them to label Stalin an enemy, his defenders
rebelled, with one exclaiming, 'We are sure that Stalin wasn't an enemy of the
people!' 52 Another wrote: 'We don't believe that Stalin was an enemy of the
people!' 53 Others, desperate to understand the essence of the matter correctly, called
for clarification. At local party meetings, many were anxious to be told how Stalin
should be labelled. At the Ugod raion meeting in Vladimir province, for example, of
the four questions asked from the floor, three pertained to the concept of 'enemies':
Could Stalin be considered an enemy of the people? Were Kamenev and Zinov'iev
52 RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1466, L 106.
RGASPI £ 82, op. 2, d. 1466, L 120.
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still enemies of the people? What would happen to Stalin's family? Underlying all
three questions are certain fundamental beliefs: if an individual is criticised, he is
surely an enemy; if he is an enemy, his family will be arrested, his fonner adversaries
acquitted.
One anonymous correspondent offered the authorities his own analysis of how the
populace was reacting to the Secret Speech. While personally opposed to
destalinisation, he identified a 'philistine' response, which he thought was particularly
common amongst collective farmers. The philistines reduced the speech's message to
a simplistic formula which went: 'Stalin is an enemy of the people, Beriia's
accomplice, and we need to chuck his body out of the Mausoleum and so on.'' The
writer rejected such a reading as crude. Although he depicted himself as an
independent thinker, he too was susceptible to the lure of Stalinist rhetoric.
Interpreting the speech as another chapter in the revolution's great struggle against
enemies, he considered Khrushchev's address - which he called 'the notorious
"unmasking" - an extension of the established culture of public denunciation
established in the 1 930s. Though adamant that Stalin himself could not be considered
an enemy, the letter-writer remained bound within an interpretation of Soviet history
in which the enemy loomed large: Kirov was a victim not of Stalin, but of 'real
enemies'; in his last years, Stalin was a victim of the 'enemy' Beriia, and his
accomplices Malenkov and Frol Kozlov. Like Khrushchev then, even those who
wished to disassociate themselves from simplistic and vitriolic denunciation of Stalin,
Vladimir Oblast'PartyArchive, P-830, op. 3, d. 213,121.
" RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1467,11.42.
RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1467, IL 42-45.
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still found themselves relying on the concept of the 'enemy' to make sense of certain
events.
There was marked resistance to the revived rhetoric of correction. Khrushchev had
implicitly used the speech to ask for forgiveness for the failings of himself and other
leading politicians during Stalin's rule. He seemed to hope it was possible for the
party leaders to admit to their own mistakes. Yet the public responded with hostile
questions about such errors: Why had the nation's leaders been so full of praise for
him while he was alive?5 Why was nothing said earlier? Why did Politburo members
not try to 'unmask Stalin's cult' at the XIX Party Congress?58 The popular response
was certainly not to praise the leaders for trying to 'correct' themselves. In fact some
believed that the leaders had not simply committed mistakes, but might in fact be the
real enemies. In some contexts, the hostile invective Khrushchev had hoped to defuse,
resurfaced, and was even directed towards him.
Although he had hoped to neutralise the term 'enemy of the people', the new party
leader was soon labelled one himself. For those who opposed the Secret Speech,
belief in the omnipresence of enemies offered a very convincing explanation for
unwanted change. One letter from Moscow, whose anonymous authors identified
themselves as workers and war veterans, began 'Down with Khrushchev!' Drawing
on the rhetoric of the Stalinist press, it accused Khrushchev of pouring dirt on Stalin,
called hini a cunning beast (ukhidnaia Ivar), and, more unusually, hoped that
everything would come crashing down on his 'bald head'. They threatened to follow
" RGANI £ 5, op. 32, d. 45,1. 69.
Vladimir Oblast' Party Archive, P-830, op. 3, d. 213,1. 75.
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the Georgian example, and demanded a public decree to say that Stalin was not an
enemy of the people, and that his body would not be touched. 59 The Stalingrader who
had proposed Mao as guardian to Stalin's body also adroitly adopted the rhetoric of
enemies to attack Khrushchev. Referring to Khrushchev's speech as 'unbridled and
exaggerated campaign of slander against the great Stalin which only enemies of
socialism want', he praised Stalin at length, and concluded that 'only a cretin, an
ignoramus or a malicious enemy would deny [his greatness]'. 6° Both were concerned
about Stalin's body, both contested the labelling of Stalin as 'enemy', and both used
the established rhetoric of vilification to attack Khrushchev personally as an enemy,
or at the very least, a cunning beast.
One anti-Khrushchev pamphlet, which landed its author in the Gulag, also employed
Stalinist rhetoric in its attack. Displeased by many aspects of Khrushchev's rule,
including the shortages in consumer goods, low pay, rising unemployment,
educational reforms, and the re-emergence of hooliganism, banditry, theft, and
'terrible rudeness', Fedor Maniakov set pen to paper three years after the Secret
Speech. According to his own confession, Maniakov's path towards non-conformist
thought had begun in 1956 when he found himself doubting Khrushchev's treatment
of the cult of personality. 6 ' Despite more sophisticated discussion of the social ills
blighting the country, Maniakov's rejection of the Secret Speech drew on the
established rhetoric of enemies. If in 1953 rumour-mongers blamed Beriia for Stalin's
death, Maniakov now blamed Khrushchev:
RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1466,11. 114-115.
'°RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1467, L 1.
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The premature death of the great genius of modernity, the wise leader of
the Soviet state and party figure I. V. Stalin - which was possibly the
work of the vile hand of Khrushchev - sharpened Khrushchev's poisonous
sting [....] Once firmly established in the post [of party leader], be
surrounded himself with like-minded people and straying from the path
laid down by the Leninist-Stalinist party, this galaxy [pliiadaj, like a gang
of out-and-out bandits, sought popularity by undermining the authority of
old party and state leaders and close colleagues of V. I. Lenin. To this end,
they unleashed slanderous accusations against the recently deceased L V.
Stalin, near enough accusing him of being an enemy of the people.62
Maniakov's anger at destalinisation centred particularly on the disregard for public
symbols, and his opposition to Khrushchev was articulated by labelling him an
enemy. Khrushchev was a poisonous snake, bandit, 'adventurist', and slanderer - all
stalwarts of Stalinist invective. Although the medium of the political pamphlet might
foreshadow later dissident texts, the mindset of the author here is very different,
locked in the rhetoric of the Stalinist era.63
Those who agonised over Stalin's body, his portraits, and songs, did not engage in a
quest for the 'truth'. In fact, they were little interested in the cruelties Khrushchev
revealed. At most, they gave a passing nod to the atrocities committed under Stalin,
evincing scant sympathy for the victims and little curiosity to find out more. In a Tale
allusion to the victims, one collective farm worker displayed chilling indifference:
Was it not possible to mention the question of the cult of personality
without mentioning Comrade Stalin? This is already a completed stage
[proidennyi etap], and by mentioning these things we won't correct Stalin
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 86890,1.30.
As someone of contested social status Manikov might have been angered more than nst by the
disruption to public culture. Born in 1907 in a village in Orel province to a white-collar family
(sluzhashchiE), be went on to study at the Moscow Law Institute between 1935 and 1938, though he
never finished the course. According to one version of his life-story, he later worked within the OGPU
and its successors (NKVD and MVD) and on the Gulag staff, later becoming a senior clerical worker us
the building division of the electrical power station in Saratov province and a party member. Howeve
this apparently exemplary CV masked a less illustrious past, punctuated by criminal sentences and a
previous - concealed - exclusion from the party. With the advent of change, and as Khrushchev
promised new narratives of the past, Maniakov was no doubt fearful; he chose to express these fears in
the only way he knew how - through a venomous attack on those be held responsible.
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and we won't bring back those people who at the present moment aren't
among the living. And with the living, it would surely have been possible
to sort things out in a communist fashion.M
Focused on Stalin's reputation, he had no compassion for the purge victims, be they
dead or alive. The kolkhoznik was not curious about the past, using a crude form of
Marxist theory to dismiss the terror as a 'completed stage' of historical development
which required no closer examination. In keeping with Yampoisky's observations on
time and monumentality, be not only wanted the stability of Stalinist culture, but also
seemed to lack any real sense of temporality when he referred to the victims who died
as 'people who at the present moment aren't among the living'. His concern was for
the present, and be had no desire to elaborate myths of the past, certainly not in the
form proposed by the Secret Speech. It is possible, of course, that the martyr-heroes
of the purges held little appeal to him, for his lack of concern might reflect the
popular belief that the purges only affected the elite. 65 Others sneeringly compared the
leaders' fear of Stalin with the courage of the ordinary Soviet soldiec one compared
the pusillanimity of Khrushchev and N. A. Bulganin with the courage of 'simple
people in grey overcoats going to battle'. Similarly, a veteran compared his own
wartime exploits with leaders who trembled in front of their Politburo colleague.
Where they did look to the past, it was primarily in order to find ways to salvage their
'performative' culture inside the boundaries set by the Secret Speech. By using
' ROASPI f 82, op. 2, d. 1446,1 160.
'5 Researc into popular opinion during the purges of the 1930s has suggested that the lower shata of
society often welcomed theni as a means to take reiribution - almost indiscriminately - against those in
power. According to Sarah Davies, the official representation of the people versus enemies of the
people was commonly reformulated into the long-established dichotomy between 'us' (the people) and
'them' (those in power). Workers often concluded that they should simply disirust all those in power,
not just the official enemies. There was even resentment that the judges at the Moscow show thai gave
more lenient sentences to political enemies than nornml courts did to ordinary workers. Sarah Davies,
Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Ten-or, Propaganda, Dissent, 1 934-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 124-144.
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Lenin's 'testament' against Stalin and accusing Stalin of lacking respect for Lenin's
memory, Khrushchev seemed to envisage revived reverence for the party's founding
father. He reminded his audience that the Palace of the Soviets, planned as a
monument to Lenin, had never been constructed. Some Soviet citizens seized on these
hints. In a report to the Central Committee, officials in Kalinin province noted that at
primary meetings and in discussion with non-party public, they frequently
encountered demands for the building of the Palace of the Soviets as a memorial to
Lenin to be accelerated. In addition people requested new memorials to Lenin in the
places where he had stayed or worked. 67 Dead before the darker episodes of Soviet
history began, Lenin could comfortably fill the empty pedestal left by a disgraced
Stalin. Their suggestions were soon taken up. According to Nina Tumarkin, the
revived cult of Lenin took shape rapidly, with thousands of publications appearing in
shops, as well as paintings, statues busts, posters, and badges decorating the 'political
landscape'.68
In a revamped Lenin, the Soviet public found it still had a glorious superhero. In the
coming years, new recruits would join Lenin in the pantheon of Soviet heroes. Space
travel was a particularly prolific sphere in this respect. As they traversed the frontiers
of space, Iurii Gagarin, German Titov and their colleagues carried out superhuman
deeds and, aided by the advent of television, became some of the most popular heroes
of Soviet history. Yet although their deeds increased the scope of the communist
venture by conquering new territory, these new heroes were not warriors. As they
competed with the Americans, cosmonauts boosted Soviet national pride, but they
"RGASPI fL 82, op. 2, d. 1467,146; RGASPI £82, op. 2, d. 1461,1 91.
'7 ROAM £5, op. 32, d. 45,11.38-39.
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were very different from old-style heroes. In popular culture, Vasilii Chapaev, Pavlik
Morozov, Aleksandr Matrosov, and Zoia Kosmodemianskaia had achieved heroic
status for fighting the Whites, kulaks, and Germans respectively; in the political realm
Stalin led the nation into battle against enemies both on the international stage and
bidden within the ranks of the party. Soviet cosmonauts, in contrast, fought no one.
The new hero did not engage in mortal combat with the enemy, and he no longer had
to exhibit vigilance and courage in unmasking and combating hidden foes.
Over the corning years, Soviet newspeak continued to eschew the use of hostile
invective to identify and vilify iconic enemies. While new heroes emerged in the
official media, they were not counter-posed to evil super-enemies. Although
Manichean beliefs remained in the collective imagination, they were no longer given
official sanction in the kind of theatrical rituals and defamatory language that had
governed public life until 1953.
Contested Narrative
At the party meeting of the Moscow publishers 'Soviet Writer', there was little
interest in the symbols and rites of Soviet culture.69 Instead, members articulated
concern for the fate of purge victims. When the discussion was opened to the floor,
several expressed profound concern for purge victims. Many drew on personal
experience or on the tales of friends who had survived prison and the camps to talk
about the importance of overcoming the cult of personality. Demanding greater
°'TsAODMf. 8132, op. l,d.6.
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dynamism from his colleagues, a certain Rudnyi, for example, referred to the critic
Charnyi, who had been repressed and recently rehabilitated:
He needs moral support. But when I, as the deputy secretary of our party
organisation, talked with Comrade Kedrina at Literaturnaia gazeta and
asked her to ring him and commission an article she passed me on to
someone else, saying it needed approval [...J Why haven't Subbotskii,
Isbakhu, Brovman and others who have also been rehabilitated and
readmitted to the party had articles commissioned?7°
The hail erupted in applause. Direct references to the ordeals of fellow writers clearly
drew emotional responses from the audience. Later in the meeting, Comrade
Voitinskaia likewise spoke of their many colleagues, including one present, who were
still unable to find work because previous convictions or doubts over their political
reliability continued to deter employers. Lamenting the fact that those rehabilitated
were still subjected to extensive questioning and re-interrogation, she talked of one
acquaintance who had spent eighteen years in camps. When asked by the Party
Control Committee what had given her the strength to survive, Voitinskaia recounted,
the friend replied 'the party'.7 ' Voitinskaia not only demanded recognition of purge
victims' right to fair treatment, but also presented the returnee as the 'martyr prince'
whose very survival was an act of faith.
Following Khrushchev's cue, it seems, Moscow writers embraced new narratives
whereby former enemies became heroes. Voitinskaia was not alone in regarding those
rehabilitated as the true sons of the party and martyrs to the cause. At the same
meeting, Comrade Ermalov concluded that the party had proved that Leninism was
'stronger than Stalinism' (which brought applause), and that the Secret Speech had
7°TsAODM £ 8132, op. 1, d. 6,165.
TsAODM £ 8132, op. 1, d. 6,177.
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'saved the party'.72 Their resurrection imbued the party with fresh glory, for their
courage was the party's courage Here at least, party members welcomed these
returning heroes, cast them as the party's saviours, and professed that, far from being
damaging, a re-writing of party history was fortifying.
The search for truth was not confined to the intelligentsia milieu, but also found its
supporters amongst party members. In the transcripts of party meetings, especially at
gorkom and obkom level, we discover an active quest to uncover the 'truth' about the
past. Members frequently called for further information over the events detailed in the
Secret Speech. They wanted to know, for instance, which of the Central Committee
members shot had now been found innocent, which military leaders sentenced in
1937-8 were now rehabilitated, how many had died as a result of the Leningrad affair,
and whether any Leningrad party leaders repressed in 1937 were still alive.73
Meetings offered communists the opportunity to inquire about the fate of individuals
they had known personally and to garner information about events in their own
locality during the Ezhovshchina. In Magadan, for instance, one asked if a certain
Berzin, the former head of Dal'stroi, was really an enemy of the people.74 In Irkutsic,
one delegate inquired after Kroshenko, presumably a local party figure.75
Although the restorative powers of this quest for truth were proclaimed, it brought its
own dangers. At other meetings, delegates asked if former obkom secretaries would
TsAODM f. 8132, op. 1, d. 6,1.70.
' RGASPI f. 556, op. 1, d. 304,1 142; RGASPI £556, op. 1, d. 601,1 133. One speaker at the
Leningrad meeting observed that Kozlov, the chairman of the Leningrad obkom and Presidium
member, had only mentioned those rehabilitated posthumously. Kozlov thed to answer this question.
Even such as high-ranking political figure stniggled to find an answer admitting that personallY be
only knew of two, and he believed that there were no others. At least, be conceded, he had not met
thenL
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be brought to justice, and some wondered if there would now be a new chistka.76
Indeed this association between the restoration of truth and the excision of the 'bad'
was not uncommon. One man wrote to Khrushchev, repeatedly thanking him for
telling 'the truth':
On behalf of many citizens, I thank you for openly telling the people the
whole truth about Stalin. This is your big service, and everyone will
remember it. The fact that you have said this truth will guarantee that
everything bad will be thrown out - and only the good will remain7
For this letter-writer, re-establishing truth also meant engaging in the act of
purification. Paradoxically, renunciation of the terror brought a revival of purge
rhetoric. Writing about the purges of the 1930s, Igal Halfin tells us that 'Messianic
truth, according to party doctrine, spoke in a single voice. Since there was only one
path to the light, and only one platform indicating that course, it followed that [..j
disputants had somehow to be "in opposition" to what subsequently became
proletarian "truth".' 75 When party members embraced the Secret Speech as the
restoration of truth, they imagined that the XX Party Congress marked a return to the
correct path, a victory of light over darkness, and an instance of purity after the
degeneration of the Stalin years. In Molotov province, the deputy director of the
Stalin factory, praised the speech, claiming that the Soviet people bad fulfilled their
historical mission by successfully liberating themselves from the 'grave illness' of the
cult of personality.79 However ironic, the rediscovery of Bolshevik honour and truth
resurrected the rhetoric of the purges. The drive towards purity might once more mean
the ejection of the impure.
RGASPT £556, op. 1, d. 638,1. 93.
" RGASPI £556, op. 1, d. 304,1 142.
ROAM f. 5, op. 32, d. 45,162.
' RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 140, 11., 185-186.
Halfin, 'The Demonization of the Opposition', p. 48.
RGANI £5, op. 32, d. 45,1 67
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In their petition letters, those who had endured political repression frequently cast
themselves as martyrs to the cause who had no desire for retribution, and in the Secret
Speech, Khrushchev adopted this representation of the noble victim. In choosing to
cite from Eikhe, Rudzutak, Kedrov, and Kosior, Khrushchev showed a preference for
those who had perished, and he rarely drew on the experiences of survivors. 80 The
lives of those who had died a martyr's death provided completed and heroic narrative.
Yet as party members met to discuss the Secret Speech, often with rehabilitated
victims present, the rhetoric evolved. As they began the task of re-formulating party
experience, there were frequently suggestions that 'overcoming' the errors of the past
could not only be a rhetorical act. It also had to involve some kind of reckoning with
the perpetrators of the purges.
At gorkom or obkom meetings, the extent and mood of debate depended greatly on the
lead given by the party secretary chairing the session. The first secretary invariably
opened the meeting with his own evaluation of the XX Party Congress. Some party
leaders were conservative, repeating almost word for word Khrushchev's text, and
limiting free discussion. In Moscow, for example, the gorkom meeting suppressed
discussion, and its chair, a candidate member of the Presidium, E. A. Furtseva, stuck
close to Khrushchev's text.8 ' In Irkutsk and Vladimir, both lead speaker and delegates
Khrushchev did cite from Comrade Snegov's petition, and mentioned that he had recently been
rehabilitated after seventeen years in the camps. The role played by Snegov is discussed fuitber in
Chapter V.
' RGASPI f. 556, op. 1, d. 705. Chaired by Furtseva, the meeting made little mention of the Secret
Speech and the floor was not opened to delegates. Their views could only be expressed in written notes
handed to the speaker. Furtseva referred to these in her summing-up and gave answers to selected
questions, but her determination to control proceedings is evident
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reproduced Khrushchev's words faithfully, and debate was limited. 82 At the meeting
of Gor'kii obkom, the opening speaker, Ignatov, focused on the financial tasks posed
by the XX Party Congress and paid scant attention to the cult of personality, so most
delegates followed suit, with the exception of a publishing editor who dared to
challenge his priorities. 83 Elsewhere, however, some party secretaries wrote their own
'speeches'. The transcripts of obkom and gorkom meetings in Rostov, Magadan, and
Stalingrad and reports from other regions provide insight into how former enemies
were now promoted, producing new narratives of party history.
On 10 March 1956, Comrade N. V. Kiselev, obkom secretary, opened proceedings in
Rostov. Like Khrushchev and first secretaries everywhere, he described the torture
inflicted on show-trial victims and others in Moscow, but Kiselev was quick to
remind his audience that atrocities occurred in their city too. Going beyond mere
regurgitation of Khrushchev's narrative, it appears he had commissioned his own
research into local archives. In a five-month period in 1937, he informed the party
faithful, no less than 1006 communists had been excluded from the Rostov party and
arrested on the grounds of fabricated confessions. By February, a further 1178 had
joined them and many were shot. Presumably on the basis of contact with purge
survivors or possibly their petitions, he continued:
Those who stayed alive recount the terrible torture that went on in Rostov
prisons. Here there were the same horrors of which the Old Bolshevik
Kedrov wrote about from within Lefortovo prison, where the enemy
Beriia was handling his case. Here we had cretinous hangmen (kretiny-
palachiof the same ilk as Rodos, about whom Khrushchev talked in his
speech.
12 lrkutsk gorkom (ROASPI L 556, op. 1, d. 304); Vladimir obkom (RGASPI f. 556, op. 1, d. 197).
'3 RGASPI £ 556, op. 1, d. 243 (especially 11.91-93).
' RGASPI £ 556, op. 1, d. 875,11. 86-87.
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Where Khrushchev quoted from the interrogation transcripts of Postyslhev, Rudzutak,
Eikhe, and other leading party figures, Kiselev used the words of a Rostov
communist, L T. Efimenko, party member since 1920 and formerly a plenipotentiary
of the Ministry of Supplies for Rostov oblast'. From inside a Rostov prison Efinienko
had written: 'Comrade Stalin, I am obliged to turn to you for a second time in search
of the truth, for Rostov investigators are afraid to look truth in the face and [instead]
fabricate rotting, cowardly cases.' 85 Like Eikhe, whose letter to Stalin was cited in the
Secret Speech, Efimenko also invoked 'truth', and through Efimenko's own words,
Kiselev allowed the foniier prisoner to embody integrity in a rotting world.
The choice to write his own narrative of local party history when other colleagues - in
Moscow, Leningrad, Irkutsk, Gor'kii, and Vladimir - used Khrushche r's words,
suggests Kiselev's profound support for the Secret Speech. Rejecting the safe option,
he committed himself to radically new versions of the party past and piomoted a
former enemy as hero. By taldng statistics from the region's archives and words from
a local victim, Kiselev showed that the text of the Secret Speech was not 'closed'.
Indeed, he interpreted it as an invitation for party members to rethink and reformulate
its own experiences. Local party members proved enthusiastic.
Three days later many of the Rostov party elite met again, this time at the gorkom
meeting. The opening speech, made bygorkoni secretary Comrade Lobanov, also
included research from the local archives. Briefly detailing the lives of a number of
the Rostov party's victims, he promoted the city's own heroes. He commemorated A.
' RGASPI 1. 556, op. 1, d. 875, L 88.
"At the gorkom meeting one delegate mentioned that many of them had already heard Xiscicv speak
at length about Rostov's victims. RGASPI £ 556, op. 1, d. 881, L 53.
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A. Semiakin, party member since 1917, A. I. Larichev, party member since 1911, V.
S. Viktorov, party member since 1917, and A. A. Konovko, party member since 1918,
former chainnan of the Rostov sovieL With the mood of the meeting set by Lobanov
and Kiselev before him, others present at the meeting spoke of former colleagues.
One delegate spoke of Ivan Chentsov. A party member from as early as 1904,
Chentsov had been sentenced to seven years in 1906 for owning a printing-press, and
had 'served his sentence, as a Bolshevik ought, asking no one for pa&on. He had
never been a part of any opposition, and had always behaved as a revolutionary.' The
speaker listed other purge victims, adding the date they joined the paLty for each one,
and it was invariably prior to 1917.8$ If revisionist research on the purges has shown
that Old Bolsheviks were not singled out during the purges, but were victimised
primarily as a result of their job or status, this is not reflected in their portrayal here.89
Party members chose to depict purge victims as almost exclusively Old Bolsheviks,
unswerving in their commitment to the party, unquestioning in their faith.
Not content with praising Chentsov, however, the same delegate wertt on to demand
retribution against those who had participated in the terror. He said of purge victims:
Now they are rehabilitated. But they were considered enemies of the
people. Why have I raised this question? I raised this question because
there were lackeys who in fact bad no party qualities. If these members of
the party slandered people, then it is necessary for our party organisations
at town and oblast' level to take retribution against them for those who
RGASPIL 556,op. l,d. 881, L 32.
RGASPI £ 556, op. 1, d. 881,1. 53
'0 J. Arch Getty and William Chase write: 'Although the individuals may have changed, Old
Bolsheviks as a group retained the most privileged and powerful position. When the terror erupted in
1936-7, Old Bolsheviks were among the victuns because of where they worked rather than because
they were Old Bolsheviks. In short, speciality or 'position' in 1936, rather than Old Bolshevik status,
was the crucial determinant of purge vu1nerability' J. Arch (3etty and William Chase, 'Patterns of
Repression Among the Soviet Elite: A Biographical Approach', in Stalinirt Terror: New Perspectives,
ed. by I. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning (Cainbndge: Cambridge University Press 1993), p. 243.
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died in vain.
His suggestion was popular, receiving applause and shouts of 'hear hear'. Someone
called out; 'And were you arrested too?' Responding by telling his own story, the
speaker recounted how they had tried to stitch him up with Chentsov, to prove that he
too was an 'enemy of the people'. He drew the conclusion that the party organisation
should investigate thoroughly, and that 'maybe there will be more than one swine to
find.'90 Thus for a second time be called for measures to be taken against those who
had labelled others 'enemies'. The implications of this are highly significant. At
meetings where the leading officials chose to engage in a re-writing of party history,
calls for a new witch-hunt began to surface. Khrushchev had made no reference to
finding the guilty, but to some party members this was a crucial step towards restoring
the party to health. Moreover, by labelling the guilty as 'swine' and calling for
'retribution', the delegate suggested that the new importance Khrushchev attached to
'correction' as a means to deal with error within the party had found little resonance.
At the Magadan oblasl'meeting, the debate likewise became heated. In the course of
discussion, one of the Talon officials took the floor and offered his own interpretation
of the Secret Speech. He detailed the purges in MagaLlan and hinted at a new round of
purging. Comrade Markov, secretary of Pen'kin Talon, told how 70 per cent of the
Dal'stoi party had been arrested in 1937-8, how the head of Dal'stroi, Pavlov, had
personally ordered the shooting of every third prisoner in the mines without any sort
of investigation or trial, and how those really guilty of terrible crimes - like Medved'
and Zaporozhets, responsible for killing Kirov - had been greeted with open arms and
a brass band. He concluded:
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We are submitting to the oblast' party committee a proposal for the
creation of a commission to review the cases of all communists shot on
the territory of Magadan oblast'. We don't doubt that many will be
rehabilitated posthwnously, and request that their families also be
rehabilitated, and that those guilty of massacring communists and
honourable Soviet people in Kolyma be held responsible. These are our
conclusions from Comrade Khrushchev's speech on the cult of
personality.9'
Although his wording was cautious, his demands - like those made in Rostov - also
pointed to some sort of further purging. In the question time that followed the
speeches, another delegate asked what measures would be taken against those who
participated in mass terrorY Markov appears to have had found support for an
initiative that not only sought the truth about the past, but would also bring to justice
those responsible for the crimes committed.
At some meetings, it was the purge victims themselves who made such claims. In
Kalinin province, the chief engineer of the Kalinin Artificial Leather Complex told his
story at some length, also coming to the conclusion that some sort of retribution was
needed. He began:
I have been a communist since 1928,! am from a worker family, educated
by the Komsomol and I was made out to be an enemy of the people, a spy,
and a saboteur [...] I am happy that I kept a profound belief in the party.
When it was possible, I applied to the Central Committee with this faith
intact.
In keeping with the language of victims' petitions, he presented himself as an almost
saint-like believer who had retained his belief through all the trials and tribulations
thrown at him. Whereas petitioners tended to portray themselves as the infinitely
90 RGASPIf.556,op. 1,d.881,L54.
RGASPI f. 556, op. 1, d. 638,11. 66-68.
RGASPI f. 556, op. 1, d. 638, L 90.
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forgiving martyr, the returnee here, however, suggested that he might wish for some
sort of revenge:
Ireturned joyful and contented in September 1955, but my happiness was
clouded [omrachen] when I saw KGB Major Aleksandrov walking the
streets of Kalinin in uniform. He had tortured me and knew better than me
my innocence.93
Concluding that further investigations were needed into the KGB staff his
contribution to the meeting also raised the issue of the 1937-38 conspirators. The
returnee might present himself as a martyr, but he now believed in his right to claim
some kind of reckoning with those who had inflicted his suffering. Readmission to the
party in itself could not, it seems, bring the returnee the unalloyed happiness he had
anticipated.
In these instances, the demand for retribution was posed tentatively. Elsewhere,
however, a more bellicose rhetoric began to emerge. When members of the Stalingrad
oblast'party organisation met on 12 March 1956, Comrade Zhegalin talked
extensively about repressions and recalled several of the city's victims, including
Stepaniatov, party member since 1918, Division Commander during the civil war and
head of the city's soviet at the time of his arrest. Reactions were mixed. One kolkhoz
chairman questioned the need to denounce Stalin to the collective farmers. While
himself critical of many aspects of party life, including the bullying tactics used by
local party officials and the pressure put on agricultural life, he was concerned about
popular reactions to the Secret Speech. He remembered how he had spoken in
glowing terms about Stalin's life in March 1953, reducing the kolkhozniki to tears,
ROAN! f. 5, op. 32, ci. 45, IL 37-38.
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and he admitted his reluctance to go to them and say the complete opposite? 4 The
head of the oblast' soviet soon intervened to criticise the kolkhoz chairman - both for
his reluctance to convey the Secret Speech to his subordinates, and for the failure of
his raion to meet their meat targets!
At first reading, a speech made by Comrade Dubrovina, lecturer in Marxism-
Leninism, seems more in keeping with the tenor set by Zhegalin's opening speech.
Dubrovina welcomed the new mood of innovation. Hoping that local history might
flourish, she lamented that there were still no collected memoirs of Stalingrad's Old
Bolsheviks, compared to the huge number of texts recording the revolutionary
movement in Leningrad and Moscow: 'Until now it was difficult for historians to
work on local material, of any period, because 'enemies of the people' - formerly
leaders of a variety of organisations and institutions - would speak out and
scaremonger.' 95 She thus understood the Secret Speech as an occasion to write new
accounts of the party's journey, to work more freely, and to write new narratives
based on local experience and local heroes. On closer reading the implications of her
statement are radical. She labelled those who had previously been in positions of
authority as 'enemies of the people'. Although she welcomed the Secret Speech, she
relied on the 'formula' condemned by Khrushchev - 'enemies of the people' - to
condemn those who bad hindered her work. Moreover, she did not apply this label to
a handful of individuals indicted for their roles in the purges, but to a whole stratum
of the local elite - former 'leaders of a variety of organisations and institutions'. She
imagined the Secret Speech ushering in widespread changes within the party apparat,
RGASPIL556,op. 1,d. 1031,1 95.
RGASPIf.556,op. 1,d. 1031,L72.
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and she believed those demoted would be cast out as 'enemies of the people'. Again,
the rhetoric of purging appears to have overshadowed the notions of correction
nurtured in the Secret Speech.
At party meetings within the universities and institutes, particularly in Mkscow and
Leningrad, the search for truth also led to more demagogic approaches. At the Gor'kii
Institute of World Literature, a speech made by Comrade Bialik caused sabstantial
concern at the highest levels of party organisation. Asserting that the party apparat
included a layer of people whose careers were built on the purges, he said that many
responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent people were still in power.
Moreover, he remarked, they were now charged with fulfilling the tasks of the XX
Party Congress. As the party had not organised a purge (chistka) for over twenty
years, he suggested one be implemented. Like Dubrovina in Stalingrad, Bialik did not
envisage token retribution against a handful of individuals, but far more sweeping
changes within the party ranks. The renunciation of terror could not in itself purify the
party, it needed to be cleansed through renewing the practices of questioning,
investigating, and expelling. Apparently his comments were acceptable to members of
the audience, as party authorities noted their failure to condenm Bialik: two others
made 'demagogic comments' and no ore spoke out against him until the final
summing up led by the chief editor of KommunistY6 This support from the audience
was particularly disturbing for the officials reporting on the incident.
The party meeting of the Institute of Oriental Studies was perhaps even more
heretical, and reports once more show how concerned party officials were about the
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meeting's failure to rebuff the dissenting delegates. Party member Mordvinov laid
responsibility for the terror on the nation's leaders who had failed to speak out in
defence of the victims. 'They are responsible for the shootings', he said. 'Comrade
Khrushchev showed himself to be a coward."7 Rather than accepting Khrushchev's
admission of error, Mordvinov chose to attack the leader and to challenge his
integiity?
Khrushchev's call for a return to Leninist practices whereby those who erred were
subject to 'correction' and guidance seems to have fallen on stony ground. Although
incidents of dissent were relatively rare, they certainly occurred and they caused
significant concern at the highest levels. It even led the Presidium to question if it was
advisable to encourage these notions of 'uncovering the truth'. At a meeting between
representatives of the Writers' Union and party leaders on 10 December 1956,
Khrushchev's colleague P. N. Pospelov criticised the chief editor of No'vyi miT, the
writer Konstantin Simonov. Along with other writers such as the poet Ol'ga
Berggol'ts, Simonov had claimed that the time had come to write 'only the truth'
(tol 'ko pravdu). Pospelov admonished Simonov, however, reminding him that there
was no such thing as abstract truth, just as there was no such thing as abstract
democracy. Heralded by members of the intelligentsia and party members alike as
the cornerstone of revived party integrity, 'truth' was now considered a potentially
dangerous heresy by some party leaders.
96 RGAN! f. 5, op. 32, d. 45,11.1-3.
'7RGANII5,op.32,d.46,L82.
'S	 case was passed on to the Moscow gorkom where a detailed investigation into Mordvinov's past
was undertaken. RGANJ £ 5, op. 32, d. 46, IL 83-7.
99 i	 and Pyzhlkov, Poststalinskoe obshchestvo, pp. 137-13 8.
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This growing anxiety culminated in an important Central Committee document issued
to all party organisations in late December 1956, entitled 'On the intensification of
party political work amongst the masses and the prevention of incidents by anti-
Soviet, enemy elements'. By claiming there had been a rise in 'enemy activity' over
recent months, the letter introduced a more cautious tone.'°° The Hungarian uprising
was identified as the main cause of increased anti-Soviet sentiment, and Voice of
America, the BBC, and Radio Free Europe blamed for spreading 'imperialist
propaganda'.'°' Problems were not limited only to the wayward minority who listened
to these degenerate broadcasts, however, for the Kremlin also voiced concern over the
political mood within the party's own ranks. As a result of discussions of the Secret
Speech, the letter asserted, communists themselves were erring towards anti-Soviet
positions. The party intelligentsia, including novelists, poets, and historians, was
condemned first, followed by students, and then Gulag returnees. While the majority
of those who returned as a result of amnesty or rehabilitation were now engaged in
productive work and leading politically and socially active lives, the document said,
there were some returnees who bore malice towards Soviet power. Former
Trotskyists, Right opportunists, and bourgeois nationalists were allegedly the most
active in their anti-Soviet agitation. Warning that the most decisive measures should
be taken against those who were hostile to Soviet power - 'just as they always have
been' - Khrushchev seemed to reverse some of points made in the Secret Speech.
In itself, the letter is curious. There is little evidence elsewhere that political returnees
were presenting a problem, except in the case of the 'bourgeois nationalists' returning
'°°RGANI £ 89, op. 6, d. 2.
'°'Aksiutin and Pyzbikov, Poststahnskoe obshchestvo, pp. 125-134.
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to territories such as Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics. 102 Archival documents
do not suggest that former political prisoners were actively engaged in anti-Soviet
activity, or that the authorities considered them a particular threat. Rather, the
decision to question their political reliability in this important circular can be seen as
an attempt to subdue the politically unstable mood engendered by the Secret Speech
and events in Hungary. Just as Pospelov urged party intellectuals to moderate their
promotion of truth, Khrushchev now seemed to distance himself from the heroisation
of Gulag returnees. The narrative and rhetoric that he had introduced so dramatically
at the beginning of the year were now blamed for discord within the party.
Conclusion
lithe Secret Speech was an attempt to resolve the confusion in evidence ever since
1953, it was not entirely successful. The search for truth brought worrying calls for
purging, something that the party leaders seem to have had little intention of doing. In
addition, there was mass anxiety over the revision of Soviet semiotics, as citizens
expressed their uncertainty about how to speak and act in the changing public arena.
In both cases, beliefs nurtured by the Stalinist system were articulated, whether in the
vilification of Khrushchev as a cunning beast and bandit, or in the demand for new
measures to cull the guilty. As in 1953, the ontological importance of the enemy was
apparent.
Party leaders responded to the apparent failings of the Secret Speech in at least two
ways. First, they launched the new Lenin cult as a means to satisfy the public demand
'°2 Weiner, 'The Empires Pay a Visit'.
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for meaningfiul monuments. Hunger for an imagined 'enemy', it should be noted
however, went unabated. Second, they rebuked leading members of the intelligentsia
who were promoting the rhetoric of 'truth' and they alluded to the questionable
loyalty of the returnee. This undermining of some aspects of the Secret Speech
reflected the trepidation generated by public reactions in 1956, but the back-track was
brief. Slurs against the returnee did not prevail, and the concept of 'restoring truth'
was not discredited publicly. Moreover, Khrushchev did not revise the fundamental
premises of the Secret Speech. He did not revoke the idea that the threat of the
'enemy' had been grossly exaggerated under Stalin, nor did he abandon the principle
that conflict lessened as the revolution progressed. In fact, the notions of correction he
promoted in the Secret Speech continued to be a highly important aspect of his rule
for several years to come.
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Chapter IV
Crime, Punishment, and Correction
'So, what do you thuik,' asked Manskii, 'does Misha
hold anything sacred?'
'He must do,' replied Kirill Petrovich decisively.
'What does that mean, he must do?'
'It means that it is easier to see the thief within a man
than the other way round - to find the man within the
thief.'
'But we must?'
'We must. We must dig it out.'
- G. A. Medynskii, Chest'1
Although the amnesty of March 1953 shook Soviet society, the authorities did not
retreat from the process of reform they had initiated. In fact, the Gulag population
continued to shrink dramatically. From the inflated figure of 2,466,914 in April 1953,
the number of Gulag inhabitants had already fallen to 781,630 by January of 1956. In
less than three years, the Gulag empire had been scaled down by over two thirds, and
almost two million zek released back into society.2 Reflecting on the early 'thaw',
Khrushchev later claimed that the Party was scared of a flood that could have 'washed
away all the bathers and retaining walls of our society'. 3 Though Khrushchev's
1 G. A. Medynskii, Chest'(Mosco Sovctskii pisatel', 1960), p.408.
2 GARF f. 7523, op. 89, d. 4408,1. 82.
3 Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 78-79.
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memoirs focused entirely on the issue of political returnees, it was primarily the
criminal contingent that many feared would submerge Soviet society.
The criminal population of the Gulag benefited significantly from the new measures
introduced. While the party commissions created in 1954 to rectify miscarriages of
justice primarily affected victims of political terror,4 a series of amnesties set free
large numbers of less illustrious prisoners. Over 1954 and 1955, amnesty was granted
to several categories of prisoner, and a total of 279,311 people were released as a
result of such acts, in addition to the 1,201,738 set free as a result of the March 1953
decree.5 A further 6,423 were granted personal amnesty by the Supreme Soviet.6
This erosion of the boundaries between the two zones was in part a means to deal with
the legacy of the Stalinist era and the heavy burden of the Gulag. It also reflected the
regime's new philosophical stance. The days of vilifying and banishing offenders to
lengthy exile seemed over. Techniques of 'excising' offenders from the social body,
so common in the Stalinist period from 1937 onwards, gave way to renewed belief in
the possibility of rehabilitating offenders. With the Ministry of Justice encouraging a
less stringent line, lighter custodial sentences were gradually introduced in the period
4 0n 9 May 1954, a decree ordered the creation of commissions to review of all cases of those held in
cançs or places of exile for counter-revolutionary crime. Where appropriate, the commissions were to
rehabilitate the individual fully, re-classify his crime, or shorten the sentence. They were not to wait for
records from the MVD but to proceed immediately with their work using the petitions received. As a
result of their investigations, 21,797 personal amnesties were granted, 8,973 verdicts rescinded, and
76,344 sentences shortened. For the full statistics on the commissions' work, see Iakovlev (ed),
Reabilitatciia: Kak eto bylo, p. 213 (this is a copy of an archival document, referenced APRF £3, op.
57, d. 109,1 39). On the creation of the committees, see GARF f. 9401, op. 2, d. 450,1. 30; f. 9401, op.
la,d. 526,197.
5 GARF £7523, op. 89, d. 4408, IL 78-81. Amnesty was granted to the following groups of prisoners:
to 22,670 juvenile offenders in April 1954; to 117,570 prisoners, including both 'counter-
revolutionaries' and bandits, in July 1954; to 2,128 petty thieves in May 1955; to 77,333 prisoners unfit
for hard labour, including the ill or agein pregnant women and young irothers on 3 September 1955;
to 59,610 alleged war-tune collaborators on 17 September 1955.
6 GARF £7523, op. 89, d. 4408, L 144.
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l953-1955. In accordance with Gor'kii's emphasis on rehabilitation through labour,
the prisoner could now hope to reduce his sentence further through hard work.
Established in 1919, but abandoned under Stalin, the 'work-day' system was re-
introduced in July 1954, and allowed prisoners who met their targets to win early
release.8 Although some officials passionately deplored the practice, arguing it
favoured the physically strong, it remained in place and allowed offenders the chance
to return home quickly. One report claimed that it was possible for a ten-year sentence
to be reduced to little over three years.9
The underlying principle was correction. Promoted in the Secret Speech as the most
appropriate means to deal with political deviants, it was extended to those convicted
of criminal acts. Rather than seeing the criminal as an inherently dangerous
individual, the new emphasis was on reforming him. The initiative raised important
questions: Could social order be maintained without the behemoth of the Gulag?
Could antisocial behaviour be curbed with the threat of the prison camp so tempered?
Would the Soviet public - so angered by the 1953 amnesty - assist in the process of
re-educating and healing those who erred?
Initial indications were disheartening. Little suggested that the crisis engendered by
the mass return of prisoners in 1953 ever really abated. As suggested in Chapter I, the
nation had witnessed a wave of violent crime in the months following the first
amnesty, and though it ebbed temporarily, this upsurge in criminal behaviour failed to
Gorlizki, 'De-Stalinisation', pp. 78-92.
GARF f 7523, op. 89, d. 4403, II. 12-17.
'GARF f. 7523, op. 89,4. 4403, IL 1-7.
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1048
1050
1570
2501
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
128,381
108,768
115,735
198,978
175,492
373,359
331,316
364,783
511,081
518,733
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disappear. In comparison to 1953, 1954 was a less turbulent year, but statistics show
crime rising steadily from 1955 onwards.
Statistics on the number of re gistered crimes 1953-1957 '°
Overall crime Hooliganism Murder
The overall number of crimes registered in 1954 decreased by 13%, but the annual
total then climbed steadily until by 1957 it was 39% higher than in even the 'painthi
year' of 1953. The figures for murder are particularly startling, with the number
doubling between 1953 and 1957.11 A great deal of correspondence between the
Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of the Interior was devoted to debating the causes of
these worrying trends. Officials were consistently concerned not only that those
released from the Gulag were themselves likely to re-offend, but that they cast a
deleterious influence on young people, luring them away from their respectable Soviet
families into criminal subcultures. Concerns over the spread of criminal behaviour,
and even fears that a cult of criminality was prevalent amongst young people, were
frequent in MVD reports. N. P. Dudorov, Minister of Internal Affairs, wrote to the
'°These statistics were sent from the Ministry of the Intenor to the Supreme Soviet in 1958. See GARF
£ 7523, op. 89, d. 7494,1 54.
"Vasil'ev, the report's author and a senior official within the Ministry of the Interior, explained away
the remarkable rise in crime by arguing that over recent years certain misdemeanours had recently been
reclassified as crimes. In itself this argument is curious, as in fact the period saw the decriminalisation
of several offences. Moreovei, his explanation does little to explain the huge rise in murder recorded.
His comments serve to remind us, however, that crime stabstics should be used with caution. They
often reflect more about official classifications, police efficiency in registering crimes, and the extent
of public reporting, than about the actual levels of criminal activity. This dissertation focuses more on
bow the party, Soviet officials, and the broader public constructed the problem, than on determining
whether the perceived rise in crime was real or not
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Central Committee in April 1956: 'Many crimes and infractions on social order are
committed in public places by former convicts and people without permanent living
place or work [...] These people do not just commit crimes themselves, but entice
unstable citizens, most commonly young people, into criminal activities."2 It was
feared that the great Gulag return would import into the Soviet mainland the hostile
and criminal zek culture.
Such anxieties were not limited to the corridors of power. In 1953, the Soviet public
responded angrily to the amnesty with a barrage of letters so ferocious that it
produced commentary from Voroshilov and Andrianov at the July 1953 plenum. As
more moderate policies remained in place and crime levels continued to climb, the
public articulated their displeasure with growing force. Apparently in tandem with the
level of offending, public outrage abated only temporarily after the shock of 1953. At
the end of 1955, an official wrote that 'after a significant increase in the number of
such letters in 1953 and the beginning of 1954, the number of letters received
decreased until the present time when it has begun growing again'.'3
In this chapter,! suggest that faced with this crisis, the Soviet authorities employed
new techniques to retain respectable law and order. As it continued to reduce the
Gulag population, the party came to recognise the importance of engaging the public
in its fight against crime. Seeking to convince citizens that the huge Gulag complex
was unnecessary, the party discouraged them from seeing offenders and transgressors
as dangerous bandits or enemies. With almost four decades of Soviet power under its
'2 GARF f. 9401, op. 2, d. 479,1334. The same year, a typical report from the provinces lamented that
young people so often fell under the influence of 'criminali elements'. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d.
4593,11. 53-64.
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belt, official rhetoric claimed, society was now sufficiently healthy and robust to take
a more active and independent role in treating transgressors and deviants. There were
two stages. First, the party encouraged greater vigilance - though not the enemy-
spotting of the Stalinist era. Citizens were to show much greater activism in ensuring
that everyone - from family and friends to work colleagues and neighbours - was
leading a moral, clean, and respectable way of life, and a kind of self-policing was
encouraged. In a second and more radical stage, the party claimed that as they neared
the communist era, the public had even more potential. No longer considering it
necessary to isolate the offender from society, the party gave the public a key role in
healing the sick and saving sinners. The site of redemption was re-located from the
Gulag to within the bounds of Soviet society.
The second part of this chapter suggests this new rhetoric was far from hegemonic,
however. Opposition to this version of 'correction' existed amongst legal
professionals, journalists, and writers, and old notions of banishment and exclusion
rivalled the utopian visions promoted by Khrushchev. Even once implemented, the
new measures provoked significant resistance, and the public protested against the
return of the criminally deviant Fears that the enemy 'other' might contaminate the
Soviet community continued to be widespread.
The Turn To Byt
In 1954, the party launched a campaign for healthy byt. On 17 August 1954, the front
page of Leningradskaia pravda led with the headline 'Towards Soviet man's healthy
U GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 189,1.65.
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byt' (Za zdorovyi byt sovetskogo cheloveka).' 4 Although the article opened with a
positive picture of the 'cultured' way most Soviet citizens lived, it soon went on to
lament the fact that vestiges of the capitalist past still remained within Soviet society.
Claiming it was imperative to fight against all that impeded the Soviet man's
'cultured' leisure time, the article identified drunkenness as a social ill that must be
eradicated without delay. In the same year, the publication of a series of new
pamphlets and books reflected the current importance of byt. The Yearbook of Soviet
Publications included the category of 'byt' for the first time in 1954, with fourteen
new titles in that year and a steady increase recorded over the decade.' 5 The new
publications included titles like Communist Morality and Byt, Towards A Healthy Byt,
The Culture of Correct Behaviour amongst Soviet Young People, with many texts
devoted to the dangers of alcohol jsm.t6
This new emphasis on byt was reflected in an important shift in crime-reportage. In
1953, 'From the courtroom' reports had consistently portrayed the criminal standing
trial as bandit, inveterate criminal, and veteran of the Gulag. In every respect this
'bandit' stood outside of Soviet society. While such depictions did not entirely
disappear in 1954, new sorts of offenders began to populate crime reportage.' 7 Not all
transgressors came out of the underworld of the Gulag, it seems, for increasingly
reports depicted ordinary citizens taking to a life of crime. Rather than strangers from
li 'Za zdorovyi byt sovetskogo cheloveka', Leningradskaiapravda, 17 August 1954, p. 1.
Kelly, Refining Russia, appendix 5.
16 Ezhegodnik bug SSSR 1954: Il-polugodie (Moscow lzdatel'stvo vsesoiuznoi palaty, 1955), p. 256;
Ezhegodnik bug SSSR 1955: li-polugodie (Moscow Izdatel'stvo vsesoiuznoi palaty, 1956) p. 294.
'7 One example is 'Bandit nakazan', Leningrad.kaia pravda, 26 May 1954, p.4. This is typical of the
model established in 1953: a beneficiary of the 1953 amnesty with a string of sentences behind him, he
returns home to lead a 'parasitic' hfe of crime. Other examples include: 'Likvidatsiia shaiki banditov',
Leningradskaiapravda, 10 November 1954, p.4; 'Grabitei', Leningradskaiapravda, 19 June 1954, p.
4; 'Prestupniki nik7any', Leningradskaia pravda, 25 March 1954, p.4; 'Grabiteli', Moskovskaia
pravda, 7 September 1954, p.4.
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an alien world, aggressors might be members of the Soviet community who had been
allowed to lapse into an unhealthy and un-Soviet way of life. Instead of simply
lamenting the rise in crime as they had done in 1953, citizens were taught that society
could play a positive, instructive role in preventing the emergence of these new
deviants.
In August 1954, an article headlined 'In drunken intoxication' opened by telling
readers that 'young joiner V. Eroshin was often seen drunk. He didn't spend his free
time with his family, but with his drinking companions.' 18 With neighbours cast as
witnesses to his debauched ways, Erosbin was identified as a member of the Soviet
community, not an outsider. The reader was given to understand that Eroshin's
problems began with his antisocial behaviour, but his transgressions soon escalated
dramatically. While drunk one summer evening, he insulted a young girl on the street,
and when one of her young companions tried to reason with bim, Erosbin stabbed
him.
In a second article entitled 'Hooligan', an eighteen-year-old from Leningrad was
sentenced for attacking a young girl who had rejected his amorous advances at the
youth-club dance.' 9 Again the roots of the problem lay with the protagonist's daily
conduct. Preferring 'hooligan' behaviour to hard work or study, Gennadii Fedorov
drank, insulted passers-by on the street, and organised parties (deboshi) at home
during the night. The reader was to infer that it was only one short step from these
hooligan acts to violently assaulting a schoolgirl. Neither Erosbin nor Fedorov were
'V pianom ugare', Moskovskaia pravda, 7 August 1954, p.4.
'9 'Kbuligan', Leningradskaia pravda, 5 June 1954, p.4.
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presented as members of a prison subculture, yet their dissolute life-style led them to
commit heinous crimes.
Replacing the marauding bandit of 1953, the press now presented the 'hooligan' who
was a product of an urban habitat. The publication of such articles seemed to remind
citizens of the importance of byt. Drinking, swearing and rowdy behaviour, readers
were implicitly warned, must be strongly discouraged for they were the first warning
signs that an individual was on the path to full-blown criminal acts. If people took
greater interest in promoting correct behaviour within their localities, criminal
tendencies could be eradicated before they caine to fruition - or so the theorists
hoped.
Members of Soviet society were thus encouraged to take an active role in raising
moral, healthy citizens of the future. The first responsibility naturally lay with the
parents. Already in 1954 a feuilleton in Moskovskaia pravda showed how two young
people slid towards crime as a result of their families' failure to teach them Soviet
morality.2° The article also suggested, however, that the wider Soviet community had
a part to play. Unruly youths and inattentive parents were visible to everyone, it
concluded, yet the vast majority of people said and did nothing. In the task of
stamping out 'unhealthy and amoral' tendencies amongst the young, the Soviet
community (obshchestvennost') had a great and, as yet, underused potential. When
they witnessed abuses, Soviet citizens must henceforth speak out.
'Km vinovat?', Moskovskaia pravda, 29 October 1954, p.3.
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The role of the Soviet conununity, or obshchestvennost', became a key motif. If
previously obshchestvennost' was associated with the voluntary work of the elite, the
party hoped it would now become a broader mass movement. 21 Initially the task
involved mutual surveillance. Citizens were encouraged to be vigilant and to 'whistle-
blow' wherever they saw transgression of Soviet byt. over the course of 1956, a series
of articles urged the Soviet community on to greater vigilance in the struggle against
hooliganism, drunkenness, and other indiscretions. in the feuflieton 'After
midnight...', Moskovskaiapravda called on Muscovites to evince greater intolerance
towards those who held responsible positions by day, while indulging in public
displays of drunkenness by night. 22 The railway station, a site of disruptive behaviour
for the bandits of 1953, was reconfigured here as a night-time refuge for urban
inhabitants who wanted - temporarily - to shed their identity as upstanding Soviet
citizens. In its conclusion, the article entreated readers to 'name and shame' all those
who sought to turn the capital's stations into places of rowdy drunkenness:
We must speak out against them at full voice. At stations and in other
places that remain open overnight, there are still those nocturnal heroes
who roam in search of 'adventures'. If you meet them, don't just give
these degenerate idlers a wide berth, proclaim their names, whoever they
21 1n his exploration of obshchestvennost' in the pre-revolutionary decades, Joseph Bradley shows how
the growth of voluntary associations nurtured a sense of public duty and civic spirit amongst the new
entrepreneurial, professional, and cultural elites. This kind of obshchestvennost' continued to be highly
important in the Soviet era, where a high value was placed on activism Under Stalin, the term
obshchestwnnost' tended to refer to the activities of party and Soviet officials, or their relatives. Mary
Buckley has studied the Obshchestvennitsa, a public spirited woman or female activist, who was
invariably married to a manager, engineer, stakhanovite, or member of the armed forces. Indeed it was
almost inevitable that these female volunteers came from society's elite, as only women from more
comfortable thinilies could afford to labour without pay. The activities encouraged in the 1950s were to
beinadditiontowork,bowever, andasGeorgeBreslauerhasnoted,bythelate l95Osthcword
obshchestvennost' developed a rather different meaning. Now it 'referred to a stratum of mobilizers
drawn from all groups in society', and became associated with a broader mass movement than had been
the case either in pre-revolutionary or Stalinist Russia. Joseph BradIey 'Voluntary Associations, Civic
Culture and Obshchestvennost' in Moscow', in Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the
Questfor Public identity in Late imperial Russia, ed. by Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and
JamesLWest (Princeton, NJ.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991), pp. 131-148;MaryBuckley, 'The
Untold Story of Obshchestvennitsa in the 1930s', Europe-Asia Studies, 48 (1996), 569-586; Breslauer,
'Khrushchev Reconsidered', p. 57.
'Posle dvenadtsati nochi...', Moskovskaia pravda, 21 October 1956, p.2.
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may be, whatever position they may hold.
Over the year, there were several articles calling for the public to denounce hooligans
and brawlers: 'The community's vital task', 'Don't walk on by!', 'The duty of each
and every one: Intensifring the struggle with violators of social order'. The press
encouraged readers to sign up to new voluntary brigades established to patrol the city
streets and intercept dubious characters? Charged with apprehending hooligans, the
new brigadiers, should never let pass even the most minor of transgressions.
In fact, not only brigadiers, but all of society must be vigilant. One typical article
berated the inhabitants of Rybnikov lane who turned a blind eye to their neighbour's
conspicuous consumption. Despite a quite ordinary job in a Moscow workshop,
Leopol'd Glazenberg took manifest pleasure in his car and driver, the lavish decor of
his home, his elegant clothing, and the long and expensive holidays he spent with his
new, young wife. Why, the article demanded indignantly, did it take so long to
discover his deceptions at work? How could a conman be at large for so long in
Moscow? In addition to the work of the street patrols, public vigilance was plugged as
a vital force in eradicating crime.25
In the same year as the Secret Speech was discouraging citizens from seeking out
enemies, the press was urging citizens to be vigilant towards neighbours and
colleagues. The target was not a hidden or masked foe. In fact, drunken behaviour or
'Krovnoe delo obshchestvennosti', Len ingradskaia pravda, 7 September 1956, p.2; 'Krovnoe delo
obshchestvennosti', Pravda, 26 August 1956, p.3; 'Ne prokhodite mimo!', Moskovskaia pravda,17
January 1956, p.3; 'Delo vsekh I kazbdogo', Mo.rkovi*aiapravda, 4 September 1956, p.2.
'Krovnoe delo obshchestvennosti', Leningradskaia pravda, 7 September 1956, p.2. The first
volunteer brigades established had close links with the police and were considered as auxiliaries in the
task of apprehending offenders. This changed significantly by 1959 when volunteer brigades were set
up independently from the police and charged with aiding the moral guidance of erring individuals.
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fancy clothes made these people clearly visible to all. Such transgressors were not
enemies, but in the quest for an ordered society, they must be intercepted before they
committed more dangerous acts.
From Vl2ilance to Salvation
On 2 March 1959, ajoint decree from the Council of Ministers and the Central
Committee 'On the participation of workers in the maintenance of public order'
introduced a range of new measures. 26 Already established on an ad hoc basis in some
areas, voluntary brigades were now to be organised in every factory and farm across
the nation. Charged with patrolling the streets, they would identify troublemakers and,
where necessary, inform the offender's work place, or even the police. Comrade
courts were also re-established, and instead of finding themselves in front of a Soviet
judge, small-time offenders might now be tried by their own colleagues and
neighbours. Reflecting the belief that the force of collective disapproval could often
be more effective than a prison term, non-custodial sentences were also revived. A
'collective' - such as a workplace or housing block - could save an offender from
incarceration by offering to become his guardian. Likewise, a prisoner might be
granted early release if a collective guaranteed to take responsible for his 'probation'.
'Ne prokhodite minio!', Moskovskaiapravda, 17 January 1956, p.3.
'Voluntary Militia and Courts', Soviet Studies, 11(1959), 214-217.
The 'community organisation' could apply for 'guardianship' of an offender during the police
investigation, or if the matter cane to trial, the judge could decide on this as a form of social
rehabilitation.
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Attached to every soviet, new commissions 'for the protection of socialist legality and
social order' were to implement, co-ordinate, and monitor these measures.
Explaining that the scope of their censure was extensive, Oleg Kharkhordin argues
that the people's patrols and comrades courts created in the 1950s could in some
respects be more ruthless than the police. 29 According to him, Khrushchev's dream
was to create a system of 96 million controllers watching each other so that not even a
mosquito could escape notice. 3° Whereas the police were in theory limited to
apprehending those who breached Soviet laws, the patrols could reprimand passers-by
for wearing inappropriate clothing, throwing litter, playing cards, or even dancing
'with unnatural, jerky movements'. In addition, anyone could join in the censure,
every passer-by could 'become a patrolman', potentially making 'mutual surveillance'
an absolutely ubiquitous force. 3 ' Yet Kharkhordin's study misses the important shift
that occurred in the late 1950s. By the time of the XXI Party Congress in 1959 and the
promulgation of the new decree, Khrushchev was no longer content with simply
For example, the Moscow soviet (Mossovet) created a commission that met for the first time on 3
April 1959 to elect a deputy and secretary and to decide on a work plan. (TsGAMO f. 2157, op. I, d.
5311,1 11)
Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual, p. 280.
3°Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual, p. 299.
31 Kharkhordin's work applies aspects of Michel Foucault's argument that the Enlightenment rejection
of public, punitive spectacles in the name of greater 'humanity' in fact disguised the development of a
highly extensive system of behavioural control Kharkhordin identifies similar patterns in the transition
from 'terror' to 'reform'. In some respects his argument holds. Although the brutal punishments of
Stalinism were never administered publicly, the 'performance' of puiushnient was enacted through
1anguage and the year 1953 brought a rejection of this performative aspect; the decline of the media's
deadly persecutions, and the promotion of 'humanity'. Telescoping Foucault's broad historical patterns
to explain the reforms of the 1950s, Kharkhordin misses important aspects of Khrushchev's innovative
project; however. Jan Planiper has recently pointed to the difficulties implicit hi making the Gulag fit
into Foucault's models based on historical change in western Europe. Plainper shows how at one point
Foucault associated the Soviet Gulag with pre-Enhighteninent mechanisms of punishment at another
with nineteenth-century penal practices, and argues that the Gulag 'ultimately remained a paradox to
Foucault; for methodological and epistemological reasons'. Sec Foucault; Discipline and PunLrh; Jan
Planiper, 'Foucault's Gulag', Kritzka, 3 (2002), 255-80.
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extending 'the net'.32 In the second half ofthe decade, the project to engage the public
in fighting crime and deviance took on a highly utopian nature, and by over-
emphasising the restrictive nature of Soviet power, Kharkhordin neglects these more
creative aspects.
Foucault writes that it is possible to 'imagine that there are societies in which the way
one determines the behaviour is so well determined in advance, that there is nothing
left to do'.33 While Soviet reality might still be far from such an idyll, it was a society
founded on the premise that paradise on earth was achievable; the new measures
aimed at bringing that paradise closer. It was believed that by educating citizens more
thoroughly, inculcating communist morality, and ensuring that the spiritually weak
felt the wholesome influence of the Soviet collective, criminality would disappear
almost entirely. With the communist future allegedly so close, Khrushchev focused on
creating the 'new man'. In the place of exclusionary practices encouraged under
Stalin, whereby those who offended were cast out from the Soviet family, new
attention was devoted to 'saving' those who erred. Citizens were now urged to
participate not so much in apprehending or arresting those who committed
misdemeanours, but to aid in the task of transforming them into valued members of
the communist collective. By 1959, the role of the volunteer brigades was less to aid
in the arrest of law-breakers than to exert moral pressure on a whole range of social
deviants, helping them to reform before a real crime had even been committed.
Pravda, 28 January 1959, pp. 2-10.
" Foucault, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self, p. 64.
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The shift was reflected in the metaphors and tropes used in the press. With the
established Manichean rhetoric undermined, the Soviet community was reconfigured
as an ensemble of fellow travellers collectively embarking on a journey towards the
communist future, yet all at risk of stumbling onto the wrong path. The new rhetoric
confirmed communist escbatology, but now rendered collective progress contingent
not upon fighting the enemy, but on ensuring that every member was living in
accordance with Soviet moral codes. Those already set upon the correct path must
look out for those who erred, and young people in particular must be deterred from
straying onto the wrong path. Rather than catching villains, the community's main
task was now to guide transgressors back onto the correct path that would lead them
all towards communism.
Although this rhetoric reached its apotheosis towards the end of the decade, it was
already presaged in earlier propaganda texts. The story of Liudmila Raikh, subject of
a 1956 feuilleton entitled 'On the slippery slope', offers a prime example of the new
rhetoric .M
 Until recently an exemplary Soviet schoolgirl, Liuda had been enticed into
the company of young thieves. With a taste for money, nice dresses, make-up, and
dances, she gradually lost interest in sport, study, or work. Thus the two paths were
counterposed; on the one side was the correct Soviet lifestyle devoted to physical
activity and hard work, on the other lay vanity, greed, and frivolity. Having taken the
wrong path, her life spiralled out of control, ultimately ending up in a courtroom
drama. Not only were her parents berated for taking insufficient interest in their
daughter's upbringing, the whole community was taken to task. All were invited to
'4 
'Naskol'zkomputi',Moskovskaiapravda, 23 October 1956, p.3.
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help return Liuda to the right path. Repeating the headline's metaphors, the authors
concluded:
The girl made a mistake, she got off onto the wrong path. But she is only
eighteen. And while it is not too late, we should come to the girl's help.
We must help all that is good and clean in this young girl fleurish.
Liudmila herself, her parents, and the whole community
[obshchestvennost I must battle for her, and for her bright future lsvetloe
budushchee].
Liudmila had a bright future ahead, but she would only reach it ifshe lived in
accordance with Soviet laws and according to Soviet byt and rejeded the false values
- cosmetics and dancing - that had taken her off track in the first place.
Over the next three years such metaphors became ubiquitous. A t3pical article on the
activities of the newly formed druzhiny described the work of one brigade. In October
1959, the unit received a letter from a certain Shatrova who begged for help with her
wayward brother who had recently indulged in some heavy drinking bouts, often
cursing and threatening both her and her children. That same evening, members of the
brigade visited the Shatrovs' apartment and rebuked the brother, thus demonstrating
to him that the 'collective' had firmly decided to 'sober him up once and for all'. The
painstaking work of the volunteers did not stop there and, in addition to further visits
to the Shatrov residence, they ensured that the brother's work 'coIflective' also
discussed his misdemeanours. The story ended with Shatrov a polite and sober
individual. The article concluded: 'This short story is just an episode. There are no
"brigands" involved, no talk of "arrest", or "convictions"... But the deed is done. One
man was prevented from veering off the path.' 35 As Kharkhordin has argued, the
Soviet community was urged to become actively involved in the y every citizen
"Proisshestvii ne bylo...",Moskovskafapravda, 19 December 1959, pp. 2-3.
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lived even within his own home; volunteers had the right to enter the family hearth
and concern themselves with the daily life of every citizen. Yet their goal here was
not to arrest or condemn those whose byt was undesirable. Charged with raising
Soviet morality in the local community, the volunteer brigades were challenged to use
the techniques of re-education and collective pressure to eradicate transgressions. The
very title of the article - "No incidents to report" - promoted the utopian dream that
there would soon be no crimes at all.
Propaganda pieces showed how many individuals experienced radical personal
transformation. Under the headline 'Collective justice', the conversion of worker 0.
S. Makarenkova was recounted. 36 As forewoman in a workshop, she would swear at
her team, humiliate them, and even slap subordinates. As the article reminded the
readers, the aim of the comrades' courts was 'not to punish, but to educate
[vospityvat 'J, to deter from further, more serious acts'. After many official warnings,
the case was transferred to the comrades' courts where the board heard her pleas and
promises to reform. It was only when the case was heard in front of the whole
collective that Makarenkova realised the error of her ways. In the half year since the
hearing, Makarenkova had stopped cursing and bad-mouthing other workers,
becoming a sociable and friendly member of the team - 'the past has been cancelled
out'.
Another article, optimistically entitled 'Towards perfect law and order in the capital',
recounted the reformation of several anti-social characters. In one workshop, the
collective met to debate the behaviour of drunken worker Osipov a full three times;
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experienced and respected work-mates talked with him; attention was paid both to his
progress in the work-place and in his personal life. Soon Osipov also became a sober
worker. In the same article, a party member managed to 're-educate' the addled
Morozov, whose transfonnation was so complete that he became a candidate member
of the party himself. Eager to show how these tales of personal transformation related
to the issue of eradicating crime in the capital, the article cited from Aleksandr
Gorkin, the current president of the Supreme Court:
Listening to criminal cases in the peoples' courts it is evident that in the
vast majority of cases law-breakers can be dealt with by means of
collective pressure. Instead of imprisonment, the pressure of the collective
can in many cases be a more effective means to re-educate a man
[perevospitanie cheloveka].
Correcting a man who is on the slippery path, preventing him from going
downhill, keeping him under a friendly but fiim control, showing him the
trust of the collective - this is the genuine battle for a man and for his
moral education [vospitanie].37
Once more promoting the vision of the offender as 'erring' or 'slipping', Gorkin
unequivocally rejected the notion of prison as an effective means to correct offenders.
Soviet society was now to become the primary site for re-education.
This campaign coincided both with Khrushchev's claims that communism was no
longer 'over the hills and far away' (ne za goramI) and, with the launch of the
Soviets' first rockets, the Soviet conquest of new terntories. In 1959, the pages of the
Soviet press were filled with images of space rockets, slogans about the rapid advent
of communism, and stories of individuals who were transformed from egotistical and
lazy deviants into Soviet citizens worthy of the beautiful communist future. Believing
it was no longer acceptable for great swathes of the population to be banished from
'Pravosudie kollektiva', Mosko vskaia pravda, 30 June 1959, pp. 2-3.
37 'Za obraztsovyi obshchestvcnnyi poriadok v siolitse', Moskovskaia pravda, 2 December 1959, p.2.
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society, Khrushchev in particular distanced himself from the Manichean formulations
of the past. In the place of aggressive rhetoric against wrong-doers, Khrushchev led
the nation on a radical mission to save all souls. Khrushchev did not promote his
policies as 'liberal' ones and did not present himself as a 'reformer'. Instead, the new
approach to criminality was promoted as a crucial part of the communist project, a
necessary step in bringing the idyllic future nearer. Although Soviet society had not
been entirely ready for such a task in 1953, the party hoped that, as a result of the new
propaganda campaign and popular participation in the brigades and courts, the Soviet
public would warm to the task. If the communist era was near, party leaders argued,
Soviet society must now be sufficiently healthy to resist the negative influence of a
few contaminated elements and even, indeed, to restore them to health.
A Tale of Redemption
At the Third Writers' Congress, Khrushchev made a long speech that Pravda
published on its front pages in May 1959. In a long and convoluted introduction,
Khrushchev first rebuked the writers for getting entangled in lengthy wrangles
between themselves, only to remind them that while capitalism still existed in the
world, conflict would always remain. Realising the ambiguity of his words, he
rhetoricised, 'You're probably wondering what I'm calling you to do - to ignite the
passions of battle, or to promote reconciliation?' In response to his own question, he
first answered, 'If the enemy doesn't surrender - then destroy him'. Citing this battle-
cry, typical of the Manichean hostilities encouraged in the 1930s, Khrushchev
repeated that in the class war with capitalism, the Soviets would never capitulate.
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Then, however, he turned to the adage 'Don't kick a lying dog' to encourage a less
ruthless approach within the Soviet Union. lithe opponent shows a readiness to take
the correct position, Khrushchev said, he should be given a helping hand, encouraged
to join the ranks of Soviet society. He concluded:
I'd like to say that in our socialist society, where there are no enemy
classes or groups, where our whole life is built on the principles of
comradeship and friendship, we need to deal more sympathetically with
those people who have let the devil get the better of them ['dat' sebia
chertu zaputat 
'1.
Retaining a Manichean viewpoint only in relation to socialist society's relations to the
external, capitalist world, Khrushchev portrayed the Soviet world as internally
harmonious. He encouraged his audience - both delegates at the congress and Pravda
readers - to follow Dzerzhinskii in believing that every individual, 'including both
political opponents and criminals', could be re-educated. 'We believe', he said, 'that
no such thing exists as a person who cannot be corrected.' Choosing to frame the
question as he did, Khrushchev suggested that those who made mistakes should no
longer be treated as enemies. Real 'enemies' only existed in the form of capitalists.
His argument was thus absolutely in keeping with the Secret Speech where he
claimed that the threat of internal enemies had been greatly exaggerated. Those who
committed mistakes, even crimes, should be treated not as enemies, but with concern
and sympathy, vospitanie (moral education) and even perevospitanie (moral re-
education) were the order of the day.
Even though he addressed writers, and not criminal experts, judges, or policemen,
Khrushchev went on to devote yet more of his speech to the question of the
'criminal'. Choosing the writers' congress as a suitable occasion to discuss the merits
3' 
'Rech' N. S. Khrushcheva na ifi s'ezde pisatelei 22 mala 1959 goda', Pravda, 24 May 1959, pp. 1-3.
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of 'correction' over 'imprisonment', he detached it from the narrower issues of penal
policy. By implication, he presented the revised treatment of offenders as a profound,
philosophical shift in how society defined itselL By addressing writers, the debate
became a question of how society's 'interpreters' should view the Soviet world and its
inhabitants. Rather than presenting society as a battleground, they should see it as a
school for new citizens.
The candidate for re-education chosen by Khrushchev was rather different from the
frivolous Liudmila Raikh, Shatrova's drunken brother, and other stray individuals
profiled in the press in the late 1950s. Konstantin Nogovitsin was the author of a
petition to Khrushchev - and a self-professed recidivist. A petition, that staple of the
Soviet criminal justice system, was now used to broadcast his life-story, and
Khrushchev read out the letter in its entirety. From the age of twelve, we learn,
Nogovitsin committed thefts, and as a result had been sentenced four times. Having
recently finished a six-year stretch, he returned home to his mother, wife, and
daughter, and found work as a carpenter but with his wife pregnant and his wages
low, he quickly sank into debt and ran away to the 'easy life'. Somehow he found
himself unwilling to take up his old life of thieving again, yet was equally unable to
return home to the family he had abandoned, in a limbo between two lives,
Nogovitsin's petition was a plea for advice. As he informed the congress, Khrushchev
invited the man to meet him. Additional biographical information was garnered at the
interview: thirty years old, sensible and pleasant, Nogovitsin talked of how he had lost
his father, and of the negative environment that had influenced him. Explaining that
he continued to be labelled a thief which prevented him from finding normal work or
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acquiring reasonable lodgings, he concluded his little speech: 'I promise you that I
will become a decent man [chestnyi chelovek]. I will prove it to you.'
Choosing to believe the man, Khrushchev offered him practical help. He telephoned
the local gorkom, instructing them to help Nogovitsin find work and acquire
qualifications. He offered him credit so he could build himself a little house (domik).
When he checked on the progress of his protégé, Khrushchev learned that the man
was working well. From his story, Khrushchev concluded that the days of draconian
discipline were over. What would this approach have achieved, he asked:
It would have meant that a man who had erred from the correct path ended
up back in prison, improving his professional qualifications only in the
business of thieving, while all the time we are in need of extra men for our
own matters. In order to return this man to the correct path, a different
approach is needed. You need to believe in a man, in his good side. Can
this man be an active participant in the construction of communism? He
can, comrades! (Noisy applause).
Eyes set finnly on the future, Khrushchev painted a rosy picture of communism. In an
environment of absolute harmony and prosperity, there would no longer be any
temptation to commit crime. While he could not guarantee complete absence of
criminals under communism, he suggested that such behaviour would be so strange
and rare, society would consider the perpetrators mentally ilL39
Up to the point of Khrushchev's intervention, Nogovitsin's story in itself was not
uncommon. After losing his father, he came under the influence of a 'bad'
environment and started thieving during the dislocations of war. As his lack of
The practice of diagnosing deviant behaviour and thought as symptoms of mental illness flourished
in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in the abuse r which Soviet psychiatry was famed. Sidney Bloch
and Peter Reddaway, Soviet Psychiatric AblLce The Shadow or World Psychiatry (London: Victor
Gollancz, 1984).
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qualifications, coupled with society's distrust, made it difficult to build a normal life
for himself, he became locked in a transitory existence, interspersed with stretches in
the Gulag. In his desperate plea for readmission to society and his promises to be
become a 'chestnyi chelovek', his petition bad much in common with those of
Tikhonov/Ivanov, Podavalov, and Topolev.4° In their cases, however, pleas for a
happy ending went unheeded, their promises of personal transformation rarely
believed. In this public manner, Khrushchev chose to re-write the ending to one life-
story, allowing Nogovitsin to become a respected member of Soviet society. In 1962,
the full story of his conversion was published in Izvestiia. It showed how the
incomplete 'Bildungsroman' could be happily concluded when society was prepared
to take an active role in forming the individual, cultivating in him the correct moral
values, and educating him in the ways of the Soviet world.4'
Describing their arrival at the Novorossiisk docks, the authors of 'Konstantin
Nogovitsin's new life' impressed on the reader the stunning industrial landscape,
deftly setting the scene for a socialist realist tale of personal transformation. The
reader first glimpses the protagonist from afar, singing as he masterfully operates one
of the huge cranes towering over the docks. Nogovitsin finishes his shift, greets the
journalists, and begins to relate his new story - not his life as a thief, but the story of
his conversion. His first days as a stevedore were painful. Physically unable to keep
up the pace and ashamed by his weakness, he was dependent upon the support of the
collective. Their help was forthcoming; no one evinced curiosity about his past and
members of his brigade were ready to tutor him. When he took his breaks alone his
40
'Novaia zhizn' Konstantina Nogovitsina', Izvestiia, 8 September 1962, p.6.
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work-mates drew him into their group, offering him food and friendship. In his
private life, important changes also occurred. With his wife and new baby borne from
the maternity hospital, the family moved into a new little room. To celebrate their
housewarming, the couple invited Nogovitsin's foreman to tea and he not only
showed great warmth towards the family, but also encouraged Nogovitsin to train as a
crane operator. Settled into a new home with his family around him, learning new
skills at work, and attending night school, Nogovitsm was on track to becoming a
model worker.42 However, no socialist realist conversion stoiy could be resolved so
easily, and our protagonist would have to undergo several trials and tribulations
before he could fully emerge as homo zovieticus.
A year went past, but Nogovitsin remained aware that he had not yet been fully
transformed, later explaining 'I felt in my soul that I had not yet become a real
working person'. He still lacked the 'proletarian consciousness' of which his new
friend and workmate, Valentin Dubinin, spoke. When problems arose - arguments
with his mother-in-law, financial worries, his daughter's ill-health - Nogovitsin
embarked on a drinking binge. Old friends somehow get hold of him and took their
former comrade-in-arms on a drunken train journey. Horrified by his friend's
behaviour, Dubinin identified it as the 'lure of the old'. Nogovitsin's life was thus
configured as a battle between the forces of the 'old' life - in which he was 'Kos'ka',
member of a vodka-drinking, criminal gang riding the rail network - and the new life,
where he had become Konstantin Nogovitsin, a budding worker, settled, loyal to
family, friends, and sobriety. Nogovitsin explained to the journalists, 'it was as if I
It is interesting that in the 1959 encounter with Khrushchev, Nogovitsin and his wife already have
children. In the 1962 story of his transformation, however a new child is born, and any pre-existing
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were reborn but didn't believe that everything was behind me'. A full transformation
of consciousness was required before he could truly become a new man.
Rejecting life on the trains, Nogovitsin immediately returned home, but faced a frosty
reception. Those who had assisted him were disgusted by his relapse. However, the
foreman encouraged them to give him a second chance, refusing the urge to cast
Nogovitsin out:
'We should fire Nogovitsin. But if we push him aside [ottolknutl, where
will he go? Off thieving? And will we be able to sleep easy if he ends up
in prison again? And after all, he did return to us. This shows that be is not
a completely lost man.'
Paraphrasing Khrushchev's words from 1959, the foreman argued that the collective
had a responsibility to save Nogovitsin from a life of crime and prison. Prison was
clearly presented as a site of corruption and degeneration, Soviet society a breeding-
ground for healthy new citizens.
The first time, Nogovitsin learnt how to work; this second time, the transformation
was a spiritual one. He became utterly dedicated to his work, remorseful for the
wasteful way he had spent so many years. When he showed the journalists the
certificate proving his status as fully-trained crane-operator, Nogovitsin commented
'so it looks like I made myself into a person [chelovekom sdelalsial'. The story ended
with a dramatic finale in which - like any good socialist realist hero - he triumphed
against the natural elements. Though modest about the incident, he explained that in
the middle of a ferocious storm, he and three colleagues had battled to save the crane
ones forgotten. For d aesthetics of this socialist realist tale, he starts a new, happy imily with the
new life granted him by Khrushchev.
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from ruin. When he saw a letter of thanks to the four workers hanging on the notice
board the following day, he was filled with pride.
At one now with Soviet society, Nogovitsin's story could end. His certificate and the
notice-board tribute offered two official recognitions of his new identity as a Soviet
worker. Khrushchev's intervention had made the story unusual, but the message was
universal: even the most 'fallen' of individuals could be restored to the Soviet family.
The path may be thorny, but all could become respected members of Soviet society.
The article praised those who made this transformation possible, those who saw their
task in 'saving' him, not rejecting him - spasti, not ottolb,ut'. Khrushchev was lauded
for having uncovered the good side underneath the 'mask' of a criminal: 'Under the
heap of convictions, beneath the dirty skin of the criminal, Nikita Sergeevich
Khrushchev saw the Man [uvidel Cheloveka].'43 Whereas the rhetoric of the Stalinist
era incited the public to 'unmask' enemies concealed under the guise of ordinary
Soviet citizens, here the reader was encouraged to find the 'man' secreted within even
the most unappealing of 'dirty' criminals. Now the rhetoric of 'unmasking' remained,
but its new application revealed a significant change in Soviet philosophy. In order to
build communism, the main task facing the collective was not to hunt out bidden
enemies but rather to seek out the natural - if buried - good within each person.
ContestinE Correction
Khrushchev's belief that all Soviet sinners could be redeemed was radical. Within the
legal profession, different views of what 'correction' should mean rivalled his utopian
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position, and a heated polemic simmered throughout the decade. A half-year prior to
Khrushchev's own foray into narrative, an alternative version of crime and
'correction' came in a short story from Vera Shaposhnikova in the specialist
periodical Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost ¶. The story began with Shaposhnikova
travelling from Moscow to the snow-bound camps to investigate prisoner life. In the
course of the journey she engaged in discussion with an elderly worker from the
camps. Probing her companion's views, Shaposhnikova took the opportunity to
articulate complaints she commonly heard from ordinary citizens about the difficulties
of living alongside offenders. In response, the camp worker professed himself a
follower of Makarenko, telling her that the 'school of reforging' (shkolaperekovki)
had witnessed many successes and dangerous criminals had 'become people'. Initially
Shaposhnikova paid tribute to the merits of 're-forging', but from her conversations
with the prisoners she concluded that many zeks would only reform as they grew old.
Although her article included an impassioned eulogy to Gor'kii and the Belomor
vision of re-forging through labour, her views strongly reflected Stalinist revisions.
Where Gor'kii had claimed that rehabilitation could be successful in a period of two
years, Shaposhnikova harboured a much deeper fear of the criminal's recidivist nature
and envisaged sentences of up to ten times those celebrated in Belomor.
'Novaia zhizn' Konstantina Nogovitsina'.
One contemporary British observer saw as a conflict between those who advocated 'restoring to
the defendant the rights impaired by the misases of the Stalin period' and those nxre coucerned with
fighting especially violent crime. In the specialist journals such as SotrialLcticheskaia zukonnost' and
Sovetskaia iustitsiia, there was great debate between those who favoured social rehabilitation and those
who campaigned for longer sentences. Those who argued for shorter sentences included B. Utevskii, L
Smirnov, and L Goliakov (see B. Utcvskii, 'Voprosy nk'aniia v ugolovnom zakonodatel'stve',
oia1Lrticheskaia zakonnost', 1958.7, 3-9, L Smirnov, 'K osnovam ugolovnogo zakotaodatel'stva
SSSR', Sotsialistiche.skaia zakonnost', 19573; L Goliakov, 'K proektu Ugolovnogo Kodeksa RSFSR',
Sovetskaia iustitsiia, 1957.2). Advocates of a return to twenty or twenty-five year sentences included
tvL Shargorodskii and P. Romashkin (see M Sbargorodskii, 'Voprosy nakazaniia v proektc
Ugolovnogo Kodeksa', Sovetskoe gosudarstvo ipravo, 1955.1,51-8; P. Romashkin, 'Osnovrne
problemy kodifikatsii sovetskogo ugolovnogo zakonodatel'stva', Sovetskoe gosudarsivo Ipravo,
1957.5,71-84). For the British point of view, see: R. ScMesinger 'The Discussion of Criminal Law
and Procedure', Soviet Studier, 10(1958), 293-306 (p. 293).
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For a time concessions were apparently made to these voices of caution, but, as we
have seen, by 1959 concerns about violent crime and recidivist criminals lost out to
Khrushchev's more radical fonnulations. Instead of incarceration, re-education and
'correction' within society became the order of the day. The emptying of the Gulag
accelerated. When the total number of prisoners dipped to 550,882 in 1960 it was at
its lowest since 1935, and the distension of the Gulag generated by Stalinist repression
had now largely been undone.47
 The example of Nogovitsin triumphed over
Shaposhnikova's more recalcitrant zeks.
From the outset, however, local officials doubted the efficacy of Khrushchev's
measures, fearing they signalled a worrying degree of leniency. In Leningrad, for
example, local procurators were unconvinced by the policy of transferring offenders
to social organisations instead of into the hands of the penal system. On 8 April 1959,
a meeting was organised by Leningrad's head procurator to discuss the introduction of
new polices, and initially debate progressed smoothly as delegates planned the new
volunteer brigades and shared their experiences of setting up 'socialist legality'
committees. The concept of rehabilitating offenders within society, however, caused
45 Vera Sbaposluiikova, 'Lishenye Svobody', Sotsialisticheskaia zakonno.it' 1958.10, 56-51.
After the traumatic effect of earlier decrees, the amnesty of November 1957 was mere prudent,
excluding several categories of prisoner and takmg into account all previous convictions for the past
ten years. The decree amnestied all women with children under eight; pregnant women, younger
offenders up to 16, men over 60 and women over 55. It excluded the following categories: those
sentenced for state crimes, banditry, premeditated murder, robbery, grievous bodily harm, malicious
hooliganism (zlostnoe khuliganstvo) rape, the large-scale theft of socialist property those with mere
than two sentences; those who had been granted early release and then re-offended; prisoners who
broke camp discipline. In the discussions provoked by the 1958 diaft of the 'Foundations of the
Criminal Code', it seemed possible that 25 year sentences so coin under Stalin would be re-
instated. This was clearly what Shaposhnikova was hoping for. In fact, though the draft placed some
restrictions on early release, the ten-year maximum sentence advocated by Lenin was upheld.
R. Schlesinger, 'Documents on Amnesty and Pardon', Sovi Studier, 12(1960), 443-446; P.
R.omashkin, 'Primenenie aninistii', Sotriahstiches*aia zakonnost', 1958.1, 5-14.
47 GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 109,1.27.
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consternation. Comrade Lototskaia, the procurator of Zhdanov raion, said that she did
not understand the new practice of transferring offenders to the guardianship of
community organisations. 'Don't these measures indicate a tendency to undermine
our fight against dangerous criminals?' she asked the assembled. She was supported
by the Moscow ralon procurator who declared that such practices would not be
adopted in his dominion.
On 18 July 1959, just two months after Khrushchev's speech at the writers' congress,
members of the new 'observation committees' from across the Moscow oblast' came
together to discuss the state of corrective-labour camps and prisons in the province.49
One member, G. U. Kalimii, made a long and impassioned speech. He reminded his
audience that their work had become even more impwtant in the wake of the XXI
Party Congress as the task of building communism was now urgent. 'We won't be
taking any thieves, bandits or robbers forward with us to the future communist
system', he told listeners. 5° In keeping with the utopian rhetoric articulated by
Khrushchev in 1959, he thus opened his speech by configuring the issue of crime in
relation to the creation of earthly paradise. He boasted that the Soviets had been the
first in the world to build a Soviet state, 'the first to launch a satellite and a ballistic
rocket', and would be the first to build communism, eradicate crime, and destroy
prisons, camps, and labour colonies. 5 ' Yet the body of his speech revealed important
doctrinal differences with Khrushchev about how this utopian state would be
achieved. Kalinin was highly suspicious of prisoners per Se. Charging fellow
' GARF £ 8131, op. 32, d. 6199, IL 130-131.
TsGAMOf 2l57,cp. 1, d. 5311,11. 148-159.The 'obsevationcommittees' weresetupbyadecree
from the Soviet of Ministers on 24 May 1957. Their goal was to strengthen public (obshchesivennyi)
control over the work of the corrective-labour institutions.
50 TsGAMOf.2157,op. 1, d. 5311,1 153.
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committee members to be more cautious when considering prisoners' requests for
early release, he told them:
Amongst them [the prisoners], there are people who can't be discerned
[razgadany] at first glance, who try to bide their face from us, and very
often they hide it so well that it is initially very difficult to work them out.
It is hard to know how this group will behave after release[.. 
.1
It is our first task to master this difficult group so that when they are
released from the camps or prison, they will be on the correct working
path [pravil 'nyl trudovoi put 1 and won't lead our young people astray.
But now they are beginning to behave in a very cunning way. When they
are released from the prisons and camps, they don't immediately go about
their shady business themselves, but instead try to involve our young
people.52
Where Khrushchev had hoped to unearth the 'man' within the criminal, Kalinin still
saw the prisoner as a potential enemy who cunningly hid behind the mask of a
reformed citizen. Kalinin tended to see the prisoners' tales as skilful invention and
considered it the task of the 'observation committees' to unveil the face of the true
criminal. Unlike Khrushchev, Kalinin did not imagine unmasking the 'man' inside the
criminal and in fact went so far as to express overt anxiety over the impact of
Khrushchev's speech at the writers' congress. Lots of prisoners, he warned his
colleagues, would try to manipulate Khrushchev's speech in order to plea for their
own release. Such prisoners should be reminded that when Nogcwitsin approached
Khrushchev he had already reformed himself; having run away from his family yet
resisted the lure of crime, thus proving from the outset his determination to give up
his life of crime. Promoting a quite different method of re-education from official
policies, Kalinin argued that the best means for re-education was through labour and
strict discipline (rezhim). In his view, the endeavours of the collective to 'correct' and
'save' an offender were appropriate only for young people who had committed a
51 TsGAMO £ 2157, op. 1, d. 5311,1 156.
52 TsGAMOf.2157,op. 1,d.5311,L 154.
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single error. On the whole, he advocated that the application of 'early release' should
be more limited than at present. Where rehabilitation or re-education was possible, it
should occur in the isolation of a prison or camp and could only be achieved through
the act of forced labour, and not through the cultural activities and 'amateur
dramatics' he feared some colleagues might support.
Kalinin's reservations were not unique. Over the coming months, local authorities
regularly reported on the progress of the new practices. Their reports sometimes
included stories of personal transformation that mirrored the tales of conversion
publicised in the press, describing how the guidance of the 'collective' could return
lost sheep to the Soviet fold. More commonly, however, they turned to the perceived
failures of the new policies.
Officials were aware that a lack of consistency undermined the initiative. At the local
level, some procurators were ridiculously cautious, others almost reckless. In the
autumn of 1959, a report from officials in Kalinin oblast' criticised local procurators
for their failure to implement the new policies in a coherent manner. The official
explained how in one raion individuals guilty of attempted murder, rape, and grievous
bodily harm might be granted reprieve and bailed out for re-education, while in a
neighbouring district a man was brought to trial for failing to pay alimony for two
months. The Leningrad procurator was initially more positive about the reforms,
asserting that in the vast majority of cases offenders 'repent' (raskaivaetsia) in front
of the collective and promise to 'correct themselves', yet he too identified a number
of problems. He criticised managers who applied to take inveterate criminals on
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probation, sometimes without consulting the members of the collective. Courts were
accused of making insensitive decisions, as in the case of A. N. Subbotina who was
assigned to her housing collective for re-education, even though these were the very
people whom she had drunkenly abused in the first place. An inquiry in Moscow
found similar problems, and again judges were criticised for letting opportunities for
re-education slip by. The author of the report questioned the appropriateness of
convicting a factory worker who stole ajar of jam, or of sentencing a deaf and mute
woman whose 'offence' was to knock down the partition dividing the room she
shared with her ex-husband.55
In addition to successful conversion tales, it was common to find the criminal
relapsing into his old ways. Some reports blamed the level of re-education on offer. In
a report on the issue of crime in Vladimir oblast', a State Councillor of Justice,
Komarov, noted the high level of crimes committed by previous offenders, and
suggested they had received unsatisfactory help. Komarov argued that there had been
a break-down in communication between the police, courts, and social organisations
responsible for re-education, and he regretted that 'the police and courts often
transferred to communal guardianship people who had committed serious crimes and
also people who had previous sentences and had already resisted correction'. A
subsequent report from the city of Kol'chugun offered individual stories to illustrate
this failure. In January 1960 N. N. Chuzlov was released early from prison on the
grounds that Workshop 10 at the Ordzhonikidzc factory would become his 'guardian'
" GARF £ 8131, op. 32, d. 3200,11.42-45.
"GA1FL 8131,op.32,d. 6199,11.208-229.
"GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6226, 11. 1-18.
'6 Vladimir Municipal Archive, f. 3789, op. 1, d. 2007,1.49.
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and take responsibility for his re-education? For almost two months, however, he
was without work and he re-offended. According to the report, delays in finding
returnees work were not uncommon.
Some reports, however, held the offender and ex-convicts themselves to blame. Even
when the collective showered them with assistance, some still simply failed to change.
The case of a twenty-eight year old man, A. L Feniusbin, is typical. After serving five
sentences, Feniushin was granted early release in May 1959 and found work at the
Ordzhonikidze factory in Kol'chugun, where he was given 'all the help he could wish
for'. Tn October 1959 he was even given a sanatorium holidzy worth 1200 roubles and
a further 130 roubles for travel expenses. Despite the generosity shown him, he re-
offended in January 1960. Another returnee from the Gulag, Telegin, managed to re-
offend in little over three weeks after his release, even though he received 100 roubles
to tide him over until he was allocated work.58
The problems with the new procedures were thus two-fold. Both local officials and
members of the collectives charged with the task of re-education seem to have been at
best half-hearted, and many offenders consequently missed out on the 're-education'
they deserved. At the same time, the recipients of these new efforts were also flawed.
Very few, it seems, were proving to have the potential for personal transformation
displayed by Konstantin Nogovitsin. Even before the first year of the experiment was
over, there were widespread misgivings amongst those charged with its
implementation.
Vladimir Municipal Archive, £ 3789, op. 1, d. 2007, 1. 68.
Vladimir Municipal Archive, £3789, op. I, d. 2007,11.60-68.
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Calls for Banishment
II doubts existed amongst officials about the merits of correction, they were even
more widespread amongst the broader public. From the end of 1955 onwards, the
Soviet public increasingly expressed its own concerns about crime in collective and
individual letters addressed to leading political figures. Time and again, letters voiced
anger that 'decent Soviet' citizens were under threat from a growing criminal
population. A letter infoniied Voroshilov that the city of StavropoI was taken over by
criminals at night:
It is no secret that the morgues are full of the corpses of people murdered.
After nine o'clock in the evening, life stops for peaceable citizens. On the
Street come out those who have spent their whole lives in the camps. They
don't allow us to live peacefully [•••]59
Describing scenes of death and killing, the writer blamed Gulag returnees for the
carnage. Inhabitants of Shchekino in Tula province expressed similar sentiments,
lamenting that 'at night you get the impression that bandits and hooligans are the ones
in charge [khoziainichaiut]'.6° In 1953 the threat was presented as one external to the
Soviet city. The criminal was imagined as an elusive bandit raiding the metropolis,
but not a part of it. Now citizens became doubly outraged for malefactors seemed not
only an established feature on the urban landscape, but almost its lords.
They were concerned about a whole variety of unsavoury behaviours. F. Ia. Filonov
from Khar'kov, complained that his neighbour Odinetskii's home had become a hang-
out for scores of lay-abouts. Instead of working, these people 'play cards for days on
GARFf7523,op. 107,d. 189,L74.
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end, and if the weather permits, chase doves [...] they throw sticks, stones and lumps
of earth at them'. In the evenings, Filonov lamented, they drink and engage in
hooligan activities, including poking out dogs' eyes.61 Iurii Smirnov from Krasnodar
was frightened to leave his house because of the groups of men openly drinking vodka
and cursing on the streets, even encouraging young people to use 'the same foul
language'.62 The inhabitants of Shchekino wrote that 'they attack decent [chestnyi]
Soviet citizens, insult them, steal, and even kill'. 63 Bracketing together less serious
transgressions like swearing with grave ones such as murder, the letters suggested that
public anxiety was not always occasioned by specific acts, but by the presence within
their communities of individuals whom they regarded as outsiders. They wished to
blame all untoward events on this imagined army of pariahs.
In some respects this was in keeping with propaganda campaigns of the mid-l950s
which called on Soviet citizens to be alert towards a range of inappropriate
behaviours, and to treat hooligan acts as the precursor to more bloody crimes. There
were, however, important differences. Deploring hooliganism, the press had
abandoned depictions of the 'bandit' and showed offenders as family members or
work colleagues. In contrast to the official rhetoric, letter-writers were loath to see the
malefactors as erring members of their own 'Soviet' family. These were impostors
deserving only of collective wrath. Although letter-writers acknowledged that they
might live across the street they continued to view them as uninvited outsiders. The
pariahs might have taken control of some locations within Soviet towns and cities -
'GARF £ 7523, op. 107, d. 189,1. 66.
"GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 189,1. 87.
' GARF f. 7523, op. 107, ci 189,1 67.
GARF f. 7523, op. 107, ci 189,1 66.
208
certain areas such as alley-ways and parks were frequently designated as off-limits to
ordinary Soviet citizens - but they were not part of the community.
Despite the media's depiction of offenders as fallen members of the Soviet family,
letter-writers increasingly labelled them as the enemy 'other'. In 1955 a group of
citizens wrote that 'a hooligan-bandit who has been convicted two or three times,
should be isolated from society as an enemy of the people [vrag naroda'.M V. V.
Polynev, writing from the troubled city of Dnepropetrovsk, 65 lamented that after
forty-three years of Soviet rule, it was shameful that crime not only existed, but was
in fact growing. He wrote: 'We are in essence failing to carry out Lenin's bidding. He
urged us on to a relentless battle against enemies of the people - hooligans, parasites
[tuneiadtsi], speculators, and so on.' Attacking official policy as a betrayal of
Leninist norms, Polynev argued for an approach that treated law-breakers of any
description as enemies.
The authorities took such views seriously. In December 1957, Voroshilov considered
one letter he received of sufficient importance to forward it on to the most senior
figures - the chief Procurator, the Minister of the Interior, the head of the KGB, and
the Chairman of the Supreme Court. The collective missive came from the Institute of
Mining in Moscow and listed a series of attacks suffered by colleagues over the past
64 GARFf7523op 107,d. 189,L73.
Local reports suggest that the southern areas of Russian and industrial zones in Ukraine were
particularly afflicted. In 1955, when the Dnepropetrovsk city soviet met to investigate claims that the
city was overnm with criminals, one delegate blamed not only the 'liberal' sentencing practices
Moscow had encouraged since 1953, but also the location of the city. Demonstrating that most crimes
were committed by those with previous convictions, he explained that released prisoners 'come to the
city of Dnepropetrovsk, which is located in southern Ukraine, arriving without document or tickets in
trains or on the roofs of trains from all corners of the Soviet Union, especially the eastern and northern
areas'. See GARF f. 7523, op. 89, d. 4406,1 51.
'6 GARF L 7523, op. 95, d. 73a, 1. 184.
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two years, asserting that many crimes went unreported because the victims feared
reprisals. Writing of these violent assaults carried out by 'hooligans' and 'bandits' on
the city's streets, they cautioned their eminent readers that, 'We shouldn't forget the
fact that the hands of bandits are often being directed by foreign spies and are acting
for the benefit of foreign enemies.' 67 Whether individual authors genuinely believed
that street stabbings and brawls were planned by foreign inteffigence services is
impossible to determine, but they clearly thought of the offenders as 'enemies of the
people'. They concluded their letter with a slogan worthy of any Bolshevik agitator:
'Show the bandit-enemies of the people no mercy!' (Banditam - vragam naroda - ne
mozhel bytposhchady!).68 As their letter received such high-level attention, equating
street crime with enemy activity seems to have found favour amongst readers at the
Supreme Soviet.
The tendency towards more lenient measures was thus contested. As in 1953, letter-
writers frequently expressed their dissatisfaction with the 'humanity' of the new laws.
A certain Smimov from Minsk exclaimed: 'How much grief these swine [merzavtsy]
inflict on our people! And this needn't be, if it wasn't for our humane laws.' 69
 A
group of workers from the Nikol'skii factory in Taganrog told the Moscow authorities
that 'the workers are deeply indignant that they as decent [chestnye] people are valued
so little, while bandits are shown such humanity'. 7° Again promoting a polar
distinction between offenders and decent citizens, the workers claimed there was
popular dissatisfaction with the criminal justice reforms and the notions of 'humanity'
with which they had been promoted in 1953. An inhabitant of Michurinsk in Tambov
' GARF £7523, op. 89, d. 7272, IL 7-8.
' GARF f. 7523, op. 89, d. 7272,11.7-8.
'9 GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 109,1. 13.
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oblast' also indicted 'humanity', writing that 'our laws are too humane towards
people (if we can call them people?) who don't want to work, who live off theft,
deception, speculation and so on'.7' The urge to de-humanise and vilify offenders won
out over the lauded concept of 'humanity'.
Tales of correction and re-education promoted in the press in the late 1950s also fell
on stony ground. Members of the Komsomol organisation in the town of Cherepovets,
Vologda oblast', collectively wrote to express their anxiety with the state of affairs in
their hometown:
The police in our town probably aren't in a position to cope with such
widely developed banditry, which makes people live in fear, as they did
during the war. All this is the fault of hooligans, let out from prison before
the end of their sentence and without learning their lesson. We know that
our country is now conducting significant work in the sphere of moral
education [vospitatel'naia rabota], but we mustn't chose to educate some
[vospilat'] at the cost of others' lives.72
More temperate than some letters-writers, the Komsomol members did their best to
acknowledge the merit of early release and re-education, but ultimately believed that
the policies of correction endangered their own lives as law-abiding Soviet citizens.
From the town of Turinsk in Sverdlov oblast', a certain Stizhevskii wrote that 'If
severe measures aren't taken against those who disrupt the lives of decent citizens,
then other measures of moral education [vospitanie] won't help'.73 A collective letter
from Ivanovo oblast' argued that the time for re-education was over: 'We workers ask
you to grant us a quiet life. Apply the most severe measures to banditry - public
execution. Moral education [vospitanie] has already gone far enough - it's time to
7°GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 99,155.
GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 73a, 1 180.
72 GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 73a, 1. 174.
GARF £ 7523, op. 89, d. 7494,1 104.
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punish!'74 Almost before the policies of re-education and correction were
implemented, the public outcry claimed enough was enough.
Expressing serious dissatisfaction with the failure of local authorities to ensure public
safety, miners from Stalinskii oblasi' asked Voroshilov to send them 'a battalion of
good soldiers from the MVD's internal forces'. 75
 Others suggested it was necessary to
'bring in the army in order to eradicate banditry as was done in Moscow immediately
after the war - but this time across all the country'.. 76 One citizen wrote that the
volunteer brigades introduced in 1959 were simply 'not strong enough to stand up to
the armed bandits'!
In addition to labelling offender 'bandits' and 'enemies', letter-writers also labelled
them 'parasites'. As early as 1955, such metaphors were common in letters addressed
to the Supreme Soviet. One letter began by praising the high 'ideological and moral'
level of Soviet people, which it quickly contrasted with the murky ways of thieves
and bandits - 'morally fallen people who have lost all appearance of being human
[poteriavshikh oblik cheloveka]'. Using terms that were becoming common, they
wrote: 'They hold nothing sacred, they are parasites on the body of society.' 78
 Calling
for more dramatic measures to be taken against a broad and often ill-defined group of
offenders, letter-writers frequently wrote of the need to 'isolate these parasites'!
7'GARFL7523,op. 89, d. 7494,1 108.
7'GARF f. 7523, op. 89, d. 7494,!. 105.
" GARF £7523, op. 89, d. 7272., 11.7-8.
' GARF £7523, op. 95, d. 73;!. 168.
7'GARF £7523, op. 107, d. 189,1. 80.
7'Letters from Axzamasskaia oblast' and Stavropol' wrote of the need of isolating parasites. GARF £
7523, op. 107, d. 189,11. 73-4.
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In 1957, the rendering of criminals as 'parasites' was briefly given official sanction in
the publication of a proposed law against parasites. Entitled 'On intensifying the
battle against anti-social, parasitic fparaziticheskieJ elements', the draft law intended
to give power to local communities, in the fonn of street committees with the mandate
of sending into exile those considered to lead a 'parasitic' way of life. 80 The proposed
law was not implemented until 1961, however, and the press, as has been
demonstrated, overwhelmingly promoted notions of correction over 'isolation'. 8 ' Yet
both before and after 1957, Soviet citizens used this rhetoric to cast out anti-social
elements. In 1960, a certain S. E. Taranov, aged 66, a former miner and war veteran,
wrote from Novocherkassk: 'The people aren't happy with such mild measures
against parasites, and I think that a bandit and anyone who kills a man are class
enemies. We need to wipe them from our earth.' By labelling offenders class
enemies, bandits, and parasites, Taranov deprived them in the process of any human
attributes and denied them the right to exist. Employees from the communal bank in
Stavropol complained about a broad cast of offenders, including 'thieves, recidivists,
murderers, pillagers, hooligans', whom they too labelled 'parasites'. Calling for new
measures, they told readers at the Supreme Soviet that it was necessary to 'clean our
society of the rotten parasites'. Arguing in favour of life-sentences, they totally
dismissed notions of correction, whether within society or through imprisonment.
They considered prison a 'breeding-ground for infection' (rassadniki zarazy), but this
was not a reason to reduce custodial sentence in their eyes, but rather grounds for
This was publicised in the press: see for exan,1e Moskoickaia pravda, 23 August 1957, p.2.
"The anti-parasite law was introduced almost immediately in some of the smaller republics, but not
until the swnn of 1961 in Russia, Ukraine, Beloxussia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moldavia.
'2 GARF f. 7523, op. 95, d. 73a, L 180.
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keeping the two worlds apart. 83 Using established metaphors of infection and disease,
they called for anti-social elements to be isolated indefinitely.TM
Many championed a return to the segregations of the Stalinist era. In keeping with the
portrayal of criminals as 'parasites', many called for them to be isolated from the
healthy body of society. The Komsomol members from Cherepovets suggested that in
place of re-education policies, 'there should be a law that if you end up in prison a
second time, then you lose your freedom for the rest of your life'. They proposed
creating 'separate settlements for them'. 85
 The Stavropol bankers wanted hooligans,
thieves, murderers, and pillagers to be sentenced to special camps for the rest of their
lives, living 'in strict isolation from society'. V. V. Polynev, the Dnepropetrovsk
inhabitant, suggested that the 'hooligans' should not be allowed to return to the south,
but 'be sent off only to the north, and after the end of their sentence, made to stay
there for ever'. 87 Whereas once isolation had been regarded as a temporary solution,
these citizens wanted those rejected from society to be cast out indefinitely.
Calls for the death sentence to be applied more frequently were also widespread. One
letter demanding murderers be sentenced to death was signed by 625 citizens.ss Not
only was the death sentence to be used to rid the country of its worst criminals, it was
GARF L 7523, op. 89, d. 7494,11. 103-4.
'4 Beer, 'The Hygiene of Souls'.
' GARF £7523, op. 95, d. 73a, 1 174.
'6 GARF £ 7523, op. 89, d. 7494, L 103.
17 GARFI:7523,op95d.73a,L 184.!tseemsagreaternumberofletterscaniefromtheindustrial
zones of southern Russia and Eastern Ukraine, and from towns at 101 kiloinelres from a major city,
where those denied access to the matropolis would congregate. These areas would prove more volatile.
Unrest reached a climax in Moscow's satellite towns in Vladimir oblast' in 1961 and in the
Novocherkassk riots of 1962. For a detailed account of events inNovocherkassk see Samuel H. Baron,
Bloody Saturday us the Soviet Union: Nvcherkassk 1962 (Stanford, CaliL: Stanford Univeraity
Press, 2001); on the riots in Murom and Aleksandrov (Vladimir oblast'), see Kozlov, Mass UprLrings,
pp. 193-214.
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to be applied as a public spectacle, allowing the collective to express its antipathy to
those who broke its laws. One inhabitant of the town of Bogoroditsk in Tula oblast'
suggested that people who had committed murder be publicly slxt, 'as they do in
China'.89 From the city of Tula itself, workers demanded that 'criminals who
slaughter people' be 'hanged in front of the whole people on the town square'. 9° A
collective letter from Novosibirsk stated:
In Leningrad at the end of the war four Germans were hung on the central
square for their evil deeds. Why can't the bandits be punished for their
bestial [zversldi] crimes in the same way? We Soviet citizens demand
public punishment like this [...]'
Even harsher proposals came from E. A. Zotova, an inhabitant of Stalino, who had
been robbed of her savings. In a somewhat confused sequence, she wanted 'these
animals [...] executed, quartered, and exiled for life'. 92 References to China and war-
time executions of Germans remind us that there was no precedent of public
execution even under the most brutal years of Stalinist rule. Under Stalin, the
'performance' of punishment had been enacted through language and symbolic acts.
Now, however, some Soviet citizens wanted a spectacle that coulid be reproduced in
their own localities and in which they could participate. It would become a means to
reaffirm their identity as 'decent citizens' or 'decent workers' in stark contrast to the
'animals' so violently contesting their control of public space. At the same time it
would satisfy the desire for new collective rituals to replace those disappearing with
the decline of performative culture ushered in by Stalin's death and the Secret Speech.
"GARF f. 7523, op. 95, d. 73a, II. 168-9.
'9 GARF f 8131, op. 32, d. 5663, L 12.
'° GARF f. 7523, op. 95, d. 73a, L 76.
"GARPf.7523,cp.95,d.73a,L 172.
'2 GARF L 7523, op. 95, d. 73; 1 179.
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Many writers set pen to paper to defend the imagined boundary between law-abiding
citizens on the one hand and offenders on the other. Within early Soviet debates on
how to treat offenders and enemies, the notion of correction and cure had been
continually threatened by demands for the diseased to be either isolated or
exterminated. During the 1 950s, as the state proclaimed its commitment to healing
within society, the Soviet public became highly vociferous in its demands for them to
be isolated once more and for their banishment to be a permanent exile. More extreme
still were the demands for extermination, often imagined as a public spectacle that
might satisfy the popular demand for new rituals of vilification in this post-Stalin era.
The Refreat from Radicalism
Chapter I explored how party leaders and newspapers were loath to ignore the rise in
letter-writing that followed the 1953 amnesty. Throughout the 1950s, both continued
to pay attention to the incoming letters. By 1958, officials at the Supreme Soviet
charged with handling these letters, considered them of sufficient significance to write
to the Central Committee, drawing its attention to the worrying levels of crime across
the nation and the public outrage that accompanied it.93 Newspaper editors equally
paid tribute to the public angst manifested in such letters. In the same year, the editors
ofMoskovskaiapravda chose to publish a collective letter from members of the
Institute of Oceanology, in which the authors demanded that the 'swine' who killed
one of their young colleagues be sentenced to death. Later the same year,
GARF £7523, op. 89, d. 7266,121.
' 'Show Murderers No Mercy!', MoskorkaiaprawIa, l4March 1958, p.3.
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Komsomol 'skaia pravda printed a collective letter from surgeons at a Moscow
hospital, outraged by the murder of a young Komsomol member.95
By late 1959, alongside the deluge of propaganda materials on re-education, there an
occasional challenge was made to the prevailing rhetoric of rehabilitation. After the
first negative reports from procurators across the nation arrived in Moscow in
December 1959, the press tentatively voiced criticism of the new policies. Under the
rubric 'From the courtroom', the story of Pave! Lavrukhin, for example, can be read
as a challenge to the whole rhetoric of 're-education'Y A drunkard and hooligan,
Lavrukhin had been taken into police custody six times. He appeared drunk at work,
created scandals at home, and assaulted his neighbours. Despite work-place meetings
devoted to his behaviour, he failed to change and after a particularly violent evening,
he was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. At odds with the message
so often proclaimed in the press articles of 1959, the reformation of a drunk hooligan
was here placed beyond the scope of the collective organs. When the community met
to discuss his misdemeanours, Lavrukbin made 'a speech of repentance', promising
not to touch a drop of vodka ever again. Depicting him in a violently drunken state the
very same evening, the article invited the reader to treat such confessions as mere
theatrics. At his trial, the accused complained that he 'wasn't given a moral
education' (menia ne vospityval. Jn Lavrukbin's mocking manipulation of the
rhetoric of 'correction', the concept itself was undermined. Just as back page crime
reports had subverted the official commitment to 'humanity' in 1953, depicting those
Komsomol'skaia pravda, 5 October 1958.
'Kogda obshchestvennost' ne mozhet poruchitsia', Moskovrkaia pnzvda, 20 December 1959, p.3. It
is perhaps significant that this article appeared after the negative reports arrived from the provincial
procurators in December 1959.
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amnestied as out-and-out criminals, the rubric was now used to question the party's
commitment to correction within the community.
The following year, an article entitled "I want probation", was even more
emphatic? The story told of four offenders who sought to avoid incarceration by
persuading their work collective to apply for guardianship over them. Their crimes
were varied, and included the deputy director of a shop who consistently swindled the
finn, a burglar, a conman, and a young factory worker who had attacked a group of
young girls and threatened to knife them. In each case, the article not only showed
how their crimes made them totally unsuitable for rehabilitation within the
community, but also demonsirated how each offender manipulated the rhetoric of 're-
education'. The shop deputy-director, for instance, begged the local procurator to let
him be adopted by his old workplace, asking 'Why are you planning to sentence me,
if the 'people' [narod] will take responsibility for my probation? I need to be re-
educated, not judged!' Out of the mouth of such a reprehensible character, the words
were clearly to be distrusted. Meanwhile the burglar was told to 're-educate himself,
and 'do it behind bars!' Correction was thus once more relocated to the site of
imprisonment. In the place of the rhetoric of conversion, in fact, a highly antagonistic
approach was taken to these offenders. The reader was told that the burglar was a
'swine who should be isolated from society and punished with all the severity of the
law!' Even though the article conceded that 'when a man has stumbled, not
understanding that he has erred onto the slippery slope of crime, it is possible and
necessary to rehabilitate him within society', it firmly concluded that this 'does not
mean that we should mollycoddle hardened bandits'. While still paying tribute to the
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official backing for the practice of social rehabilitation, this 1960 article aiready
began to adopt a position of greater severity, calling for the isolation of bandits and
swine.
Within a year, the official line was beginning to reject the policies of iocial
rehabilitation, and this turn seems, at least in part, to be a reflection of the public
response. On 7 March 1961, Kalinychev and Savel'ev, senior officials within the
Supreme Soviet wrote to Leonid Brezhnev, now its chairman, voicing concerns about
both crime itself and the epistolary outcry it had generated. Initially praising the
measures adopted in 1959, they swiftly moved on to doubt their effectiveness, noting
rising crime in 1960 and the accompanying influx of letters, mostly coming from
large industrial cities in Russia and the Ukraine. This led Kalinychev and Savel'ev to
question the practices of re-education within society. Weak participation on the part
of the collective, they wrote, frequently resulted in those on probation re-offending.98
Already, the heyday of re-education within society was over. By 19611 the number of
prisoners granted reprieve from custodial sentences and transferred to the auspices of
community organs for probation and re-education, had almost halved in comparison
with the preceding year? Minor offences were now to be rewarded with short
stretches in prison, rather than re-education or probation, and the inevitable result was
a dramatic increase in the Gulag population. While in 1960 the prison population had
'7 'Khochu na porukL. .', Leningrads*aia prawla, 26 Jw 1960, pp. 2-3.
' GARF £7523, op. 95, d. 99,11.49-53.
GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 109, IL 25- 27.
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been at its lowest in thirty-five years with 550,882 inmates, by 1961, it was back up to
674,080, and by early 1962 as many as 968,080.'°°
On 4 May 1961, the draft law of 1957 'On intensif'ing the battle against anti-social,
parasitic elements' was finally passed.'° 1 Assemblies were to be formed in each street
or housing-block, and on their collective ruling citizens deemed to lead a 'parasitic'
life, could be exiled for periods of up to five years - twice as long as the original 1957
draft would have allowed. Rather than targeting specific offences, the new act allowed
Soviet communities to rid their neighbourhood of those whose behaviour they
considered anti-social. This represented another highly important shift in the way
community action was understood. Instead of acting as mentors to the 'erring',
community activists were now encouraged to act as judge and jury. They could play a
decisive role in ejecting undesirables from the Soviet 'family'.
Over the summer of 1961, newspaper headlines publicised the revised rhetoric.
Typical articles proclaimed 'Parasite, get out of Leningrad!' and 'The people convict
a parasite'.'°2 In these tales, the protagonists were not on trial for any specific crime,
but for a failure to conform to the profile of a good, hard-working citizen. In 'Parasite
brought to justice', another example, the reporter opened with a courtroom scene,
pouring scorn on Oleg Oparin for the way he was sitting, his bored expression, and
'°°GARF £7523, op. 95, d. 109,11.25-27.
'°'The law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 4May 1961 gave collective assemblies the
power to resettle the 'parasite' elsewhere. Similar laws were passed in May and June 1961 in Ukraine,
Belorossia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Moldavia. (The other republics had passed earlier laws that were
now amended to conform to the RSFSR version.) See Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR: An
Interpretation ofSoviet Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 291-298.
'°2 'Narod sudit tuneiadtsa', Leningradskaia pravda, 7 June 1961; 'Tuneiadets von iz Leningrada!',
Leningradskaia pravda, 17 July 1961.
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his generally lackadaisical attitude in the courtroom) 0' The reader was told that
Oparin has already been sentenced for several crimes in the past, including
hooliganism, possession of firearms, and contravention of the passport regime. As be
did not have any official work, the court deduced that be must make money out of
illegal activities, through it had no duty to provide evidence. His persona and past
record were sufficient grounds for exiling him from Leningrad for five years. In
'Parasite, get out of Leningrad!' the leading man was a beneficiary of the 1953
amnesty, and although he was not depicted as a dangerous criminal, this dubious past
contributed to his negative profile. Returning to the city, the young man had been
repeatedly fired from jobs for drinking, and had relied on the limited resources of his
ageing mother to support his dissolute life-style. In both cases, the individual's life-
story included previous convictions, and this was very important in constructing their
profile as un-Soviet individuals. Even if they had not committed major new crimes,
those once cast out were considered unworthy to be members of the Soviet family.
In fact, the type of negative behaviour the 'parasite' demonstrated was often little
different from the protagonist's transgressions in the conversion tales of 1959. With a
previous conviction for hooliganism, Anatolii Selenkov, the anti-hero in 'The People
Convict a Parasite' was already a marked man. His antisocial activities were
catalogued: he rarely stayed more than a few days at one job; he stole his mother's
belongings and sold them at the market; he drank heavily and beat his mother and
wife. These might contravene Soviet laws and norms, but in the late 1950s a
newspaper article might easily have told of Selenkov's reprehensible actions and
subsequent rehabilitation. No longer was he offered the sanctuary of 'correction' or
'°3 'Tuneiadets priviechen k otvetsvennosti', Moskovskaia pravda, 3 June 1961.
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're-education'. When the collective met to judge him, one factory worker spoke out
against him, shouting 'He has lost his conscience. My opinion is this: Parasite - get
out of Leningrad!' There was no longer any hope of a sinner reforming, and he must
be ejected from the Soviet city.
'Parasite - get out of Leningrad!' (or Moscow, or Dnepropetrovsk, or Stalingrad...)
became a frequent formulation. The imagined Soviet realm was once more divided
into two 'zones' - one an urban enclave for decent, hard-working Soviet citizens, the
other an ill-defined wilderness for offenders, parasites, and all other undesirables.
This new topography pointed to the decline of the more radical aspects of reform.
Belief in the inherent goodness of every Soviet citizen, however much he may have
erred, lost out to widespread fears of social degeneration.
Conclusion
Over the 1950s, the repeated challenges to the new rhetoric of 'correction' and
'redemption', and the contempt for perceived incidents of 'liberalism' and excessive
'humanity', undermined attempts to reform criminal justice. With the re-introduction
of more severe measures in 1961-62, the authorities sought to control the unruly
sectors of the Soviet population, by assigning them to exile or imprisonment.' 04 By
granting street committees an important role in policing these new policies, the law on
' Yoram Gozzllki notes the raising of the minimum sentence, the increased seventy towards serious
recidivists in the RSFSR cnmmal code of 1961, and the introduction of longer sentences in Februaiy
1962. Harold Berman details the extension of the death penalty in 1961 to a wide variety of crimes,
including theft of state and social property, counterfeiting money and violent attacks in places of
impnsonmenL The following year, the death penalty was also extended to attacks upon the We of a
policeman or druzhinnik various forms of rape, and bribe-takmg. He also notes the increased penalties
for lesser crimes. Gorlizki, 'De-Stalinisation', pp.114-118; Berman, Justice in the USSR, pp. 85-6.
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'parasites' also recognised the public's desire to participate in the practice of
condemning and banishing.
In established wisdom, the years 196 1-2 are regarded as the heyday of liberalisation
and reform, yet in terms of criminal justice 1959-1960 was the moment of greatest
change. Although often overshadowed by the XX and XXII Party Congres the XXI
Party Congress in fact ushered in a brief era of supreme radicalism. The Guiag
reached its lowest level since the purges and visions of universal salvation were
celebrated. Almost immediately, however, the reforms were reversed and what Yoram
Gorlizki has dubbed 'the backlash' began.'°5
Tn 1953, 'socialist legality' had referred to the new controls placed on the legal and
security apparatus and the proclaimed end to arbitrary terror. By 1959, 'socialist
legality' had changed dramatically in meaning. The organisations created l monitor
the new mechanisms for collective pressure and re-education were called 'socialist
legality' committees, and the term was associated with the utopian missioi to correct
and redeem all sinners. In 1962 'socialist legality' underwent another reincarnation, as
reflected in its use in a 1962 crime report. Detailing a workplace scam in which
crooks underweighed products and pocketed the spare, the journalist wrote:
When these and other criminals were punished with all the severity of the
law, they began to scribble off petitions, reckoning [spekuliruia] on the
words 'legality' [zakonnost , humanity [gummanost 1. and so on. But in
fact they were sentenced for the sake of socialist legality, for the sake of
genuine humanity and justice.'°6
'°5 Gorlizki, 'De-Stalinisation', pp. 114-118.
'°' 'Poiimny!', Leningradskaia pravda, 15 June 1962, p.3.
223
Ridiculing legality and humanity as textual ploys used by scheming petitioners, the
article claimed that 'socialist legality' now meant strict discipline.
Although an unlikely hero, the figure of Konstantin Nogovitsin encouraged readers to
have some sympathy for those young men who had erred into a peripatetic and
unstable life of crime. Nogovitsin's charms soon faded, however. The picture of
offenders as 'lost souls' who had somehow missed out on a Soviet upbringing -
perhaps as a result of war-time losses - rapidly lost its appeal. In a pamphlet entitled
In a Society Building Communism there should be No Place for Law-breaking and
Crime, A. L Remenson wrote:
Some prisoners claim that: 'I'm not the one who's guilty it was the war, I
got a poor upbringing [plokhoe moe vospitaniel, the wrong kind of
teachers and so on. Poor, unhappy old me - I'm not to blame.' We should
say straight out to these people: 'Don't deceive yourself!' The war
brought almost everyone unhappiness and there were shortcoming in the
way millions of people were raised [nedostatki vospitaniia vstrelis'
milliony liudei]. But the absolute majority of Soviet people overcame the
difficulties, rather than bowing down before them."
The strategies of prisoners who sought readmission and socialisation were now
undermined. Vospitanie no longer occupied such a primary role. The key to being a
Soviet man lay not in the way he was raised, but in the individual's own inner
resources.
'°7 A. L. Remenson, Vobshche.stve, stroiashchem kommunizm, ne dolziuzo byt' mesta
pravonarusheniiam iprestupnosti (Moscow: Politotdel MZ MOOP RSFSR, 1963), p. 19.
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The pinnacle of destalinisation came at a point where the party was already realising
the failure of re-education and correction. The attempt to create an all-inclusive
society had broken down, and the partition between the 'big zone' of Soviet society
and the 'little zone' of the Gulag was once moTe paramount.
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Chapter V
Destalinisation at its Peak
	
	
Pravda, 8 August 1961, p. 5
During the 1953 investigation into Beriia's crimes in Georgia, one of the few
surviving victims, A. V. Snegov, was transported directly from the camps to the inner
sanctum of the Kremlin. According to legend, he was interviewed by Khrushchev
while still wearing his prison clothes.' He was subsequently reinstated into the party
and made a lieutenant-colonel in the KGB. In the Secret Speech of 1956, Snegov was
one of only two living purge victims Khrushchev mentioned by name. With
Khrushchev as his champion, he became politically active in the late 1950s, a self-
appointed voice of reform and a stem critic of Stalin. In July 1961 he urged
Khrushchev, Kozlov, and Nikolai Shvernik to make a full denunciation of Stalin,
Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, p. 11.
Image removed due to third party copyright
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writing that it was necessary 'to decisively shatter the myth of an infallible deity'.2
Attached to his letter was his own version of Soviet history based on his work in the
archives at the Marx-Lenin Institute. 3 He was soon to expound this damning
indictment of Stalin's revolutionary record to a much wider audience.
The triumphant nature of Snegov's return was, of course, unusual. Few of those who
returned from the camps had the opportunity either to explore archival materials or to
share their opinions with the party's leading lights. Nevertheless, Snegov's celebrity
in the winter following the XXII Party Congress offers insight into the mood of
Moscow party circles. According to a denunciation from another Old Bolshevik, N.
G. Alekseev, Snegov spent the winter of 1961-2 publicly deprecating Stalin's entire
party record.4
 Snegov had made his first speech on 30 November 1961 at a meeting of
Old Bolsheviks at the Lenin Museum, followed by a further six or seven similar
appearances in locations across the capital. 'There are rumours,' wrote Alekseev, 'that
in view of the popular demand for Snegov [V vidu sprosa na Snegova v narodel , he
will speak at a meeting for all Old Bolsheviks at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.'
Alekseev was vociferously opposed to Snegov, but his letter suggests that in late 1961
and early 1962, Snegov was enjoying significant popularity as a heroic purge victim
and critic of Stalin. Snegov, claimed Alekseev, was now considered a voice of
authority, his writings were read, discussed, and digested at mass meetings as if an
epistle coming directly from the Central Committee.
2 RGANI £5, op. 30, ci. 350,11.56-57.
3 RGANI £5, op. 30, d. 350,11.58-78.
4 ROANI L 5, op. 30, ci. 378,11.38-44.
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Outraged by Snegov's views, Alekseev contested the notion that Stalin based his rule
on 'bloody tyranny'. Likening the current situation to the years 1924-7 and the party's
'fight against the Trotskyists', he deliberately cast Snegov and his supporters as
outright heretics, repeatedly showing how their views diverged from the official
pronouncements of Khrushchev and Leonid Ilichev. 5 Yet it seems that such views did
not seem so profane to Snegov's audiences. Alekseev could only mention one other
party member who shared his opposition to Snegov. As he condemned the celebrity
status Snegov was enjoying, Alekseev inadvertently indicated to his eminent readers
that few of his party colleagues shared his outrage. With the "Snegov show"
apparently that season's hit, and demands rising for a performance in the celebrated
venue of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, it seems a purge victim could now
become a party hero himself.6
The XXII Party Congress is often viewed as the most radical moment of
destalinisation.7 Whereas the Secret Speech had occupied an ambiguous, only semi-
official position, condemnation of the cult of personality was now made public. As
Stalin's body was removed from the Mausoleum, former 'enemies of the people' like
Snegov were reted as examplars of true revolutionary heroism, victims who, despite it
all, returned home more committed to the Bolshevik cause than ever before.
5 Lconid U'ichev headed the party's department of propaganda and agitation between 1958 and 1961.
'It is interesting that Alekscev was also a purge victim. Despite his dislike of Snegov, be was proud
that following the XX Party Congress he had written a letter to the party suggesting that prizes awarded
in Stalin's name now become Lenin prizes instead.
Breslauer, Medvedev and Medvedev, and Fainsod all consider the XXII Party Congress as the
'culmination' of processes that began in 1956. Fainsod, Khrushchev's Russia, p. 238; Breslauer,
'lthrushchev Reconsidered', pp. 52-5 8; Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, p. 146.
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Perhaps the now public nature of destalinisation prevented the kind o'f crisis
engendered by the XX Party Congress. In the wake of the XXII Party Congress, party
organisations at all levels met, as usual, to discuss, clarify, and applaud the speeches
and resolutions made in Moscow. Comparing the lists of questions posed at party
meetings in the autumn of 1961 with those of March 1956, we find the situation
significantly less volatile. At the Gor'kii obkom meeting, for instance, there was just
one question regarding Stalin's theoretical works, while the rest focused on wider
issues, such as relations with Albania and China. 8 When members of the Man obkom
met, the list of questions posed included several on agriculture, three concerning
relations with China, one on Marshall Zhukov's position, one on the rate of US
economic growth, three on the Anti-Party Group, one on the provision of food, and
one seeking further clarification on how the cult of personality had ever been
possible.9 In Moscow, at the meeting of the Dzerzhinskii raion partyaktiv, the pattern
was similar: there were four questions about Molotov and the other members of the
Anti-Party Group, two on Albania, two on China, several on housing issues, industry,
local factories, and local political figures.'° A few hundred miles away at the meeting
of the Iurev-Pol'skii raion meeting in Vladimir province, delegates did evidence
interest in the cult of personality, with four of the nine questions posed at the meeting
concerning the origins and nature of the cult of personality. Yet the lopic did not
predominate exclusively, with international relations and the supply of consumer
goods to the town also ranking highly." The wider range of questions discussed
intimates that the issue of Stalin's reputation was no longer as dominant as it had been
in 1956 when delegates were so shocked that they focused almost exclusively on the
'ROAN! f. 5, op. 32, d. 174, L 29.
'ROAM f. 5, op. 32, d. 174, IL 259-260.
tO TSAODM f. 65, op. 46, d. 28, IL 57-62.
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topic. Indeed, at the party meeting in Karelia, no questions whatsoever were
registered on the topic of either Stalin or the Anti-Party Group.'2
At these meetings, moreover, support was apparently voiced for the transformed
status of the purge victims. At the meeting of the Ivanovo oblast' party aktiv, one
delegate suggested that local factories be renamed after rehabilitated members of the
local party apparatus. In his proposal, the Zhidelev factory could once more become
the Bubnov factory, while other works would be named after Postyshev, Kolotilov,
and other purge victims.' 3 Another party member present asked for more information
about the local victims of the 1937-9 purges, while a third suggested that collected
memoirs of local Bolsheviks be published. At the Leningrad obkom, a party member
asked whether a monument would be erected to the victims of the Leningrad Affair.M
In an emotional letter to Khrushchev, a certain Shtil'mark rejoiced that the last
remnants of sadness were now washed away, and in their place, a 'granite monument
to the fallen warriors' was to be erected.' 5 Public reverence for monumental
propaganda, knocked off-balance by the Secret Speech in 1956, resurfaced.
Party leaders were once more able to stage a confident and reassuring performance,
and members of the public responded emotionally. When the Martirosian family in
Moscow wrote to Khrushchev telling him 'We have just listened to your concluding
speech on the radio, and listened to your every word without breathing', they might
" Vladimir Oblast' Party Archive, P430, op. 3, d. 824,1 166.
12 RGANI L 5, op. 32, d. 175,165. Of four questions noted, oue was on the problems with China, and
three concerned issues related to housing and the provision of consumer goods.
'3 RG.ANI L 5, op. 32, d. 174,1. 178.
14 RGANI f. 5, op. 32, d. 175,1.34.
'5 RGANIL 1, op. 4, d. 67,122.
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easily have been describing their response to Molotov's graveside speech in 1953.16
Others explicitly stated that their greatest joy lay in the fact that the official sources
now seemed to give them a clear and comprehensible message.' 7 On 28 October
1961, Shtil'mark wrote:
Why should I hide it? I'm writing, and tears get in my way. I listened to
the concluding words standing next to the loudspeakers, not daring even
to sit down. I couldn't hold back my burning tears. Then I got hold of a
newspaper, and I read it through again and again, word for word, and
again I was crying. I had to write to you. In all my long working life, I
never felt such agitation, and never had such feeling towards a political
leader. I simply couldn't not write!'8
He presented himself in a state of emotional exultation as he listened and absorbed the
new interpretation of the past being disseminated from Moscow. In the same letter, he
wrote: 'Please understand me correctly. I didn't hear anything that was new factually
or anything unexpected, but I couldn't believe that I was hearing it all on the radio
from the party's first secretary.' Shtil'mark was thus aware that his sense of triumph
came not from the acquisition of new information, but from the fact that the party had
resumed its authoritative voice.
Party leaders had cultivated this new aura of consensus over several months. Whereas
in 1956, the Secret Speech had appeared without any preparation or explanation in the
press, in 1961 the build-up began three months before the congress opened. First
published in an extended edition of Pravda on 30 July 1961, the draft of a new Party
Programme represented a major attempt to shape public opinion. It explained to
Soviet citizens the nature of their past, their present location on the road to
"RGAN! f. 1, op. 4, d. 87,135.
11 One citizen wrote that after Khrushchev's speech 'everything is clear and comprehensible.' RGANI
1. 1,op.4,d.87L33.
11 RGAM L 1, op. 4, d. 87,1.22.
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communism, and the steps necessary to ensure successful arrival at the destination.'9
In August and September, party meetings were held in every workplace to propagate
the message contained within the Party Programme and to involve rank and file
members in the act of endorsing the new party dogma. In Moscow alone, there were
400,000 propagandists and agitators. 2° By publishing extracts from 'letters-to-the-
editor', each citizen was constantly reminded that his own faith mattered. Excerpts of
letters from ordinary Soviet citizens on the subject of the Party Programme filled the
pages of Pravda throughout the early autumn?' Apparently successful, the campaign
elicited a significant response, with a total of 123,000 letters sent to party organs and
newspaper editors.22
In a retrospective account of the 1960s, two Russian émigrés began their narrative of
the 1960s from 30 July 1961, claiming that all the month's other news events paled
before the publication of the new Party Programme. Petr Vail' and Aleksandr Genis
argue that the practical possibility of creating a communist utopia was irrelevant: the
new programme was read with enthusiasm as a work of art whose beauty lay in its
universality, aspirations, and renewal of faith.23 'With all the mastery of an
experienced preacher, the programme touched the right spot in every soul.'2'
"Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo naroda', Pravda, 30 July 1961, pp. 1-9. Here it
explained that the first Party Programme, adopted in 1903, aimed to create a workers' revolution in
Russia. Alter this goal was attained with the 1917 revolution, a second programme was adopted in
1919 with the new task of creating a socialist society. By 1961, the article proclaimed, socialism had
been achieved and a third programme drafted. The task now lay in constructing a communict society.
°RGAN1L 1,op.4,d.27,L 1.
21 From 16 Septenther 1961 onwards, Pravda devoted the third page of most issues to the Party
Programme, and almost daily it contained the rubric 'Lines from your Letters' (Stroki izpisem). In a
period ofjust two weeks, Pravda received 1290 letters, of which 61 were published. ROAM £1, op. 4,
d. 73,1. 5.
RGAML1,op.4,d.23,L46.
Petr Vail' and Aleksandr Genis, 60-e: Mir soveiskogo cheloveka (Ann Arbor, Mick: Ardis, 1988),
pp. 3-6.
Vail'andGenis,6O-e,p.6
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This chapter opens with the exultant mood generated by the XXII Party Congress and
the publication of the Party Programme. I explore the new revolutionary myths and
the rhetoric of rebirth and renewal, suggesting how they were also reworked and
adapted - according to the particular 'spot' they hit in each soul. Joining Khrushchev
in his vision of the communist future, members of the public accentuated the elements
in the Party Programme that fit with their beliefs. In particular they embraced the
notion that the future paradise was contingent upon eradicating any signs of a non-
communist mentality, be it in the form of hooliganism, drunkenness, or laziness. Its
popularity stemmed from the fact that it combined promises of a better life with a
return to the rhetoric and practices of expelling the uncultured and un-Soviet from the
imagined community. These ideas are brought together in a short case-study exploring
the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Lfe ofIvan Den isovich.
The reactions to this text allow special insight into the nature of public support for
destalinisation. Although the novella was widely condemned as a seditious text, it was
not reviled because of what it said of repression and terror, but rather because the
author appeared to condone the uncultured behaviour and language belonging to the
'other' world of the Gulag.
Having established that a demonic 'other' still remained in the collective imagination,
the second part of this chapter examines the language of condemnation. I suggest that
ongoing popular demands for a return to the political culture of the Stalinist era,
whereby fallen heroes would have been incorporated into public rituals of castigation
and annihilation, were ignored. Instead of being denounced as inveterate enemies,
political figures were denounced as 'brakes' or 'obstacles' hindering the nation's
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progress towards communism. Equally dependent upon eschatological narrative, an
individual might now be cast out as a 'parasite', whose deviant, lazy and un-Soviet
way of life impeded the construction of communism. The portrayal of two different
foes is compared: first, the members of the Anti-Party Group, denounced as the
perpetrators of the purges; second, IosifBrodskii, a young and allegedly dangerous
poet.
Si2npostin2 the Future
As Genis and Vail note, the XXII Party Congress was advertised triumphantly as a
great moment of truth. 'The undoubted bestseller of the Soviet press of the 1960s was
Khrushchev's concluding speech at the XXII Party Congress, which drew on the
dramatic conflict between his desire to tell the truth and the intention of Molotov-
Kaganovich to hide it.'25 Despite concerns over its 'abstract' nature in December
1956, truth became the byword of the era. At the congress itself, a leading Georgian
communist Dzhavakhishvili echoed Khrushchev when he proclaimed that 'for the
sake of justice, for the sake of Leninist truth and in the interest of our triumphant
advance, the party had no choice but to honestly and openly tell the people the whole
truth so that in the history of our great party, this will never be repeated'. 26 The notion
that truth had been restored met with public approval. When party members at school
No 299 in Leningrad met in the autumn of 1961, the director bragged that the XXII
Party Congress showed that 'the strength of our party lies in the fact that it relies on
the people, that it tells the people the truth and the people are highly appreciative and
Vail' and Genis, 60-e, p 139
26 'Rech' tovarishcha G. D. Dzhavakhishvili', Pravda, 31 October 1961, p.2
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proud of this trust'.27 Other individuals wrote directly to Khrushchev, euphoric that
'Truth has triumphed' (Pravda vostorzhestvovala).' Shtil'mark claimed that 'when,
in the auditorium of the XXII Party Congress, delegate No I told the whole people,
things previously divulged to the 'faithful' (posviashchennye, then TRUTH came'?
Capitalising the word 'truth', Shtil'mark understood it to signify something almost
sacrosanct, revered by the people and now restored to them.
Claiming a return to Leninism, the XXII Party Congress became a moment of
spiritual rebirth. A Leningrad party member since 1902, D. A. Lazurkina spoke at the
congress, explaining that she had 'shared the lot of many' Old Bolsheviks. As she
retold her life-story, she created the narrative of a true revolutionary hero. Imprisoned
as a political enemy both under tsarism and Stalinism, she ascribed her survival to an
unshakeable belief in the party. Tying up her emotional speech, she explained: 'The
only reason I survived is that ilyich was in my heart, and I sought his advice, as it
were. (Applause.) Yesterday I asked ilyich for advice, and it was as if he stood before
me alive and said: 'I do not like being next to Stalin, who inflicted so much harm on
the party.' 3° With Lenin speaking through Lazurkina's intercession, the XXII Party
Congress dramatically bore out the belief that 'Lenin lives'. In his letter to
Khrushchev, Shtil'mark echoed the motif of resurrection, writing:
Do you remember how in olden time, believers used to greet each other at
Easter with the words 'Christ has risen'. Today I feel like saying: 'Good
wishes, Lenin has risen! [pozdravliaiu, Lenin vokres.']3'
RGANI f. 5, op. 32, d. 175,1.5.
The son of a Ukrainian purge victim, now rehabilitated, wrote a short legram of congratulations to
Khrushchev, euphoric that 'Truth has triunhed' (Pñzwia ws1o&terIvowila). A Moscow communist
used the identical formulation. RGANI f. 1, op. 4, d. 67,1.23, L 27.
° RGANI £ 1, op. 4, d. 67,1 23.
3°'Rech' tovarishcha D. A. Lazurkinoi', Pravda, 31 October 1961, p.2.
RGANI f. 1, op. 4, d. 67,1.23.
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Shtil'mark's religious analogies suggest that the new atmosphere within the party
created a sense of renewed, exalted belief. In metaphors of resurrection, the 'death'
endured during 'the cult of personality' became a prerequisite for the day's euphoric
spiritual rebirth. Terror was thus embedded into the overarching narrative of
humanity's epic struggle towards salvation.
According to Igal Halfin, 'the Marxist metanarrative assigned a beginning and end to
history and marked out the landmarks between the two points'. Consequently, 'no
event escaped the Marxist eschatological prism'. 32 As first secretary and the party's
appointed exegete, it was thus incumbent upon Khrushchev to interpret the
repressions in a way that conlirmed the party's odyssey towards the light of the
future. In his speeches at the XXII Party Congress, Khrushchev constructed a
coherent eschatological myth, in which revelations about the terror fortified the party
in its struggle towards the communist utopia. Rather than detailing the flaws in
Stalin's character, Khrushchev simply labelled him a 'brake' (tormoz); Stalin's guilt
thus lay in slowing the party in its inexorable journey forwards. 33
 Commending the
party for courageously correcting its wrong turns (izvrashcheniia) and returning to the
path set by Lenin, he condemned the Anti-Party Group for trying to divert the course
of revolution. Khrushchev explicitly reiterated the eschatological nature of history.
Successful revolution involved three stages, he reminded the congress: first, the
overthrow of the exploiters and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat;
second, the building of socialism; and third, the creation of communist society.
Identifying the Soviet Union's location on the timeline, he told his audience that 'our
Halfin, From Darkness to Ligh4 pp. 8-9.
" 'Dokiad N. S. Khrushchcva', Pravda, 18 October 1961, p.9.
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party and people have aiready completed the first two stages' (pervye dva etapa
nasheipartiel i narodomproideny), and he attributed their successes to the fact that
the party had a 'faithful compass' (vernyi kompas) - the doctrines of Marxism-
Leninism.34
Throughout his speeches, Khrushchev consistently presented history as a journey,
using topographical metaphors to show the party moving forward. The cult of
personality was a dangerous leg of that journey, but one that had now been
successfully traversed. In his concluding speech, he said:
The time will come when we will all die for we are all mortal. Until then
we must do our work, and we can and must tell the party and the people
the truth. We need to do this so that nothing like this can ever be
repeated.35
Khrushchev's emphasis on individual mortality served to remind the party of its own
immortality: repetition of the past was impossible, history was linear, the ranks of the
party were moving collectively and inexorably towards the promised future. As in
revolutionary lore, the individual may die, but the party lives on, going forward to the
light of communism Khrushchev's sound-bite would be repeated frequently over
the coming months.
Inspired by Khrushchev, many communists made sense of the horrors of the party's
past by locating them on the historical timeline. At the congress, P. N. Demichev, first
secretary of the Moscow gorkom, claimed that the party had traversed a 'difficult, but
glorious and victorious path' (nelegkii, no slavnyi pobednyi put'). Undeterred, he
'Dokiad N. S. Khrushcheva', F?avda, 19 October 1961, p.1.
" Tvardovskii's preface to 'One day in the Life of Ivan Demsovich', Noyi mir, 1962.11,8.
"Clark, The Soviet Novel, p.49.
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continued 'the Party Programme has opened up even wider horizons before the
people. It is almost as if Soviet people have grown wings on their backs'? 7 IPerhaps
inspired by Titov's recent exploits in space, Demichev drew on the prevalent images
of flight, imagining the boundless horizons opening up to the Soviet people. Yet he
also rendered the 'difficult' past a source of pride: having survived an arduous stage
on the journey towards the light, the party had new reason to be confident ii the
legitimacy of its mission. The first secretary of Ukraine, Podgornyi, used sinnilar
formulations:
We communists are proud that the honour fell to us to build mankincFs
bright future. Whatever kind of obstacles we encounter on the way, they
will be overcome, because our party is the party of Lenin, the party o
unstoppable movement forward, the party of victory in the name of
communism and the happiness of all the people of the earth.38
Reiterating the inexorable nature of their mission, these leading communists assured
their audience that the exposure of the cult of personality confirmed the future
because it proved the party's capacity to overcome any obstacle placed in ilts way.
All across the Soviet Union, party meetings appropriated these myths of fotrtitude and
reiterated their faith in the advent of the communist future. At the Amur obfwm
meeting, for instance, the party secretary was jubilant that by criticising the cult of
personality and overcoming the distortions (izvrashcheniia) and mistakes of the past,
the party had ensured a better future. 39 A letter from Tambov party members even
more euphorically embraced the new eschatology. The town's gorkom wrde to
Moscow commending the congress's repudiation of the cult of personality, adding
that now 'the path has been cleared [raschishchen] for an even quicker advance
37 'Rech' tovarisbeba P. N. Deniicheva', Pravda, 20 October 1961, p.2.
' 'Rech' N. V. Podgornogo', Pravda, 20 October 1961, p.4.
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forward towards communism'. 4° When party members in Chavash oblast' met, a
party member since 1917, comrade L E. Efimov, a victim of repression, said:
Thank you to the great Leninist party, and from the bottom of my heart
thank you to the Leninist Central Committee and personally to Comrade
N. S. Khrushchev, for making it possible for us old communists, whose
lives hung by a thread, to live to see these happy and triumphant days,
when the banner of Lenin's party is emblazoned with the words: 'The
present generation of Soviet people will live under communism.' Glory to
the Leninist XXII Party Congress which has paved the way to
communism!4'
Even a victim of repression could interpret his own suffering in terms of the collective
path towards communism and see the XXII Party Congress as an important landmark
on their journey.
In this euphoric environment, many purge victims felt inspired to contribute their own
stories of symbolic death and spiritual rebirth under Khrushchev. In the early 1 960s,
many of those who had undergone the ordeal of the labour camps put pen to paper.
They wrote not to indict or condemn the party, but to enrich the party's own narrative.
As they despatched their writings to party headquarters or to the editors of a Soviet
journal, they believed they were contributing to the collective re-writing of the past.
In December 1962 Aleksandr Zuev wrote to Novyi mir with his recollections of 1938,
asking if the time had come for the publication of such material - if not, for his
manuscript to be returned to him. 42 The journal's editor, Aleksandr Tvardovskii,
replied that he read the text with interest but was unable to publish it, partly because
the journal was simply inundated with such memoirs, partly because Zuev named his
persecutors and that created 'additional problems for the editors'. Despite the
" RGAML5, op. 32, d. 175,1 201.
4°ROAM £5, op. 32, d. 174,146.
41 RGAM f. 5, op. 32, d. 174,1270.
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impossibility of publishing his work, Tvardovskii told Zuev that it was still 'correct
and necessary' that these pages had been written. 4 When one of Tvardovskii's
colleagues wrote a rejection letter to another memoirist-purge victim, he too claimed
that the journal had received 'hundreds' of such memoirs over the past year, but
assured the author that even if it remained unpublished, 'the manuscript was worth
writing'." The journal's editors seemed to claim that even if publishing such detailed
material on the purges was inadvisable, the act of writing was in itself valuable.
Zuev also sent a copy of his manuscript to the Central Committee, and he was not the
only purge victim to do so in the wake of the XXII Party Congress. In the central
party archive at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism a special fund (fond) was created
for 'manuscript materials relating to miscarriages of justice committed during the cult
of Stalin's personality'.45 Some hoped that the manuscripts they submitted would be
published, others wished to clarify things for the party itself. Fedor Lisitsin had no
view to publication, but hoped that by describing his own experiences of repression in
193 8-9, he could clarify exactly what happened within 'the walls of the NKVD'. He
felt the terms 'lawlessness' and 'arbitrariness' (bezzakonie iproizvol) used in the
press were vague, and hoped to give a clearer understanding of what they meant in
reality. Some felt they had a duty to recount their experiences, both to the party and
to their fellow citizens. Submitting an account of his 'dark past' to the party, M. A.
Panich entitled his memoirs 'Letter to a Friend'. He began:
42 Memorialf.2,op. 1,d.68,L1.
43 MemorialL2,op. 1d.68,12.
Kondratovich wrote to Boris Oliker a rehabilitated party menther from Minsk in May 1963. RGALI
£ 1702, op. 9, d. 109,120.
45 NowhousedatRGAsPlf 560, op.!.
' RGASPI L 560, op. 1, d. 24, L 2.
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Finally I have picked up my pen. It is hard for me to do, for I find it
difficult to remember my dark and terrible past. Yet I must tell everything
to my comrades, friends, and acquaintances at work, as this all has a
socio-political importance.
At the XXII Party Congress they said that it was our duty to carefully and
thoroughly deal with cases like this which relate to the abuse of power. A
time will come, we will die, we are all mortal, and while we live, we can
and must explain a lot and say the tiuth to the party and people... We
must do this so that this kind of phenomenon can never be repeated in the
future.
For many years before this I could not talk to you of this. Now I will try
and put everything bnefly.47
The congress encouraged Panich to think that his contribution to the party's history
was important, and despite the pain involved, he came to believe that remembering
and articulating his ordeal was valuable. When he spoke of mortality, he adopted
Khrushchev's words, echoing the leader's belief that the 'truth' must be told. As he
recounted his emotional response to rehabilitation in the concluding pages of the
memoir, Pazuch wrote that he sobbed 'out of happiness that TRUTH had triumphed,
genuine Leninist truth.'48 Again capitalised, the concept of restoring 'truth' had great
meaning for Panich.
Although the party took a rather ambiguous approach to publishing purge victims'
memoirs, this did not prevent a flurry of writing in the early 196Os 9 Having spent
RGASPIL56O,op. 1, d. 30,1.1.
'R.GASPIf.56O,op. 1, d. 30,125.
Some memoirs were published in the years immediately following the XXII Party Congress.
Although the main thrust of her work is to denxmstnite the ongoing suffering inflicted on 'the Gulag
survivor', Adler admits that in the 1960s the thick journals 'propagated "heroic epoch" tales which
extolled the virtue of victims of the terror who, despite it all, "returned home having preserved the
flame of their devotion to the revolution." One communist Boris D'iakov, introduced his memoir in
the journal Zvezda, by saying: 'My chief aim is to show tiue communists always remain communists
no matter what terrible experiences are thrown at them.' Quite often, published works were the stories
of purge victims who had returned home to prestigous positions. For example, Novyi mir published the
recollections of A. V. Gorbatov, a Red Army General briefly repressed at the height of the purges who
returned to take up a leading position in the Soviet Army. Some grass-roots iniatives at publishing
memoirs were, however, repressed. In 1963, camp sumvor and human tights activi$, Simeon Vilensky
first attempted to publish an anthology that included writings by people who had been repressed, but
his initiative was blocked at the last moment Adler, The Gulag Survivor, p.215; Boris D'iakov,
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much of the 1950s composing petitions for release, rehabilitation, housing and work,
many purge victims were not ready to lay down their pens. No longer considering
themselves outsiders to society, they found the act of writing a meaningful way to join
in the celebration of truth and openness. As they wrote they hoped both to make sense
of their distressing ordeals, and to support the party in its victory over the darkness of
the past.
In the early 1960s, the press frequently labelled the congress a 'compass' or
'beacon'.5° The XXII Party Congress was presented as a key landmark: truth was
restored, Lenin revived, and the relentless advance towards the communist future
back on track. After the doctrinal uncertainties engendered by the Secret Speech, the
party once more had a road map directing them to the communist paradise they
sought.
The Moral Code
In response to the Secret Speech in 1956, not all had welcomed the revision of party
narrative. Amongst those who attached importance to the fate of Soviet symbols and
rituals, the stories of party trials and tribulations held little meaning. However, the
eschatological narratives of 1961 proved more popular. In the rhetoric of 1961, the
communist future was imagined as a haven safe from any crime or delinquency.
'Perezhitoe', Zvezda, 1963.3, 177-196; A. V. GoTbatoY, 'Gody I vorny', Novyt miT, 1964.3, 133-156;
1964.2, 99-138; 1964.3,106-153); SeireonVilensky(ed), Till My Tale is Told (Bloomington, md.:
lmliana University Press, 1999), p. x.
50 or example, on 18 November 1961, Th-awla carried an article on the XXII Party Congress iflen
by a Canadian communist entitled 'Workers' beacon'. On 14 October 1961, the Pravda front page
depicted a large ship, called Lenin, sailing through rocky seas. From the ship, search lights are directed
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Increasingly, those who might threaten this coming utopia were to be excised from the
advancing collective. Although hailed in the west as a moment of refonn and
liberalisation, the destalinising rhetoric of 1961-2 in fact signalled a return to greater
stringency. Where the XXI Party Congress had claimed that all might be transformed
into Soviet citizens of the future, the doctrines of 1961-2 united 'respectable' citizens
against any nefarious influences that might derail progress towards communism.
While in 1959 Khrushchev's eschatological visions of the future had embraced the
whole of society and extended the promise of correction and re-education to all,
access to the future paradise was now restricted. Only if those who failed to comply
with the Moral Code were excluded could the Soviet collective dedicate itself fully to
the task of constructing communism party rhetoric claimed. At the XXII Party
Congress, Khrushchev showed his own intolerance for those who refused work,
saying that 'some people seem to think that under communism, man won't have to
sow or reap, just sit about eating pies.' 5 ' He went on to back demands for a more
aggressive 'battle against idlers and parasites, hooligans, and drunkards'. Instead of
wishing to see them reformed within the Soviet community, he now advocated their
banishment: 'There is no place for these weeds in our life.'
When the draft of the new Party Programme was published on 30 July 1961 it
contained a long section devoted to 'inculcating communist consciousness'
(vospitanie kommunisticheskoi soznatel 'nosti ). It listed at least six characteristics to
this new Soviet man: a scientific woridview based on the doctrines of Marxism-
Leninism; a love of labour; communist morality; international proletarian patriotism;
upwards to form the letters XXII against the night sky, across which whiz three rockets. Next to it, read
the headline 'Faithful compass ( Vernyl kompas)'.
'DokladN. S. Khrushcheva', Favda, 18 October 1961, p. 11.
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a thoroughly developed personality, spiritual richness and physical perfection;
intolerance for capitalist ideology and behaviour. The draft programme allotted
significant attention to the third of these: communist morality, and it became an
important topic in the coming weeks. The draft provided Soviet citizens with a Moral
Code, including twelve principles they should follow:
1.Devotion to communism and love for the socialist Fatherland and
socialist countries.
2. Conscientious labour for the good of society; he who does not work,
does not eat.
3. Concern for protecting and accumulating communal property.
4. A developed sense of social duty, intolerance towards those who violate
collective interests.
5. Collectivism and a comradely attitude to helping others; all for one and
one for all.
6. Humane relationships and mutual respect between people: each human
being is a friend, comrade, and brother to all.
7. Integrity and truthfulness [chestnost'ipravdivoss 1 moral cleanliness,
simplicity, and modesty in public and private life.
8.Mutual respect within the family, attention to the upbringing of
children.
9. Intolerance towards injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, and careerism.
10.Friendship and brotherhood amongst all the peoples of the USSR;
intolerance of any kind of nationalist or racial hostility.
ii. Intransigence towards the enemies of communism.
12. Brotherly solidarity with all the workers of all peoples.52
Under the headline 'The Builder of Communism's Moral Code', a Pravda editorial
repeated the importance of these twelve principles a few weeks later.53 A didactic
text, the Moral Code sought to mould citizens of the communist future.
52 'Prograinma Kommnniiticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza', Pravda, 30 July 1961, p.8.
" 'Moral'nyi Kodeks Stroitelia Kommllni7ma', Pravda, 26 August 1961, p.2.
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Throughout August and September, agitational workers and propagandists were hard
at work conducting informal discussions door-to-door and leading official party
meetings in the workplace. Because of the general nature of the Party Programme, the
meetings provided an unusual occasion for members of the public to express their
views on a range of topics. Of all the issues raised in the draft Programme, the Moral
Code produced the most passionate responses. One worker from the Krasnopresenskii
Construction Complex in Moscow proposed writing the Moral Code out in golden
letters and hanging it in all public places. With portraits of Stalin perhaps already
removed in his factory, this worker seemed to believe that shared moral values could
become the new binding symbol of Soviet identity. If the nation's security was no
longer ensured by the ever vigilant gaze of the leader, then this new rule-book could
act as a new form of defence. Each and every citizen must be constantly reminded of
the rules of conduct by which he and his fellow workers must abide.
Considering the tide of outraged letters penned over the course of the 1950s, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the publication of a Moral Code once more unleashed
passionate contempt for notions of correction and re-education. Participants in the
debates took the meetings as an opportunity to demonstrate that their fury against
'injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, and careerism' went beyond the mere intolerance
demanded in the ninth point of the Moral Code. A Pravda article suggests that there
was significant support for more radical formulations. Under the headline 'Against
vestiges of the past', Ts. Izraileva, a party member since 1919 and a worker at
Chemigov Housing Committee No.3, described the energetic propaganda work in
which their group was engaged. Izraileva claimed that in almost every home they
54 RGANIf 1,op.4,d.27,13.
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visited they encountered demands for more stringent measures to be taken against
those who hindered the construction of comnuinism and calls for a more aggressive
struggle against 'parasites, drunkards, and hooligans'.55
In a sununary of the reports received from primary meetings nationwide, a Central
Committee official commented that there were widespread demands that 'punitive
measures should be used against parasites, thieves, bribe-takers, speculators,
hooligans, and drunkards, alongside educational work [vospitatel 'naia rabota] '. As
suggested in Chapter IV, Soviet citizens had used the practice of letter-writing to
reject the notions of vospitanie advocated by the party in 1959-60; now they found a
new forum to articulate their fears about social degeneration. Time and again,
members of the public took the publication of the proposed Party Programme as an
opportunity to reiterate their concerns about rising crime and to call for more
aggressive measures against allegedly antisocial behaviour.
Information from the provinces suggests that demands for 'the party to announce a
decisive battle against any kind of antisocial acts' and for more aggressive measures
against parasites were common. Reports cited various such comments:
We should clean society [ochishchat' obshchestvo] of parasites and petty
thieves. Instead of taking them on probation, we should judge them with
all the severity of the law and banish them from the towns, so that the
negative influence of these elements does not harm young people.51
Again rejecting the practice of 'probation', petty thieves were rendered as harmful,
contagious 'elements' for whom there was no place in the Soviet city. Another read:
" 
'Protiv perezhitkov proshlogo', &avda, 8 October 1961, p.3.
'RGANIL 1, op. 4, d. 27,1 11.
RGANI L 1, op. 4, d. 29,1 121.
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Where it [the Party Programme] talks about parasites, it should add that
these people are liable to be shunned by the workers of communist society
and sent to distant places in the country to take care of themselves.58
In Magadan oblast' there were demands for a 'tougher battle against parasites' -
alongside pleas for cheaper cinema tickets, better books for students, and free
breakfast for children. One Leningrad official noted that when the party conducted
discussions across the city and province, they frequently encountered calls for the
revised draft to include 'more concrete statements about the measures to be taken in
the struggle to strengthen social order', in particular the practice of taking offenders
on probation.59
 While the programme's Moral Code simply stated that the 'new man'
should show intolerance towards 'injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, and careerism',
the Soviet public demanded stronger formulations.
Articulating these demands for 'punitive measures' was not, however, deemed at odds
with the rhetoric of destalinisation. Severe punishment of those who displayed
criminal or anti-social behaviour was rarely considered an indication that the state was
'repressive'. In all the debates, one lone voice suggested that the anti-parasite
measures were an abuse of 'governmental and revolutionary legality', akin to the
repressive methods used during the cult of personality.6° Such a heretical suggestion
was wholly drowned out by those who claimed that such stringency was a necessary
precondition to building communism. V. Belousov, the chairman of a village soviet in
Saratov province called for greater severity by invoking the party's own commitment
to the future:
RGANI £ 1, op. 4, d. 28,11. 120-122.
RGANIt1,op.4,d.51,L 16.
'° GARF £ 7523, op. 95, d. 95,1 8.
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In a society that is building communism, there should be t place for law-
breaking and criminality. But while criminal incidents still occur, it is
necessary to punish severely those people who commit dangerous crimes,
who break the rules governing the socialist communitr and who don't
wish to be a part of a decent [chestnyi], working life.6
Belousov certainly did not associate the ruthless treatment of criminals with
repression, but with commitment to the revolutionary cause of building a brighter
future. Although he praised the Party Programme for devoting such attention to
'raising people of the communist tomorrow' (vospitanie liudei kommunisticheskogo
zavtra), one Leningrader also wanted something added about the 'use of force against
those who maliciously prevent us from moving forward'. 62 Again intolerance of
criminality was required for progress along the revolutionary path. A certain
Domacheva, a cook in a communal dining room, commented:
In our country there should be no place for parasites, idlers, skivers, and
other parasitical elements who are hindering the building of communism.
If these types won't respond to educational measures [nepoddaiutsia
vospitatel'nomu vozdeistviiu], they should be punished by judicial
means.63
Imagining a people actively constructing their future idyll, Domacheva maintained
that there was no 'place' for those who were unable or unwilling to participate in the
collective mission. As the nation accelerated towards a golden future, the practices of
exclusion were thus ever more imperative.
A year later Pravda printed another long piece on the Moral Code, this time
expressing even greater hostility towards those who violated it than had been the case
either in the original code or in the editorials of 1961. Entitled 'The most important
principle of the Moral Code', the 1962 article seemed to present itself as some kind of
"RGANI f. 1, op. 4, d. 72,139.
2 RGANI f. 1, op. 4, d. 51,1.38.
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response to the public outcry." Explicitly stating that 'Pravda receives many letters
from decent labourers [chestnye truzhenikij who express indignation about idlers
[lodyri], parasites [tuneiadtsi], and petty thieves [zhuliki i khapugfJ', it articulated a
position of even greater intolerance than before:
Lenin saw in them the damned enemies of socialism [zaliazye wagi
sotsializma]. The parasite lives off others. He is a thief who lives off other
people - not off a single individual, but off the whole people and society.
He is given food, drink, clothing, and footwear, but he himself creates
nothing. The parasite corrupts [razvrashchaet] those around him. He
regenerates (vozrozhdaet] the psychology of parasitism, which is deeply
alien and enemy to the socialist order, and if he goes without punishment,
the parasite encourages the illusion that you can live happily without
working.
Those who refused to work were not simply layabouts, but 'the damned enemies of
socialism'. Drawing on psycho-medical discourses to label those who refused work as
alien bodies and sources of contagion, the article went on to suggest that the Soviet
people were dissatisfied with a merely chastising role, and eager to become more
severe judges. Hostility towards those who refused to take their place in the
respectable, hard-working collective of Soviet society had been growing throughout
the decade. Pravda now not only sanctioned such hostility but also recognised its
popular character.
Responses to the Moral Code reveal the problematic nature of viewing the XXII Party
Congress as a moment of 'liberalisation'. In fact, the same eschatological rhetoric that
condemned terror and repression in fact also nurtured increasing intolerance towards
various forms of anti-social behaviour.
"RGANI f. 1, op. 4, d. 52,11.7-8.
"Pravda, 20 September 1962, p. 1.
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Fi2htin! Ivan Denisovich's VuIarity
When Aleksandr Solzherntsyn's One Day in the Life ofIvan Denisovich was
published in the November 1962 issue of the literary journal Noyi mir, it entered this
complex cultural climate. While many praised the work as a 'moment of truth', there
was deep resentment of the moral degeneracy allegedly displayed by Solzhenitsyn's
characters and outrage at the uncultured and uncouth manners he depicted. For this
reason alone, many considered Solzhenitsyn's text a challenge to the line s by the
party. It was not his depiction of the Gulag or even his condemnation of prison
guards, but his negation of the moral codes that marked Solzhenitsyn's work as
seditious.
In Oktiabr', a literary journal of conservative reputation, N. Sergovantsev opened his
review article by indignantly condemning the 'cult of personality' and lamenting the
suffering of many thousands of honest Soviet people.65 He too believed that it was
necessary to say the 'truth' about the repressions and the camps. This did not prevent
Sergovantsev from fundamentally objecting to One Day in the Life ofIvan
Denisovich. In his view, Shukhov's character had more in common with the muzhik of
the patriarchal village than with Soviet people of the 1930s and 1940s. Where the new
Party Programme encouraged citizens to be 'spiritually rich', Ivan Denisovich lived in
a 'spiritual world that was highly restricted'. Instead ofa passionate sense of the
collective as prescribed in the Moral Code, Shukhov was 'a terrifyingly lonely man'.
Reviewing the literary achievements of 1962, another critic, Lidiia Fomenko,
'5 N. Sergovantsev, 'Tragediia odinochestva i U1j byt", Okiiabr', 4 April 1963, pp. 198-206.
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considered the tonnents of camp life described by Solzhenitsyn a 'tragedy'. Though
she proclaimed that the time had come to 'tell the truth so that this will never happen
again', she too was dissatisfied with Solzhenitsyn's depiction of Soviet man, however.
In fact she preferred the protagonists of a short story by Georgii Shelest' in which,
repressed communists, though half-starved and ill, 'could by their very nature not stop
being Komsomoitsy and communists'.67 In quite similar terms, another reviewer,
Fedoc Chapchakhov, felt it would have been better if Solzhenitsyn had taken as his
heroes people who had somehow remained 'brave citizens of their Fatherland, never
losing faith in the inevitable triumph of the great truth of the people and the party'.68
Instead he found a world where the bad language and thieves' jargon revealed how
the characters had lost the 'moral features' characterising a Soviet person.
Participating in the triumphant embrace of 'truth' and anxious to show their own
support for exposing the errors of the past, these reviewers were nonetheless opposed
to One Day as a rejection of the moral values officially promoted as an essential
element in achieving communism.
Back in November 1962 Novyi mir's editor, Tvardovskii, seems to have predicted the
conning debate in his preface to the text. In his opening paragraph, he encouraged
readers to approve the work as a necessary part of breaking with the past, citing
Khrushchev on the importance of speaking the fruth. In the closing words of his
preface, however, Tvardovskii did acknowledge that some might oppose
"Lidiia Fomenko, 'Bol'shiie ozhidaniia', Literaturnaia RossUa, 11 January 1963.
'7 She refers to a short story by Georgii Shelest', entitled 'Samorodok' and published 6 November
1962, Izvesnia, p.6. In the story, four purged party members sent to the Kolyma gold nunes exhibit
Uue communist behaviour. Having unearthed a huge nugget of gold, they are tempted to hide it so that
they can then sliver off small pieces each day, thus meeting their targets with less exertion. They resist,
however, andhand it all inimmediately in orderto help the war effort
"FedorChapchakhov, 'Nomerailiudi', Don, 1963.1, 155-159.
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Solzhenitsyn's tale. Reflecting the uncontested status of the new rhetoric of truth and
openness, he envisaged no challenge to the story's fundamental acceptability. He did
fear, though, that some overly 'pernickety' people migbt object to some words and
expressions taken from the 'milieu' in which the story takes place. Tvardovskii's fears
proved correct, and it was not only on the pages of rival literary journals that such
views were found. The publication of One Day in the Life ofIvan Denisovich became
an important public event, once more provoking members of Soviet society to
articulate their opinions in the form ofletters-to-the-editor. In the responses of Novyi
mir's readers, we do indeed find that it was the issue of language that created the
greatest furore, even amongst those who embraced the rhetoric of destalinisation,
openness, truth, and party revival.
Such a response is best illustrated by a letter from a certain Greenberg, a Novyi mir
reader from the city of Ukhta and a keen supporter of both Khrushchev and the
journal's liberal editor, Tvardovskii. 7° Greenberg welcomed Khrushchev's promotion
of purge victims as the true heirs of the revolution. A 1ading party cadre himself,
Greenberg was repressed in 1937 and survived eight years in the camps. Paying
tribute to his fellow victims, he said they lived in a world utterly different from the
one created by Solzhenitsyn: 'Against all the odds, those comrades who survived and
are now rehabilitated, did not lose their human dignity.' Greenberg also praised
examples of these resurrected heroes in official culture Recently the film Clear Skies
had been broadcast on Soviet television and for Greenberg, the film offered an
admirable hero: the leading character, Astakhov, is an innocent victim of repression,
'°Tvardovskii's preface to 'One day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich', No%yi mir, 1962.11,8.
7°RGALI f. 1702, op. 9, d. 107,11. 58-61.
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but despite all his undeserved suffering 'does not lose his faith in the party'. 7' Like the
critic Fomenko, he also esteemed the protagonists of Shelest"s tale who exhibited
Bolshevik honour and were symbols of 'moral cleanliness'.
For him, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich was a distortion of Khrushchev's
new rhetoric. He wrote: 'N. S. Khrushchev did not mean in any way for all this dirt to
be raked up under the guise of truth'. Greenberg did not object to Solzhenitsyn's work
from a point of view that can easily be described as 'conservative'. He saw himself as
the promoter of the holy 'truth' that dominated party rhetoric at its most radical in
1961-2, a truth that stood in opposition to something he identified as 'dirt'. So, what
was the nature of the 'dirt' Greenberg detected? As Tvardovskii had predicted, it was
indeed the language of the text that he contested. The whole tale, he wrote, was
composed in the jargon of the 'thief, the recidivist, and the bandit'. He cited various
examples of this slang, which, he claimed, 'makes you sick'. Why, he asked, do we
need to make a cult out of thieves' jargon? In addition to labelling Solzhenitsyn's
language 'the lexicon of thieves and bandits', he also repeatedly designated it as
vulgar (poshlyi) or vulgarities (poshliatina).
Greenberg's dread of vulgarity revealed the significance he attached to good manners.
He feared the appearance of bad language as a threat to established Soviet
kul 'turnost'. Poshlost' - derived from the Russian word poshlo meaning 'traditional'
or 'ancient' - represented a direct challenge to the 'new' Soviet valuesY Ivan
Denisovich's language became associated with the threat of 'unculturedness' that the
71 ChictoeNebo. Dir. Grigorii Chukhrai. Mosfil'm. 1961.
Svetlana Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Eveiyday L fe in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 42,64.
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mass releases from the Gulag had created, as thousands of those excluded from the
great civilising mission returned to Soviet society. The fact that a Gulag returnee was
pennittedto publish a literary text in 'criminal jargon' was of particular concern as
literature had been one of the prime sites for the promotion of kul'turnost' throughout
the Soviet period. 'The culture of speech derived from good literature,' writes Vadim
Volkov, and 'reading was also directly connected with the acquisition of
culturedness'.73 It was no surprise then that Greenberg was so aghast to discover
examples of the criminal jargon promoted in a leading literary journal. He asked the
editors of Novyi mir, 'Do you really have to be a "pernickety" person to disapprove an
approach to literature which flaunts the most vulgar [samyeposhlye] examples of the
thieves' lexicon in our high-minded Soviet literature?' A few lines later he again
questioned why Tvardovskii encouraged 'actual vulgarity' (nastoiashaiaposhliatina)
in literature.
According to Greenberg, the conflict between respectable Soviet society and the dirty
underworld of the criminal should remain an absolute one. When expressing his
concerns that 'this jargon and vulgarity [poshlost]' would reach 'the lexicon of
callow youths', he argued that poshlost' represented the 'harmful influence of an alien
ideology' (chuzhaia ideologiia). Labelling the vulgar jargon as 'alien' transformed the
issue of language into an encounter between two conflicting poles, one 'Soviet', the
other foreign. Soviet respectability was thus at risk from an alien, criminal subculture.
Greenberg was not alone in his focus on the issue of language. In the letters located in
the Noiyi miT archive, it appears to be the single most distressing aspect of One Day
Volkov, 'The Concept of Kul'lurnost', p. 223.
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in the Life ofIvan Denisovich for many of the correspondents. One pensioner
described how he almost laughed at the made-up, criminal (blatnoi) wanls, but was
drawn up short by his own feelings of bewilderment that this kind of 'concoction' had
been published.74 A Russian teacher complained that in all sixty-five pages the reader
would not find a single phrase written in the literary language he had been taught.
Meanwhile, a captain in the Soviet army expressed his indignation that someone who
had received higher education, served as an officer, and was now a teadher and novice
author, should use words that it would take most readers 'years to learn'. 76 For the
captain, Solzhenitsyn's status identified him as a respectable member of Soviet
society - a fact that should have been reflected in the language he empkyed.
A letter addressed to the Chairman of the Supreme Court from a certain A. Mel'nikov
warrants a more detailed reading for it offers further insight into why Soviet readers
were so fearful of the 'criminal' language becoming a part of mainstream Soviet
culture. Mel'nikov's letter began on a topic seemingly unrelated to the uovella:
I am writing to you because I hope you can resolve this important issue.
Much is being done by the people's patrols [narodnye druzhiny] in the
battle against hooliganism. Much is being written in the newspapers about
the moral education of the people [vospitanie naroda]. You don't see the
rampant hell-raisers who spew out foul language on the streets anj more.
Now they quickly take them off to sober up at the police station.
The letter articulated fears about increasing hooliganism that had been prevalent
throughout Khrushchev's rule. Although MeI'nikov was glad that the initiatives of the
late 1950s seemed, in his eyes, to be remedying the situation, he portrayed the Soviet
streets as a stage for violent and rowdy behaviour, populated by hooligans drinking
74 RGALI £ 1702, . 9, d. 108,11. 10-12.
RGAUL 1702,op.9,d. 107,171.
RGAUf. 1702,op.9,d. 107,165.
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and shouting slang and swearwords. He thus opened his attack on One Day in the Life
ofIvan Denisovich by reminding his readers that respectable members of society were
engaged in an ongoing struggle to bring order to the streets. When he labelled
Solzhenitsyn 'a malicious hooligan', Mel'nikov deliberately denigrated the writer not
in political terms, but rather in terms of the wave of unrest he saw threatening Soviet
stability.
Moving on to discuss Solzhenitsyn's work in more detail, Mel'nikov predictably
opened fire on his use of 'criminal words' (blatnye slovechki), words that he too
found shameful and disgusting. Like Greenberg, he designated the new vocabulary as
'vulgarity', writing:
This kind of vulgarity [poshlostl is clearly only permissible abroad, but
here in the USSR the man of the future is being raised, and not the man of
the obsolete past, when the older children taught the younger ones to say
disgusting swear words to their own mothersi. . . Why then is the journal
Novyl mir not pulling the reader towards the good, but instead dragging
him towards the mire [boloto]?78
Mel'nikov structured his text on certain oppositions, between the good and the 'mire',
here and abroad, the new and the old. Abroad 'vulgarity' might flourish, but there was
no place for it here in the Soviet Union. In the 'old' Russia, children were raised in
the uncouth and vulgar ways of their older brothers and sisters, now they are raised as
citizens of the communist future. Mel'nikov saw One Day in the Ly'e ofIvan
Denisovich at odds with the official commitment to raising this new man. In the wake
of the anti-parasite campaign and the promulgation of the Moral Code, it was
inconsistent for a text that so undermined established Soviet 'culturedness' to be
allowed.
' RGALI f. 1702, op. 9, d. 107, L 76.
256
A little over a year later, one Western observer wrote that the discussion of
Solzherntsyn's work 'has now become the main arena for the ever more bitter feud
between the "conservatives" and the "liberals". 79 This fitted with a view popular in
the western academic and political community that Soviet society was divided into
two halves, those who supported reform on the one hand, and those who opposed it on
the other. In fact, SoLzhenitsyn's work was contested not because he wrote of the
Gulag or because he claimed innocent victims were persecuted en masse, and only
rarely because of the unflattering way he depicted prison guards and camp officials.8°
Those who opposed him did not necessarily take up positions that can readily be
identified as 'conservative'. Indeed they often praised Khrushchev for his courage in
repudiating the cult of personality. Within the new rhetoric of the XXII Party
Congress, progress towards the communist future was dependent upon two things:
overcoming the errors of the past (through exposing and condemning them); and
ensuring that the social body was expunged of any harmful elements. Surprisingly
perhaps, renunciation of terror and the denunciation of the socially undesirable went
hand in hand. One Day in the Lfe ofIvan L)enisovich was condemned not for what it
said about the Gulag, but for its unwillingness to criticise weak, uncultured, and even
vulgar characters and for its shocking failure to create heroic examples of the new
Soviet man.
71 RGALI £ 1702, op. 9, d. 107, L 76.
7'Max Hayward, 'Solzhcnitsyn's Place in Coukuiporary Soviet Literature', Slavic Review, 23 (1964),
432-436 (p. 433).
One such exception came from an anonymaus party member who wrote to the editors of KommunLrt
early in 1964, arguing that Solzhenitsyn gave a false view of camp life. Having spent fifteen years
working in the camps, be had made his own impressions of both prisoners and guards, and found they
were qinte different from the ones depicted in (Me Day in the Life ofIvan Denicovich. He claimed that
in reality the prisoners were 'as a rule outright enemies of the Soviet people' and the guards were
'carefully selected', with only 'the best workers' sent to work in the hard labour camps. ROASPI f.
560, op. 1, d. 44, 11. 1-7.
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Prisoners' Reactions to Ivan Denisovich
With greater access to newspapers and books as a result of Khrushchev's reforms,
zeks also read Solzehnitsyn's novella with interest. 8 ' Like ordinary Soviet citizens,
some prisoners found the text confusing, and they too sought clarification from the
editors at Novyi mir. The journal's archive preserves at least five letters from
prisoners, three of which are examined here. 82
 The prisoners hoped that someone in
Moscow might be able to offer them assistance in making sense of things, and one
wrote: 'Help me to work things out correctly in life!' 83 Many were bewildered by the
apparent contradictions within official Soviet culture. The media had spent the last
few years promoting vospitanie and correction, yet the prisoners suspected that there
was little genuine commitment to these conversion tales. Some seized on the
publication of One Day in the Life ofIvan Denisovich as an opportunity to express
their own views on the issues of crime and punishment, and to rail against their
renewed exclusion from Soviet society.
Of the five letters the most dejected and rebellious came from A. Makarov. Well-
versed in Soviet theories on re-education, he used pamphlets and booklets as textual
aids, citing at length from a brochure by A. Kovalev The Psychology and Personality
of the Prisoner and the In dividual Approach to the Process ofRe-education. Using
the regime's own texts to condemn it, he noted its failure to live up to the grand
In his memoirs, one political prisoner later recalled how they sat amund in the bairack as the story
was read aloiuL Leonid Sitko, 'Dubrovlag pri Khrushcheve', Novyl mir, 1997.10,142-160.
'2 See RGALI f. 1702, op. 9, d. 108,11.74-70 (letter from Mikhail Fadeev, a currentzek) and RGAL! F.
1702, op. 9, d. 107, IL 49-5 1 (letter from A. P. Sergachev, a former prisoner)..
RGAL1f 1702, op. 9, d. 107,1.4.
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claims of the 1950s. Having learned that Soviet justice was committed to returning
prisoners to life within the Soviet collective, Makarov asked sardonically: 'In a few
years' time, will I really be working in some collective or other, if out of the 43 years
of my life, I've spent five and half of them serving in the army and seventeen in
prison?' Makarov remained sceptical about the possibility of readmission into society,
and was indignant that having endured seventeen years of hard labour he had not
atoned for his sins in the eyes of society. He complained that his 25-year sentence was
in breach of the promises of re-education made by Kovalev, Remenson et aLM
Concluding that redemption was simply not possible, he dismissed the notion of
correction as merely a 'pretext' (predlog) hiding the Gulag's true function a as site of
infinite suffering. 'I can't find any answer to the question,' he wrote, 'Who needs
these camps, why do they exist? Are they really a method of 're-education', or a
means of spiritual and physical corruption?' 85 By the end of the letter he came to the
radical conclusion that he would never be allowed back:
There's only one way out: death! To die is far simpler than meeting the
daily norms. The only pity is that so many still have to meet the norms
and I have to ask: What is all this for, and who needs it? If I have still not
become respectable [chestnyi] in the eyes of the people, and atoned foir my
crime with seventeen years of imprisonment, then are the people
respectable [chestnyi] in my eyes?
Makarov had already reached the bitter conclusion that a return to Soviet society was
impossible and the regime's promises of re-education empty. And if readmission was
not possible, he renounced life.
Another prisoner, V. A. Lovtsov, likewise believed that the regime lacked any kind of
commitment to its proclaimed goal of re-education. Describing in detail the barbarity
$44	
also cited from Remenson's Vobshche.stve, stroiashchem Kommunizm.
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of life in the camps, he was highly critical of the Soviet penal system for failing to
'correct' prisoners. According to Lovtsov, prisoners in 1950-5 1 - the year in which
One Day in the Lfe ofIvan Denisovich was set - would commonly say that as soon as
they were free they would try to steal a little bit more money, commit a robbery, or
even kill someone. 'Neither re-education nor correction had touched them', averred
Lovtsov. While the Gulag allowed them to become master card-players, it denied
them access to newspapers, study, or training. Penal reform was still painfully slow in
the post-Stalin years, he said, and not until Khrushchev's speech at the III Writers'
Congress in 1959 did the prisoner begin to hope for change. Hearing Khrushchev's
promises of 'faith in man' (vera v chetovek), every prisoner felt that he too 'could
become a human being' (stat' chelovekom). 86 Soon, however, this too became another
broken promise. Commenting on the failure of the amnesties and the high levels of re-
offending, he argued that the authorities had betrayed their own pledge to 'correct'
prisoners. Applied only to petty offenders, the amnesties ignored those serving long
terms, effectively suggesting that as dangerous criminals they were excluded from the
promises of rehabilitation. Lovtsov emotionally claimed that the criminal should be
'forgiven', however grave his first offence had been. 'If you believe in him once, if
you forgive him, he will never be a criminal again.' According to Lovtsov,
Khrushchev's promises of 'faith in man' had never materialised, the practices of the
Gu.lag remained sharply at odds with the advertised rhetoric of 1959.
Lovtsov desperately wanted to be granted readmission to society and wrote
passionately:
UGJf17oop.9 109,1.141.
L 1702, op. 9, d. 108,1.5.
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Do you really think that I don't want to be respectable [chestnym], that I
don't want to live well, like millions of Soviet citizens? But how to obtain
this? How and to whom shall I prove that I want to live respectably
[chestno], that I won't commit anymore crimes? [...] Nobody wants to
deal with my case.87
Clearly despondent, Lovtsov had written to every possible body and institution, but no
one was willing to allow him back into the honest and respectable Soviet world.
Despite his yearning to live within Soviet society, he continued to see himself as an
outsider, recognising that 'I am a son of the Gulag, if you can put it that way'.88
Writing on the 22 December 1962, a third prisoner, A. G. Baev, serving his fifth
sentence, opened his letter with a long description of camp life. In it he hoped to
prove to his reader that the hardships and injustices endured by Ivan Denisovich had
not yet been eradicated. 89 Rotten meat, neglect for the sick, and official corruption
were still the staple of camp life. Such experiences led Baev to believe that no
prisoner could come out of camp life reformed. Typically a prisoner was so corrupted
by his ordeals in the camps and by the loss of his family and home, he wrote, that
upon release there was little chance that he would do anything other than re-offend.
These prisoners embraced One Day in the Life ofIvan Den isovich because the world
Solzhenitsyn described was one they recognised, yet they were both surprised and
concerned by its publication. Realising that many readers had been led to believe that
the Gulag horrors Solzhenitsyn describes had disappeared, they tried to show that
camp life remained brutal, unjust, and destructive. All three bitterly concurred that the
promises of redemption blazoned across the newspapers in the 1950s had been
'7 RGALIf 1702, op. 9, d. 108,1 7.
RGALI f. 1702, op. 9, d. 108,12.
'RGAUf 1702, op. 9, d. 107,118-14.
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broken. None of them could cherish any hope that they would emerge from the camps
as new men or be taken on by a collective within Soviet society for re-education.
While the purge victims could share in the euphoric mood of 196 1-2, the 'criminal',
who had been wooed with notions of correction throughout the 1950s, remained
isolated and excluded. In recognition of the fact that the 'conversion' story of the
ordinary criminal had now been rejected, the prisoners sought to reclassify themselves
as purge victims. Denying that he was born a criminal, Baev sketched out his life
story:
During the war, I lost my parents and became a street-child at the age of
twelve. While I was still a minor, I joined the anny and received many
awards. I was in the partisan forces. But after the war my life, a 'crack'
[treslichina} appeared, and the stamp of Stalin's cult of personality was
imprinted on my life. And so I served fifteen years in prison, experiencing
all the oys' of a life without any happiness and without any hope for the
future.
Orphaned during the war and left to live on the streets, his life-story had some typical
elements of the zek autobiography. Yet he realised that the days of trying to re-
educate or redeem the 'lost sheep' of the war generation were over and he did not feel
it appropriate to foreground this aspect in his narrative. In Baev's eyes, his only
chance to rejoin the Soviet collective was as a victim of Stalin's cult of personality.
Obstacles, Not Enemies
Although divisions between Soviet society and its 'imagined other' clearly remained
and were perhaps even fortified by the early 1960s, representations of the 'enemy'
had changed greatly since 1953. When a party figure erred from the correct course,
the Soviet press no longer leapt to label him a warmonger, traitor, monster, loathsome
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vermin, foul degenerate, or contemptible hireling; a show trial was no longer
considered necessary. The approach taken to the 'deviation' of leading party figures
such as Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov in 1961 illustrates these changing
techniques.
Identified as deviators from the party line, a minority tried to condemn them with
traditionally invective rhetoric. From the tribune of the XXII Party Congress,
Pospelov labelled them 'unprincipled double-dealers' and 'wretched renegades'
(zhal'kie otshchepentsy), 9' while Rodionov commented: 'The members of the Anti-
Party Group have been called dogmatists. This is correct. But what they tried to do in
June 1957 was not dogmatism, it was banditry, it was broad daylight robbery razboi
sredi belogo dnia].'92 Labelling them bandits and robbers, Rodionov fought against
the moderate tenninology that Khrushchev and others used to criticise Molotov,
Kaganovich, and Malenkov. As his statement intimated, his invective proved the
exception. More commonly, the party chose to label them with the milder term
'dogmatists'.
Indeed, the prevailing censure at the congress was temperate. Stalin's old colleagues
were cast not as venomous enemies, but rather as obstacles and hindrances slowing
the collective progress towards communism. In his concluding speech, Khrushchev
prided himself on how differently he treated his political opponents compared with his
predecessor. He indicted Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov on two counts: first,
their role in executing the purges of 1936-8; second, their recent attempts to turn the
RGALIL 1702, op. 9, d. 107,L 12
"Rech' tovarishcha P. N. Pospelova', Pavda, 28 October 1961, P.4.
' 'Rech' tovarishcha N. L Rodionova', Prawfa, 31 October 1961, p.3.
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party from the correct path. Although he labelled them 'renegades', he did not call for
them to be pilloried, vilified, or court-martialled. In fact, he attempted to put into
practice the principles of the Secret Speech whereby those who erred from the correct
path were no longer excluded from society. The three senior party figures were to be
offered work so that they could contribute to society like all other Soviet people?5
Just as deviating communists in the 1920s might be returned to the factory bench, so
Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov were returned to factories - albeit as the
managers?'
As might be expected, the Soviet public was again distrustful of the notions of
correction. Not only did local party committees write their own local stories of the
terror in which Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov played a key role in repressions
committed in their area, they also called for them to be excluded from the party or
even put on trial. At the Ivanovo obkom meeting, one personal pensioner shared his
iniscences of Kaganovich's role in the local purges, finishing his speech with a
call for Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov to be charged. As the meeting drew to a
close, the delegates voted for all three to be excluded from the party, and for
Kaganovich, whose role was so significant in the Ivanovo party repressions, to be
sentenced?5 Later in the proceedings when written queries were submitted from the
floor as usual, the issue of Kaganovich's guilt was again central. Demanding that this
'Zakliuchitel'noe slovo N. S. Khnisbebeva', Pavda, 29 October 1961, p.3.
"First given managerial positions in remote areas of the Soviet Union, all three lived on into old age in
relative obscurity. in the early 1980s, an American relative visited Kaganovich who was living out his
retirement in Moscow, and subsequently wrote his biography; over several years the Russian writer
FeIlks Chuev visited both Molotov and Kaganovich, later publishing extracts from their conversations.
Both Chuev and the American, Stuart Kahan, depict elderly men living comfortably but simply, with
relatively little contact either with each other or other former colleagues. Stuart lCahan, The Wolf of the
Kremlin: The Fiit Biography ofL M Kaganovich, the &rviet Union's Architect ofFear (London:
Robert Hale, 1987); FelIks Chuev, Takgowril Kaganovich: Lrpoved' stalinLikogo apostola (Moscow:
Otechestvo, 1992); Feliks Chuev, Molotov: Polude,zhavnyi vlastelin (Moscow: Olma-Press, 1999).
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'beast in human form be sentenced', one delegate anonymously declared that
Kaganovich's crimes were not 'mistakes' but 'crimes against the people and against
the Fatherland, the like of which have not been seen since the middle ages'? Once
more, the notions of 'error' and 'correction' lost out to vilification.
Events in Ivanovo were not entirely exceptional. At the meeting of the Moscow
obkom, delegates also proposed that the members of the Anti-Party Group be put on
trial for committing such 'grave crimes' (tiazhkieprestupleniia). When the party aktiv
met in the town of Vyborg in Leningrad oblast', Kondukov, a retired railway worker
and party member since 1917, talked of the 'unlawful acts' (fiikty bezzakonnye)
Kaganovich committed as Minister. Kondukov concluded that 'Kaganovich,
Malenkov, and Molotov's hands are stained with the blood of many honourable
[chestnye] and loyal Soviet people. I propose excluding Kaganovich, Malenkov, and
Molotov from the party and handing them over to the people's court.'A student from
Karelia said, 'I consider that Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov should be tried
openly, so that the whole people knows about it.' 95 These proposals not only pointed
to support for some kind of show trial or ritual of public condemnation, but also to a
readiness to use Stalinist rhetoric to label political opponents enemies.
A letter-to-the-editor further reveals how one anonymous member of the public
craved a return to the type of performative culture crafted under Stalin. Describing
herself as a 'non-party Muscovite', the letter-writer described her admiration for
RGAMf5,op.32,d. 174,L 178.
9'RGANI £5, op. 32, d. 174,1. 179.
RGANIf5,op.32,d. 175,L 116.
' ROAM £5, op. 32, d. 175,1.230.
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Khrushchev to the editors of the party newspaper Kommunist. Having lost her
husband to the purges and her son to the war, she had considered herself an 'orphan'
until Khrushchev's recent acts of 'bravery' revived her, implicitly, Khrushchev
became the new 'father' figure. She clearly yearned for another great leader, and
though she approved of the idea of a monument to the victims of the purges, she went
on to suggest it might be better to commemorate Khrushchev as the one responsible
for rehabilitating them. She particularly admired him for his courage in vanquishing
enemies. Khrushchev, she wrote, 'bravely, heroically routed [razgromil] the base
group of renegades [podlaia gruppa otshepentsev] - carriers of the cult of personality
[nositeli kul'ta lichnosti].' He had courageously gone into battle 'against the dark
forces of the carriers of the cult of personality and their overt [vsk,ytye] accomplices,'
and, she wrote, he knew that without such a battle there could be no movement
forward. Understanding the world to be locked in conflict between light and dark, she
idolised Khrushchev for protecting the nation against pernicious, contagious elements.
She seemed to hope that Khrushchev could be venerated as a paternalistic protector
and omniscient guardian like Stalin before him and that he would be fully
acknowledged as the one who had vanquished 'carriers' of the cult.
In these interpretations of the Anti-Party Group, the former leaders were denigrated as
carriers of infection, as a base group of renegades, and as beasts in human forms;
there were calls for their exclusion and even court-martial. Ignoring such demands for
ritual condemnation, the party leaders instead let Molotov, Kaganovich, and
Malenkov sink into obscurity. Despite the consensus established in 1961-2 through
99 RGASP1L599,op. 1,d. 183,11.3-6.
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the party's pursuit of 'truth' and the repudiation of 'parasites', there were still
important differences in the way that political deviance was understood and treated.
Poet or Parasite?
Although official culture largely eschewed Stalinist invective, new ways to condemn
dissenting figures did begin to emerge. Based on popular hostility to the 'parasite',
and supported by the official sanction awarded to such antipathies from 1961, new
strategies were elaborated for denigrating and excluding selected heretics.
Condemned as uncultured, parasitical, and uncouth, IosifBrodskii was a prototypical
anti-hero of the early 1960s.
Unlike the persecution of controversial cultural figures in the 1930s, the campaign
against Brodskii did not appear to originate within the higher ranks of the party, the
Ministry of the Interior, or the secret police. According to one of Brodskii's
supporters, the vendetta against him was launched by a zealous member of the local
volunteer brigade (druzhina). In her memoirs, the Leningrad poet Natal'ia Grudina
ascribed personal responsibility to Iakov Lerner, deputy director of Leningrad's
Giproshakht Institute and activist in the Dzerzhinskii district druzhina. 10° With a
'respectable appearance' (respekiabel 'nyi vid), Lerner had appeared in newsreels as
an exemplary activist devoted to the task of morally educating young people. Initially
'°°iklai Iakünchuk, Kaksudiipoeta (delo I. Bmdskogo) (St Petersburg: Soiuz Kinematografistov
RSFSR Sankt-Peterburgskaia Organizatsiia, 1990), pp. 6-7. Efim Etkind also describes Lerner as
Brodskii's main persecutor. According to Etkind, Lcrner had been a captain m the MVD troops until
1954, subsequently becoming a druzhinik. (Etkind credits him as a manther of the patrol in the
'European Hotel' district of Leningrad rather than the Dzerzhinskii district) Etkind claims that Lemer
regularly extorted huge suns of money from the black-marketeers (fartsovkE) and that in 1973 he was
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obsessed with catching and 're-educating' young people involved in bflack market
transactions, Lerner then turned his attention to those young people amongst whom
supposedly 'anti-Soviet moods' flourished. Prior to the Brodskii case, Lerner had
already organised one campaign against three young poets at the Technological
Institute and presided over the public trial (obshchestvennyi sud) of a vung teacher
who had quit his job at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute. Presaging Biodskii's fate,
the man was publicly tried as a parasite and sentenced to exile from Leningrad.'°'
In his first sally against Brodskii, Lemer sought to stage a trial at the same Elektrosila
factory in the Dzerzbinskii district of the city, and he showed the factory director
pornographic photographs allegedly featuring Brodskii's friends. At the same time,
Lemer used his contacts at the editorial offices of Vechernii Leningral to publish a
long condemnation of the young poet, effectively turning the twenty-three year-old
over to official scrutiny.'°2 When arrangements for the Elektrosila tri1 fell through,
Lerner turned to the Leningrad Writers' Union, where he sought to convince the
chairman, the writer A. Profok'ev, of Brodskii's pernicious influence. !n December
1963, the Writers' Union voted unanimously to try Brodskii as a parasite, and he was
subsequently arrested. In March 1964, a Leningrad judge sentenced him to five years'
exile from Leningrad.
arrested and sentenced to six years' imprisonment as a swindler (moshennik krupnogo mashtaba). Efirn
Etkind, Pvtsess Iosfa Brodskogo (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd. 988), p. 47.
'°'Grudina explains that when the young teacher travelled to Moscow to plead for intervention by the
Konisomol's Central Committee, they instructed the young man to return home and find hinc1fa job,
mocking Lerner's zealous activism. Kaksuddi poeta, p.7.
'°2 'Okolohteraturnyi truten", Vechernii Leningrad, 29 November 1963, reproduced in P7vtsezs Iosfa
Brodskogo, pp. 16-22.
268
Some members of the intelligentsia used the Brodskii case to draw parallels between
the repressions of the Stalinist era and the present, depicting it as an echo of 1937 or
1949.103 Grudina and others, however, have located the case within a new political
culture. Grudina emphasised the rise of the druzhiny:
The decree against the parasites was a sign of the times. Our society was
held captive by illusions. We were promised communism within twenty
years and this promise was proclaimed from the highest tribune. As it was
presented, the decree was a link along the chain that would take us
towards our cherished goal. The parasite decree was used to save us from
all kinds of speculators, black-marketeers and spongers [tuneiadtsy].'°4
Like Genis and Vail, Grudina recogmsed the importance of the Party Programme's
fantastical pledge to constnict communism. Moreover, she linked the reassertion of
eschatological myths to a growing intolerance of any sort of non-conformist
behaviour. Far from remembering the last years of Klrushchev's rule as a time of
unprecedented freedom, Grudina asserted that this era was 'characterised in
Leningrad by one thing - the prominent role given to the druzhiny.' Zoia Toporova,
Brodskii's legal defence attorney, also identified the druzhiniki as principle actors,
writing that at his second trial on 13 March 1964, the courtroom was absolutely full -
scores of druzhiniki on one side and young poets and members of the intelligentsia on
the other.'°5
In the article druzhinniki helped pen for the Leningrad evening newspaper, their
concern for behavioural conformity was evident. Although insinuations about
Brodskii's political allegiances were also made, he was primarily condemned for his
'° In an unpublished letter to Liseraturnaia Gazeta, Lidiia Chukovskaia wrote: 'When I read the first
article about him, published in d newspaper Vechernii Leningrad on 29 November 1963, it seemed to
me that by some miracle I had been transported back from 1963 to 1937. Or, let's say, 1949.' Kak
sudilipoeta, p.8.
'°'Kak suthli poeta, p.7.
'°5 Kaksudthpoeta,p. 11.
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appearance and unconventional behaviour. Entitled 'A Pseudo-literary parasite', the
article began by sketching out an image of the young poet. From the outset the reader
was given to understand that this youth deliberately fashioned himself as something
out of the ordinary: he wore corduroy trousers, and walked the streets without a hat in
winter, his red hair covered in snow. Before the authors even began to denigrate his
poetry, Brodskii had been painted as a nonconformist.
The way he spent his days was also rebellious. With Soviet culture placing a high
value on productivity and health, propaganda encouraged citizens to assign time
appropriately to work, education, rest, and leisure.'°6 Brodskii, however, chose to
sleep late, then take a stroll down the Nevskii, where he liked to flirt with a young
shop assistant in the book-store. By evening, he would invariably find himself in a
café or restaurant, drinking cocktails, often in the company of someone called 'Jeff
or 'Jack' and some girl 'in glasses with a big mop of dishevelled hair'. This daily
routine demonstrated the two approaches taken in the attack against Brodskii. On the
one hand, he was a parasite, an idler who failed to get out of bed in the morning; on
the other, he was friends with Americans, a shady type with a questionable sense of
patriotic duty. In this slur on his patriotism, Lerner and his co-writers recounted how
Brodskii almost betrayed his fatherland during a trip to Samarkand with his friend
Shakhmatov. Having made the acquaintance of an American tourist, Brodskii handed
over copies of his work for publication abroad. Brodskii and Shakhmatov then went to
the aerodrome, where they planned to steal an aiiplane and fly it over the border, until
they realised there was insufficient petroL As Brodskii also chose to take his articles
'°' In 1930 a famous piece entitled 'The Task of Scientifically Organising Byt' laid out a daily schedule
for the worker. The day began at 6am with reveille, followed by 5 minutes of calisthenics, 10 minutes
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back from the American, no actual crime was committed even within the bounds of
this constructed narrative, yet Lerner and his accomplices left no doubts about
Brodskii's intended treachery.
However, this profile of a traitor was secondary to the portrayal of Brodskii as a lazy,
anti-social youth leading a quasi-criminal life. The reader learns that his companion
on the Samarkand adventure had since been sentenced for a criminal act, and that
many of his other friends led marginal lives. Geikhman was a criminal (ugolovnik),
while Shveigol'ts, a bully who refused to work, had already been named and shamed
on various druzhiny posters. Efim Slavinskii was labelled a good-for-nothing, while
Mariamma Volianskaia had abandoned her elderly and needy mother for the sake of
the bohemian lifestyle, hanging out with a girlfriend who was fanatical about yoga
and any sort of 'mysticism'. Brodskii was thus indicted as part of a youth subculture
that rejected official Soviet values such as hard work and devotion to family, and
where criminal behaviour was the norm. Claiming that Brodskii had been
unresponsive to 'educational work' (vospitatel'naia rabota), the article drew on the
prevailing rhetoric of the 'anti-parasite' campaign to call for his exile: 'Clearly we
need to stop fussing over pseudo-literary parasites [perestat' nianchit 'sia c
okololiteraturnym tuneiadtsem]. There is no place for types like Brodskii in
Leningrad.' The article concluded that not only Brodskii should take heed, but all his
cronies who were embarked on the same 'dangerous path'. In keeping with the mood
of the time, however, little hope was given that those already set on the wrong path
would return.
in the toilets, 5 minutes for an optional shower, and so on right through the day until 10pm when the
worker could at last retire. See Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, pp. 20 1-202.
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This first assault on Brodskii presented new ways of denouncing heretics. The real
danger to Soviet well-being was located not in the form of enemy spies and foreign
hirelings, but in the activity of ordinary citizens who rejected Soviet mores. Where the
Stalinist purges had been dedicated to the 'henneneutics of the soul', the secret and
almost surgical delving into the inner recesses of the accused man's mind, the post-
Stalinist world looked for external, transparent signifiers of an enemy heart. If velvet
trousers and an absence of headwear signified a heretic, he was easily visible to all.
This was a significant transition from the Stalinist era, reflecting the new importance
attached to morals, dress, manners, and speech. Yet it also reflected an important
revision of the byt campaigns. If in the late 1950s the impetus had been to identify
those who needed further assistance to become decent Soviet citizens, the mission
now centred on removing those individuals whose behaviour was considered non-
conformist and dangerously un-Soviet. While the practice of exiling 'parasites' could
be used in every district of the Soviet city to regulate behaviour, the Brodskii case was
used to incite the mood of social intolerance further still. In Leningrad especially,
Brodskii's trial was used as a heuristic device, instructing the Soviet public that one of
the greatest threats to Soviet security now came from those who failed to abide by
society's moral and behavioural codes.
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Conclusion
In the summer of 1962, an article entitled 'By way of an exception', offered a less
than laudatory profile of the 'purge victim'.' 07 Using the well-known figure of the
Soviet impostor, a long Pravda feature seemed to advise caution towards those
rehabilitated.' 08 The reader was introduced to the character of Kirill Marikutsa, who
had adopted a false identity and claimed to be a victim of injustice, even though in
actual fact he was just a common criminal and jailbird. The days of 'unmasking', it
seems, were not definitively over. Admonished for a lack of vigilance, the public was
taken to task for not seeing through Mariksuta's cunning disguise. As in the pre-1953
era, the Soviet public was told to be on its guard. The nature of his hidden identity is
highly significant, however. Where 'unmasking' in the Stalinist era had revealed
Trotskyists, rightists, and foreign spies, here the press used the same practices to
unearth a 'common criminal'. Again the message of the article was that the prime
threat to Soviet well-being came not from the hirelings of the capitalist west, but from
its own uncivilised masses, here represented by the criminal let to return from his
Gulag exile.
The article also had implications for the status of the purge victim. Pravda
editorialised: 'A citizen of crystal-clear purity, Marikutsa was treated badly: "he was
repressed" (wepressirova1i). Not now, of course, but "in those times" (xa v to
'°7 'V poriadke iskliucheniia', Pravda, 23 August 1962, p.3.
a recent article, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws our attention to the importance of the 'confidence man'
in Stalinist Russia. Her focus is on the 'social', while here I examine how the figure of the trickster was
employed in a newspaper article in order to convey a political message to its readers. I have little
evidence that the authorities experienced real problems with .tiin.1s seeking to pass themselves off
as 'victims of repression'. After the publication of (e Day in the Lfe ofIvan Denisovich some
prisoners convicted for amntinal acts wrote to the editors of Novyi nur claiming that they too were
victims of the cult of personality. They did not necessarily do so, however, as an act of deception, but
believed that this offered an explanation for why they had become criminals. Sheila Fitzpatrick 'The
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wemia).' Placing the words 'repressed' and 'in those times' in inverted commas,
Pravda began to treat the modish terms of the XXII Party Congress with irony, but as
yet, this cynical approach to their tales was rare. As reactions to the publication of
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich have shown, no one yet challenged the
importance of speaking the 'truth' about the purges. Although the party sought to
restrain the graphomanic tendencies of the rehabilitated, some memoirs of purge
victims were published in 1962-4. Even if most of their writings remained in the
sanctum of the party archive, the very fact that purge victims chose to engage in the
act of writing and to submit their works to party headquarters reflects their own belief
that they were important participants in the party's revival. Unlike the criminal or the
'parasite', these former enemies could join in the celebratory mood of the early 1960s.
If in the wake of the XXII Party Congress, the official repudiation of terror seems to
have caused less controversy than it did in 1956, it was perhaps because the new
eschatological myths not only proclaimed the 'restoration of truth' as an affirmation
of party legitimacy, but also committed the regime to creating a society where anti-
social and criminal behaviour had no place. Renewed intolerance towards those
considered anti-Soviet elements was rarely viewed as a retreat into the Staiinist
culture now so passionately condemned. Instead, fervent revolutionary zeal came
together with a passion for respectability and moral cleanliness that had been nurtured
over the 1950s. With the urgent call to construct communism, violent struggle against
any 'enemies' who stood in the way of the glorious march of revolution was
condoned. Genis and Vail' rightly highlighted the 'poetry' and universal appeal of the
World of Ostap Bender Soviet Confidence Men in the Stalin Period', Slavic Review, 61(2002), 535-
557.
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Party Programme, for in one beautifully crafted text, it allowed Soviet society to
denounce the 'terror', to proclaim the future, and to cast out those who threatened
their cherished image of Soviet society as ordered, respectable, and pure.
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Conclusion
Community activists will catch bandits and terrorists!
(Banditov I terrorLctov budut lovit' obshchestvennikil)
- Izvcstua, 11 July 2003
'I am not a bandit, and I am not an enemy of the people. I am a Soviet person and a
Soviet writer,' wrote Nikolai Kochin to Khrushchev in 1956.2 Claiming his right to
full rehabilitation, this former prisoner and purge victim petitioned for his case to be
reviewed and his individual status revised. His claim succinctly illustrates the nature
of established Soviet beliefs. In Kochin's mind, the Soviet world was bi-partite,
divided into 'bandits' and 'enemies of the people' on one side, the 'Soviet people' on
the other. Firmly believing he had every right to be treated as a Soviet person - indeed
one meriting the elevated rank of a writer - he contested his current position as a
banished outsider. Even while disputing his own fate under Stalin, Kochin employed
'Novyi Taganskii pravoporiadok', Izvestzza, 11 July 2003, p.1. The article explains that in the wake
of the latest terror attacks at a pop concert in Moscow on 6 July 2003, there are proposals for a new bill
to create voluntary street patrols. Strangely echoing the language of the Khrushchev era,
obshche3tvenniki are once nre the key to nintming urban order. In a pilot project in the Taganka
district of Moscow, members of the volunteer patrol included a police inspector, the bead of the local
war veterans' association, and several 'vigilant' (bditel'nye) citizens. The emphasis is on the
interception and unmasking of bandits and terrorists, of course - not on their re-education and
redemptiou
2 TsADKM £ 85, op. 1, d. 513,11. 5-10.
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the very categories created under Stalinism to divide the population into insiders and
outsiders, to identify those belonging to the imagined 'community' and cast out those
who threatened it.
At his trial in 1964, the poet IosifBrodskii claimed he was a poet, 'not a parasite'.3
Like Kochin, Brodskii claimed to be a loyal citizen who contributed to the good of
society through the profession of writing. Significantly, the Soviet mental world was
still divided into insiders and outsiders, yet the terms of definition had changed.
Rather than being vilified as an 'enemy of the people', a bandit, a spy, or indeed a
'beast in human form', Brodskii was condemned as a 'parasite'. The official rhetoric
of the early 1960s still maintained firm boundaries between Soviet society and its
outcasts, but the 'enemy' was imagined in new ways. The term 'parasite', present in
Lenin's rhetoric but largely overlooked in the Stalinist lexicon, had gained new
currency under Khrushchev. It became a common rhetorical tool used to castigate
those whose appearance, language, and daily life marked them as 'un-Soviet', and
reflected the growing importance attached to the moral behaviour of the new Soviet
man.
By the end of the Khrushchev era, the campaign for a healthier byt had rather different
meaning than when first launched following the difficult year of 1953. In the wake of
the first mass releases from the Gulag, the party had sought to convince the public that
even transgressocs deserved the chance to rejoin the collective. Leading ideologues
hoped that by creating the necessary social mechanisms they could preclude the
3 Zoia Toporova, the lawyer defending Brodskii, recorded these concluding words at his trial.
Lakunchuk, Kak sudEli poeta, p. 23.
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emergence of new deviants and criminals. Throughout the mid to late 1950s, the
regime attempted to create a society where every citizen worked to raise the
consciousness of his colleagues and neighbours, and where each offender could be
corrected by the moral will of the community. The final goal was the creation of
communism, where there would be no place for jails, camps, or colonies.
The policies met with limited success. Reduced levels of sentencing in fact masked a
steep rise in crime. By the early 1 960s, the regime faced the spectre not only of
individual and group insubordination, but also outbursts of collective rioting and mass
unrest.4 Moreover, faced with this rise in disruptive behaviour, the Soviet public
remained highly sceptical about the merits of correction and re-education. Not only
did Soviet citizens take up their pens to protest against the perceived leniency of state
policy, they even on occasion took to the streets. n 1960, a lynch-mob of over 2000
gathered in the Zheleznodorozhnyi district of Cheliabinsk, and forcefully prevented
the police arresting a paedophile.5
 Protesting against the lenient sentences allegedly
awarded by the courts, they wanted to stage their own impromptu people's court
(samosud).
On the whole, the Soviet public proved more willing to expel those who failed to act
as a respectable (chestnyi) Soviet citizen, than to engage in practices of re-education.
4 Kozlov, Mass Upriringr, Baron, Bloody Saturday.
'According to Laptev, head of the local obkom, he talked with workers and house-wives
(domokhoziaki) during the protests, and they expressed their dissatisfaction with the 'Iil,eral verdicts'
(hberal'nye resheniia) courts gave to dangerous czi.iiiiials. 'They said that the practice of reducing
sentences allows prisoners to be released early and they often Cmuuit serious crimes again,' he wrote
in a report to Moscow. Laptev's sympathies clearly lay with the protesters, and he concluded that the
fact that many 'incorrectable' or 'irredeemable' criminals escape with such light punishment leads to
'legitimate indignation' against Soviet justice, thus unwittingly revealing his own disbelief in the
possibility of universal salvation. RGANI f. 5, op. 32, ci. 166, ll 57-59. A MVD report follows (11.60-
61).
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Many officials working within the system seemed to have shared these popular fears
of social degeneration, and scorn for the direction in Soviet cnminal justice. By 1961,
official policy underwent an important change, perhaps in response to this ongoing
resistance to criminal reform. In a raft of new measures, the policies of rehabilitation
within society were largely revoked, custodial sentences lengthened, and a rhetorical
about-face executed. Newspapers began pillorying those who transgressed society's
norms and rules, using terms from established Stalinist invective to castigate the
'parasite' as both irredeemable and contagious.
The failure of the crusade for moral education and correction and the propensity to
vilify society's deviants and marginals, reflected the ontological importance of the
'enemy'. In a range of different scenarios, including the release of the Kremlin
doctors and the downfall of Beriia in 1953, the dethroning of Stalin in 1956, and the
attack on Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich in 1961, the Soviet public interpreted
unwanted change as evidence of enemy action. On each occasion, they called for
rituals of condemnation. Thus, when faced with the spectre of rising crime and social
instability, citizens drew once more on the Manichean, eschatological, and
antagonistic beliefs nourished by the Bolshevik creed and popularised by Stalinist
public culture, to violently condemn those whose deviance seemed to endanger
society's progress towards the communist future. In both official rhetoric and public
opinion, this reneging on the promises of correction and redemption was never
presented as a return to the Stalinist past, but was instead embraced as part of a
buoyant and utopian mood that seized the country. If in 1959 Khrushchev's utopian
vision embraced all, by 1961 the euphoric claim that communism was nigh became
dependent upon banishing 'the other'.
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Though initially capturing the public imagination, Khrushchev's promises of the
imminent advent of communism brought their own risks, however. While the nation
may have been happy to bask in the poetic glory of his vision, he dangerously raised
social expectations. Khrushchev's fall from power in late 1964 was to mark the
decline of the eschatological vision.' In political rhetoric, 'developed (or mature)
socialism' took the place of the utopian and poetic notions of 'building communism'
promoted by Khrushchev.7 Where the Soviet press of the early 1960s was filled with
images of space rockets flying into the future and excited promises of the imminent
new world, Brezhnev culture looked backwards. Where in the late Khrushchev era,
the suffering of the past was celebrated in order to proclaim the future, Brezhnev
culture gloried the past for its own sake. Two varieties of martyr narrative illustrate
this shift: in the early 1960s, heroic stories of purge victims were deployed as
evidence of the party's valiant advance towards a shining future; by the 1970s, the
courage of the ordinary Soviet soldier was celebrated as an end in itself, a sacrifice
appreciated as proof of the war generation's bravery, not for any future it might
presage. The motif of the 'path to the future' was radically reworked. On Victory Day
in 1975, Brezhnev proclaimed: 'The path to victory was difficult. Many were lost on
this path, and today we think most of all of those who did not return from the front,
6 Throughout this dissertation, my argument has been to suggest the problematic nature of reform in the
post-Stalin era. While I see this as a fundamental failure in Khrushchev's rule, I do not attempt to
assess the reasons why certain menthers of the Politburo chose to topple their leader in the autumn of
1964. Any history of ehte politics under Klmishchev is still limited by the archival restriction on
Politburo material, and the most detailed narrative of this plotting is still William J. Tonipson's, 'The
Fall of Nikita Khrushchev', Sowet S*udie3, 43 (1991), 1101-1 121.
7 The political scientist Ron Hill claimed that the Brezhnev administration rapidly dropped much of the
political rhetoric of Khrushchev, notably the reference to the 'unfolding building of communism'.
Ronald!. Hill, 'State and Ideology', in Khrushchev and Khrushchevirm, ed. by Martin McCauley, pp.
46-60 (pp. 58-59).
280
who perished defending the land of their fathers, the homeland of socialism.'8
configured in the official rhetoric of the 1970s, the revolutionaxy path did not point to
the shining future, but stopped with the war. Though victory had been achieved, it
became associated with death and loss.
Brooks claims that Brezhnev and his government reasserted the 'old-style
performance with an almost comic banality, decrepitude, and cynicism'. 9 If in the
twilight years of the Soviet Union, this performative culture, though still ubiquitous,
was moribund, by the 1990s it became the object of post-modern play, its symbols
used ironically in art, literature, journalism, and the burgeoning field of commercial
advertising.'0 Yet although the communist state collapsed and the Marxist ideology it
proclaimed was discredited, beliefs cultivated during the Soviet project have not
necessarily disappeared. The division between the 'cultured' and the 'uncultured'
which came to flourish in the 1 950s - against state intentions - continued to be
important both in the late and post-Soviet eras. 1 ' Public fears about crime found new
articulation both under Mikhail Gorbachev and in post-Soviet Russia, as descriptions
of violent acts moved from back-page crime reports to fill the newspapers and
television screens with graphic images.' 2 Responsive to the tropes of degeneration and
'Cited in Brooks, Thank You, p. 243.
'Brooks, Thank You, p.241.
"Theresa Sabonis-Chafec, 'Communism as Kitsch Soviet Symbols in Post-Soviet Society', in
Consuming Russia, pp. 362-382.
"On the rising levels of street crime ark! the accompanying public outrage under Brezhnev, see
Jonathan D. Wallace, 'Youthquake: Crime, Booze, and Gangs among Soviet Youth, 1970-1978'
(unpublished paper presented at the 34th AAASS National Convention Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 21-
24 November 2002). The camp and prison networks continued to nurture a violen1, hostile subculture,
and the Gulag eventually produced its most powerful and radical heretics in the kim of the Russian
mafia. Writing on the mafia, Martin McCauley says that 'some of the toughest crooks formed loose
associations while in prison and maintained these links after they left the gu1ag'. Martin McCauley,
Bandits, Gangsters, and the Mafia: Russia, The Baltic States and the CIS since 1992 (Harlow
Longman, 2001), p. 72.
12 Naney Ries, Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation during Perest,vika (Ithaca, N.Y.: CorncH
University Press, 1997), p. 15. During the Soviet era, the letters of citizens distressed by fears of rising
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moral collapse, the Russian public was a willing audience for such tales. The moral
values and the importance attached to good manners, correct speech, and welI-kempt
appearance outlived the state that had fostered them. Although crime is without doubt
a very real problem facing post-Soviet Russia, the imagined threat of the uncultured,
deviant 'other' is perhaps even greater.
Under Khrushchev, many enemies were released from prison, some rehabilitated, a
few transformed into heroes. In Soviet cosmogony, however, the enemy remained,
though his image was refashioned. The vitriolic invective elaborated as part of the
rituals of the Stalinist perfonnance was now shifted from those once imagined as
spies or saboteurs, modified and redirected towards those regarded as threats to social
order and respectable conformity. These adaptations and reworkings ensured that
Manichean beliefs would survive Stalin's death, the decline of 'performative culture',
and perhaps even the end of the Soviet empire.
crane were usually consigned, unpublished, to the archives; hi the late 1980s they began to be
published regularly in the press. See Ron McKay, Letters to Gorbachev: Life in Russia through the
Postbag ofArgumenty I Fakty (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), and Marina Albec and Christopher
Ccrf Voices of Glasnost: Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok Magazine, 1987-1990, trans. by
Hans Fenstermacher (London: Kyle Cathie, 1990).
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